http://www.mindmatter.de/mmabstracts7_1.htm <http://www.mindmatter.de/mmabstracts7_1.htm>
*Intentionality and Computationalism: A Diagonal Argument * Laureano Luna Cabanero, Department of Philosophy, IES Francisco Marin, Siles, Spain, and Christopher G. Small, Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo, Canada Computationalism is the claim that all possible thoughts are computations, i.e. executions of algorithms. The aim of the paper is to show that if intentionality is semantically clear, in a way defined in the paper, then computationalism must be false. Using a convenient version of the phenomenological relation of intentionality and a diagonalization device inspired by Thomson's theorem of 1962, we show there exists a thought that cannot be a computation. ----------------------------------------------------- How good an argument it is I don't know ..... I am in the process of getting my hands on the paper. Meanwhile, if any of you folks can get it sooner I'd be very interested. BTW I have recently submitted my own refutation of COMP to a journal...it superficially resembles a more practical version of the above. Basically.....a computationalist-based artificial scientist cannot propose/debate, let alone test, computationalism as a 'law of nature'. Confusing/self-referential but has teeth as an argument. Q. How many times does it take for dogma X to be refuted before projects totally dependent on the truth of dogma X get their outcome projections/expectations reviewed? cheers colin hales --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
