At some point, doesn't it just become far more likely that the teleporter just doesn't work? I know that might seem like dodging the question, but it might be fundamentally impossible to ignore all possibilities.
2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > The seven first steps of the UD Argument show this already indeed, if > > you accept some Occam Razor. The movie graph is a much subtle argument > > showing you don't need occam razor: not only a machine cannot > > distinguish real from virtual, but cannot distinguish real from > > arithmetical either. Many people does not know enough in philosophy of > > mind to understand why the movie graph argument is necessary to > > complete the proof, so I rarely insist. Maudlin's 1989 paper can be > > said answering to the "counterfactual- objection" against the MGA > > (Movie-Graph Argument). > > > Bruno, I'm not sure why you de-emphasise step 8 of the UDA. The other > steps are relatively straightforward and uncontroversial compared to > step 8. People who encounter the argument will naturally ask, how can > you have a computation without a computer or a mind without a brain? I > think I understand your reasoning (and Maudlin's) here, but it needs > to be spelled out if the UDA is not to be dismissed on the grounds > that it proves nothing about reality, assumed to be at the bottom > level comprised of hard physical objects. > > > > Stathis, you see I cannot doubt about consciousness, so I can doubt only > matter, and my research is in big part motivated by explaining what is > matter without taking granted it exists or what it can be, i.e. my goal > consists in explaining matter from non material entities which I can > understand; like numbers and simple sets (of numbers). It took some time for > me to realize that most people really take the existence of matter for > granted. But then what is it? Despite appearance, physics never relies on > the materialist assumption, except in the background, as an excuse for not > dwelving into what they take, with Aristotle, as metaphysics. Physical > theories are mathematical theories, with conventional and relative > "unities". To invoke "matter" as an explanation for actuality or reality > seems to me as erroneous as using the notion of God for justifying the > creation. At the origin, the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) was an attempt to > explain the mind body problem once we assume comp, and to show the > difficulties of the notion of matter to the materialists. But your remark is > fair enough, and eventually we have to spelled out all the details for > having a proof or completely convincing argument. > I will try to build an argument developed through little steps; like I have > done for the UDA, but note that even for UDA it is rare people tells the > step where they stop to understand. We will see. I guess sometimes that > people are a bit anxious with those matter and I don't want to push them too > much. yet I am very glad you understand it, so perhaps you will be able to > help. I will send, in a new MGA thread, a first step. OK. I will go slowly > (if only because I am a bit busy). > > > You wrote also: > > > 2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > To make a prediction on the future from the past you have to remember > > the past (or at least some relevant part of the past). If you allow > > (partial) amnesia, it could depend on many things including the type > > of computations allowing the amnesia: it makes almost no sense a > > priori. It would be like asking what is probability to get six > > (subjectively or as first person experience, like we have to do > > assuming comp) when throwing a dice knowing in advance that once you > > have thrown the dice you will forget that you have thrown the dice! > > So I am not sure the question can even make sense. I said to George > > Levy a long time ago (in this list) that all first person > > probabilities in self-multiplication experiments presuppose that the > > level of substitution (of brain material) has been chosen correctly, > > and thus serendipitously given that we cannot known for sure our own > > substitution level. > > > Your teleportation thought experiments seem quite straightforward and > intuitive to me: if I am copied to two separate locations, then I > should have a 1/2 first person probability of finding myself in one or > other location. We can assume for the sake of the experiment that the > copying is close enough to perfect, and dismiss the possibility that > the copies will be zombies. So, will the probability of finding myself > in each location still be 1/2 if one of the copies is perfect but the > other is 99% or 50% or 1% faithful, by whatever criterion you care to > define these percentages? > > > > Hmmm... Sometime ago I would have refuse to answer this question. I know > that for the exact and precise derivation of physics from computer > (mathematical) science, we need to be able to answer this, but my point has > never been to derive physics from comp, it consists just to explain why, > assuming comp, we *have to* derive physics from comp (independently of the > difficulty of the task). > But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer that > the probability remains invariant for that too. The probability remains > equal to 1/2 in the imperfect duplication (assuming 1/2 is the perfect one). > But of course you have to accept that if a simple teleportation is done > imperfectly (without duplication), but without killing you, the probability > of surviving is one (despite you get blind, deaf, amnesic and paralytic, for > example). OK? What do you think? > Sometimes ago I would have equate total amnesia with death, but I have > change my mind on this. What is your opinion on this, doctor? > > Note also that eventually the measure of uncertainty are not really > probabilities but coefficient of credibility. They don't compose > transitively. The notion of probability can be used only for the immediate > experience, despite they are defined by a weight on, most probably, infinite > histories (for not getting paradoxes we have already discussed). > > - Bruno Marchal > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> > > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
