Comments below. Bruno Marchal wrote: > Exercise: criticize the following papers mentioned below in the light > of the discovery of the universal machine and its main consequences > from incompleteness to first person indeterminacy. Think of the > identity thesis. To be sure Tegmark is less "wrong" than Jannes. > > Solution: search in the archive of this list where I have already > explained this, or use directly UDA, or wait for what will (perhaps) > follow. > > I should send some of my papers on arXiv, but up to now, only > logicians understand the whole "trick", so I have to better > appreciated what physicians don't understand in logic, before making a > version free of references to mathematical logical baggage. Logicians > are not interested in mind, nor really matter, and physicians are > still naïve on the link consciousness/reality, I would say. > > To be sure Tegmark is closer than most physicists except perhaps Wheeler. > > Also, Tegmarks' argument for mathematicalism is invalid (even with > strong non-comp axioms). But I prefer to help you to understand this > by yourself through the understanding of what a universal machine is, > than trying a direct argument. *I need to get a better grasp on what a universal machine is, yes. I am interested in finding out how Tegmark's argument for mathematicalism is invalid, especially since I'm using it to motivate my research.*
> > According of the part of UDA (or perhaps AUDA) you understand, you can > already see the weakness of such direct mathematical approach. Note > that comp makes physics much more fundamental, and separate it much > clearly from possible geograpies. Above all comp does not eliminate > the person, which Tegmark is still doing: the frog view is not yet a > first person view, in the comp sense. > > Interesting stuff, still. Thanks for the references. *I'll have to think more on Jannes' paper. As I basically resting the motivation of my research on the correctness of "ERH implies MUH," I'm trying to formulate a good refutation to his paper.* --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
