While I wasn't around for the original ASSA vs. RSSA arguments on the list here, and I'm sure I'm risking a rehash of things back then, the recent traffic over "adult vs. child" and "AB continuity" seems to revolve around this anyway.
It seems intuitively obvious to me that from a 1st-person perspective, I have to treat successor observer moments with a /conditional/ probability. My next observer moment I face would be selected from among only those where a), I am conscious, and b) those with memories of this one, or more generally, with a causal thread of continuity with this one (unitary evolution of SW). So my subjective expectation would then be the absolute probability of those occurring conditioned on, or given, that the one I'm in now has already occurred. It is an open question (to me at least) whether there are any observer moments without successors, i.e., where the amplitude of the SW goes to zero. If it does not, then this implies that the always branching tree of observer moments has no leaf nodes--rather, it becomes an ever finer filigree of lines, but any particular point will always have a downstream set of forks. This is the essence of the no cul-de-sac conjecture, and the crux of the quantum theory of immortality. If the above is true, then the absolute measure of an observer moment becomes irrelevant; it's clear that as one traces through a particular branch it would always be dramatically decreasing anyway. But the relative measure of my next observer moment to this one becomes the thing that drives my expectations of what I am "likely" to experience. Indeed, some version of me experiences all of them, but each split copy of me can only say to himself, "what I am experiencing now was likely (or unlikely) given where I was a moment ago." Johnathan Corgan --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
