On 18 Aug, 09:55, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > Any physcial theory is distinguished from an > Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only > some > possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that > is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further > defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.
That's a good start - contingent vs. necessary is a key distinction in theoretical approaches, as I've said. Given that, under PM, just how 'material' do explanatory entities have to be? Perhaps the clue is in the pun: IOW they must obviously be material to the explanation - i.e. their referents must be plausibly RITSIAR. Is this just to say material => whatever-is-RITSIAR? And what about the mental? Is mental => material under a different - but paraphrasable - description? David > > > Perhaps our > > ultimate explanatory entities need be conceived as no more 'material' > > than necessary for us to depend on them as plausible pre-cursors of > > the more obviously material; but of course, no less so either. > > > While I've got you here, as it were - I don't see why this wouldn't > > apply equally to the mental: IOW our explanatory entities need be > > conceived as no more 'mental' than necessary for us to depend on them > > as plausible precursors of the more obviously mental; but no less so > > either. > > > David --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
