On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no > doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive, > assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of > universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which > capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation, > and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent- > contingent obeys laws.
AFAICS the essence of Bruno's dispute with Peter consists in: 1) ***If you accept the computational theory of mind (CTM)*** then matter can no longer be primitive to your explanations of appearances of any kind, mental or physical. 2) ***If you assert that matter is primitive to your explanation of appearances of any kind, mental or physical (PM)*** it is illegitimate to appeal to CTM. Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are compatible). Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form - seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic currently generating so much heat. UDA-8 sets out to be provable or disprovable on purely logical grounds. I for one am unclear on what basis it could be attacked as invalid. Can anyone show strong grounds for this? David > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---