On 17 Nov 2008, at 16:22, Kory Heath wrote:
> > > On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to > >> implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what >> Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully conscious >> like you or me, even when implemented either directly in arithmetic, >> or in a mathematical physical universe itself implemented in >> arithmetic (or fortran, whatever). I think your point is just the >> same >> than mine: we don't need a material bottom. > > Yes. We may end up disagreeing about certain details (as any two > philosophers will), but we seem to both hold the same basic position. I have no position (just an argument). Years ago, in a moment of weakness I have mentionned my perpetually oscillating positions, from hoping comp true (false) and believing it is false (true), the bad days, and the goods days hoping it true (false) and wanting it true (false). I mean even my taste is oscillating. But I think nobody should really care about things like that. as a professional, if you want, I care only on the sharable deductive results which is mainly that you can't have both mind and matter both computable. And the related: If MECH is true, then MAT is false. NOT MAT or NOT MEC. Read my post to John Mikes, which has been sent probably when you wrote your's. I am not a philosopher. If you really want to classify me, just say that I am a (neoneoplatonist) theologian (with or without grain of salt). I just take the opportunity of comp to transform philosophical problems into mathematical problems (nobody has to believe in the assumption, nor believe I believe them). > > >> The question for the existence of mathematical physical universe >> (your mathematical physicalism) is an open one. > > I'm a little bit confused by this, coming on the heels of your > previous paragraph. Do you believe it's an open question whether or > not "a person can be fully conscious like you or me, even when > directly implemented in arithmetic", or do you mean something > different when you say "the existence of mathematical physical > universe"? In any case, I take a strong stance on the former statement > - I think we have enough reason right now to conclude that it's > correct. I guess you mean, ASSUMING COMP, and after the UDA-MGA proof. Then, the use of word is delicate, and can be understood only through the understanding of the argument, really. I can make a cautious try. You cannot implement a person in arithmetic, because they are all already implemented in arithmetic. You can' do that for the same reason you cannot make, by yourself, 17 a prime number. 17 is already prime, and persons are already implemented. Now, you can apparently implement arithmetic in our most probable computational histories, note the "s". I say "apparently" because it is an empirical fact. It is enough to implement a computer like the one in front of you right now. And you can implement a person, by yourself in a computer, except you have to solve the AI problem or to implement the universal dovetalier (and then be patient, and not to demanding because you will not been able to extract the people from the universal computation). Now, even in the lucky case you implement a person on a computer, the consciousness of that person will noy been exclusively related to the computer in front of view which executes the person. from the person point of view, she will feel executed by an infinity of programs, inddeed all those already implemented in arithmetic. Give me a bit of time, and I will try to make this clear in MGA 0. This should be understandbale if yopu really 1) grasp the seven steps, and 2) abandon materialism (through MGA or not). The UDA says something about physics, that simple mathematicalism does not say, and it is related to the fact that the UD existence relies on Church thesis, like physics (and more) will be related to incompleteness and the mathematical structure of universal machine ignorance. You seem to forget or to be unaware that, a priori, nowhere in the deployment, does a physical structure arise. Physical structures arise in the "memories" of universal machine, and emerge, in a relative or conditional way, from a non computable (a priori) set of computable functions executions. Mathematical physicalism seems to invoke a program which would emulate somehow that sum on all computations; this seems impossible. But I agree that some facts are with you, it is a mystery (still too much non computable rabbits with comp). Yet if you are correct, then it means that your consciousness is defined by that the whole execution of that little programs. Comp is false, or is true but makes the whole universe my brain. Comp would be true in the weaker sense. Now, even if you are correct, it has to be justified completely from the comp hypothesis. > > >> If it exists, we have >> to explain how it wins the "measure of uncertainty" battle on all >> other programs which reach also your mind computational state in the >> universal deplyment. All right? (this follows from step seven). > > Do you mean that if "mathematical physicalism" is true, we need to > offer a mathematical-physicalist solution to the "white rabbit > problem"? Any theory has to wash out its white rabbits. Any modal realism has to wash out its inflation of inferable possibilities. But I am saying a stronger things. Always assuming comp, of course. I am saying that the question of the truth of "mathematical physicalism" has to be solved. Once you assume comp, it is an open problem. In with my insight I would say there is few chance it could be true. If by mathematicalism you mean that the big thing is a mathematical object, then I think mathematicalism is wrong. Assuming comp the big thing is, well, it has no name. If there is a theory of everything (and everyone), then its has to ba a [no-name]logist theory. despite this we can bet it is no more than arithmetical truth, but only by keeping in mind that this is equivalent to the "yes doctor" act of FAITH. > I agree with that. And in fact, I don't claim to have a full > solution to the white rabbit problem. However, I think the logical / > philosophical arguments against the materialist's conception of > "matter" are so strong, and the replacement of that conception with > the concept of "mathematical facts-of-the-matter" is so fruitful, that > the acceptance of mathematical physicalism is justified, even without > a full solution to the white rabbit problem. Your intuition is similar to Tegmark. I think we can have even physical motivation for mathematicalism. What I say, is that the comp hypothesis makes it possible to translate the mind-body problem into a mathematical measure problem. It does not mean comp is true. It means comp is sufficiently precise to translate philosophical problems into mathematical problems. A bit like newton did with aristotle natural philosophy. With comp you get Plotinus theology, with matter described by a verifiable theory (of course here you need to translate effectively UDA in Arithmetic. This is AUDA, or the lobian machine interview, and that is really the advanced technical sequel of MGA. For that stage, you have not only to understand UDA+MGA, but you have to understand why any universal machine (believing in induction axioms) can understand UGA+MGA. This is a bit less simple, because it points of the fact that obvioulsy comp relies on computer science, and few people in the list does like I use it too much (the F_i and the W_i makes the people running away. ) But this is not needed for understanding the proof of the reversal. > > >>> "Mathematical facts play the role that physical existence is >>> supposed >>> to play for materialists." >> >> I would say "some mathematical facts". > > I see your point, although someday later I might want to defend the > position that I don't really need the word "some". No I agree. If you see this, you have an idea that physics is a sum on all math. Then replace "all math" by "all arithmetic", and you go near. But the game for me is not to defend a position. It is to convince people by an argument. > > >> For that reason I am >> not sure you will appreciate the MGA, because you clearly seem to be >> aware we don't need material stuff. > > I'm interested to learn how similar the MGA is to my own reasons for > accepting what I'm calling "mathematical physicalism". If you have reasons, (other than taste), feel free to share them with us. > It may turn out > to be functionally identical to one of the arguments I've been using > (in my head). Or it may be a complementary argument that I've never > thought of. Or it may turn out that I don't find the argument > persuasive, which may in turn indicate that what I'm calling > mathematical physicalism isn't actually identical to your position. It is certainly not my position, if you mean by my position "what we have to believe if we say yes to the doctor and if (indeed) we survive the comp substitution". Then "my position" is "mathematical physicalism" (a bit à-la Tegmark) is wrong. I remain open that the process of hunting the white rabbits out would converge to mathematical physicalism, and this would be equivalent of making our substitution level lower and lower. If mathematical physicalism is 100% true, and if we still keep comp, then it means I can say yes to the doctor only if the doctor gives me a brain which simulates the entire universe. Well I am thinking here to a Sxhmidhuberian+Tegmarkian universe, and the "truth" is actually even more subtle. To sum up: mathematical physicalism, I just don't know, and I am sure it could depend how we choose to interpret the words physics and mathematics. > Or > I might just think there's an easier or better way to get the same > conclusion. In any case, I think it would be fruitful. Write down your way. We just try to understand each other. In all what I say, the comp assumption plays the key role. My point is "just" that if we assume comp, then Physics has to be derived by gluing conditions on machine dreams. It is an open problem if that can lead to a physics capable of being described by a (computable?) mathematical object. I speculate (only) that it can't be. I could summarize my conclusion(s) in many ways. What I try to show is that the hypothesis COMP is testable. With comp, you have to extract physics from comp, in a precise unique way, then do it (I show a way, there are others) and then compare the comp physics with empirical facts. Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
