Hi Jesse,
On 30 Apr 2009, at 11:19, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Search MGA 1, MGA 2, (and forget MGA 3 I don't like it) in the > recent threads on this list. Or read the french versions in my two > theses. Or wait I put my last paper on my web page. > Let us see: > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/search?hl=en&group=everything-list&q=MGA&qt_g=Search+this+group > It is more easy with this link: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_frm/thread/201ce36c784b2795/aa1e30fe5b731a40?hl=en&tvc=1&q=MGA#aa1e30fe5b731a40 Best, Bruno > >> >> >> >If you believe that consciousness supervene on the physical >> implementation, or even just one universal machine computation, >> then you will associate consciousness to a description of that >> computation. >> >> But why must I do that? Why can't I associate consciousness to a >> causal structure in the real world that's isomorphic to the causal >> structure of the computation, not just a passive description of the >> computation? > > > > > Because in a particular running what makes the structure causal can > be physically inert. This means that if you attach consciousness to > it, you are attaching consciousness to something abstract. No > problem, both consciousness and computations seems to me abstract or > immaterial at the start. But then, unless you introduce a physical > selection principle (unrelated to the abstract computation), you > have to attach consciousness on all abstract realization of the > computation. The machine cannot know which computation (or which > mathematical universal machine) implements its states, forcing to > consider the whole abstract space of all computations, which > fortunately makes sense (through Church thesis). > > Put in another way: a digital machine cannot distinguish between > real, virtual or arithmetical. Unless magical power not present in > the computations is introduced to select a reality. > > > > > >> Is there a fatal flaw in my suggestion about defining "causal >> structure" in terms of propositions about events and the way >> certain propositions logically imply others > > > > No fatal flaw. On the contrary, it is the good idea. I do this too. > But then you cannot rely on particular "concrete things" to select > one computations among all possible one. You already move to the > abstract, or mathematical or logical. I just insist to push that > idea to its ultimate consequence. The seemingly realness or > concreteness will have to emerge from an infinity of absract, but > well defined, computations. No Token, many Types. Token are types > view from inside. Comp gives an indexical (self-referential) way to > explain concrete token from abstract types. > > > >> (if you take into account the basic laws of whatever 'universe' >> you're describing with these propositions, whether it's the laws of >> physics in the real universe or the laws governing a cellular >> automaton)? > > > > If you survive "qua computatio", you cannot make a consciousness > singular in the absolute. A concrete machine (relatively concrete > with respect to you) can be endowed with consciousness, but from its > first person view, its future (and past, and reality) is determined > by all sublevel computations that the machine cannot distinguish. > > If you attach an evolving mind to a cellular automaton states' > sequence, you have to attach that same mind to all relative > implementations of that sequence generated in the universal > dovetailing, or in elementary arithmetic, and this change the > prediction that the automaton can make about what it can find when > it looks at himself or at his neighborhood below its substitution > level. There are many consequence of this. For example you can > deduce that whatever the physical universe is, it is not a classical > cellular automaton, nor the result of any classical evolving > system. At best, it could be a quantum cellular automaton, but even > this should be deduced from a relative measure on *all* computations. > > I hope this can help, I am aware (and Maudlin is too as he told me a > long time ago) that this point is a bit subtle and rarely well > understood. > > Note that Maudlin concludes that there is a problem with comp, and I > conclude there is a problem with the physical supervenience. We both > agree that comp and physical supervenience are incompatible. I keep > comp as my favorite working hypothesis, and so I attach > consciousness, not to any implementation of a computation, but to > all at once, and only through logical links at some level. > When the computations differentiate up to the point the machine can > tell the difference, consciousness bifurcate or differentiate. It > remains to justify why the quantum computations seem to win the > competition among all computations, but classical computer science > gives clues that this could indeed be the case when we take the self- > referential limitations explicitly into account (cf AUDA). This > would prevent comp from solispisme: there would be a coherent notion > of first person plural. There are also evidences from pure number > theory. > > Feel free to criticize MGA, I appreciate (rational) critics by non > person eliminativist researcher. > > Bruno > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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