Dear Bruno,
on diverse lists (I cannot call them 'science-branches' since lately most
domains are discussed in considering aspects of several of such on the
diverse discussion-lists) -
CONCEPTS (I wish I knew a better word) appear by different content.
If somebody has the time and feels like (knows how to) do it, a brief
reconsiderational ID listing would help us outsiders to reconfirm what "WE"
mean by
*Comp* - (computing, computer-universal or not,)
The application of (=your relevance of) the *Church* thesis
*Universa*l machine - BTW: machine, or God, as in (our) theology
*White rabbit*, (and I don't even dare write:) *numbers,* -
and in not much than 1-2 lines(!!!) ea:
*UD, UDA, AUDA*, with:
hints to "YES" *to the doctor*, and *maybe some more* -
*
which the 'old listers' apply here with ease (yet *maybe(!)* in their
modified i.e. personalised taste?) - newcomers. however, usually first
misinterpret into 'other' *vernaculars*.
(It is my several decade long research experience to sit down once in a
while and recap
(recoop?) the terms used in the daily efforts. They change by the *(ab?)*use
and re-realizing their original content may push the research effort ahead
from a stagnant hole it falls into inevitably during most "routine"
thinking. -
In doing so, almost all the time there occurred an "AHA".
One cannot do it privately and alone. We cannot slip out from our skin. I
did it with someone knowledgeable in the broader field (maybe even a fresh
graduate?) or on a public lecture, where questions and opposite opinions
could be expected.
Best for the hooiday season: this may be a present for Chirstmas.
On St. Nicholas Day
John Mikes
On Sat, Dec 5, 2009 at 4:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 05 Dec 2009, at 21:00, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 10:35 PM, Brent Meeker
> > <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
> >> Rex Allen wrote:
> >>> What is your alternative to the "everything" universal acid? That
> >>> things just are the way they are (uniquely), and there's
> >>> ultimately no
> >>> explanation for that. Right?
> >>>
> >>
> >> Exactly so. "It's just happened that way" and "Everything happens
> >> and
> >> so this happens too." are both equally useless. Progress is only
> >> made
> >> when we can explain why this rather than that.
> >
> > So, we have our observations, and we want to explain them, so we need
> > some context to place them in. So we postulate the existence of an
> > external universe. But then we want to explain what we see in this
> > external universe, and the only option is to postulate the existence
> > of a multiverse.
> >
> > Nothing can be explained in terms of only itself. To explain it, you
> > have to place it in the context of something larger. Otherwise, no
> > explanation is possible, you just have to say, "this is the way it is
> > because that's the way it is."
> >
> > Right?
> >
> > Basically there's only two way the process can end. Two possible
> > answers to the question of "Why is the universe this way instead of
> > some other way?":
> >
> > 1) Because things just are the way they are, and there's no further
> > explanation possible.
> > 2) Because EVERYTHING happens, and so this was inevitable in that
> > larger context of "everything".
> >
> > What other option is there, do you think?
>
> Well in this list we follow the option "2". (As its name indicates).
> To progress we need to make the everything idea more precise. Most
> naive "everything idea" are either trivial and non informative, or can
> be shown inconsistent.
> QM is an amazing everything theory, astoundingly accurate. Yet it is
> based on comp (or variety of comp), which means that if you take
> serioulsy the first person experiences into consideration, then you
> have to derive the Schroedinger waves from a deeper purely
> arithmetical derivation.
> But with the computable, something happens: the discovery of the
> universal machine (accepting Church's thesis).
> This makes enough to confront all universal machine, actually the
> Löbian one will even understand why", with a "consciousness/reality"
> problem, or first-person/third person relation problem, and that the
> Löbian machine can develop the means to explore the many gaps which
> exists there.
>
>
>
>
>
> >
> >
> >>> So we can take our observations of the world around us and
> >>> construct a
> >>> narrative that is consistent with what we see...a narrative that
> >>> involves big bangs and electrons. But what caused the big bang?
> >>> Why
> >>> do electrons have the particular properties that they have? If you
> >>> propose a particular cause for these things, what caused that cause?
> >>>
> >>> How is that better than a narrative that allows for "everything"?
> >>> They would seem to have equal explanatory power. Which is to say:
> >>> zero.
> >> We have much evidence about the big bang and some theories as to
> >> how it
> >> may have happened which are testable.
> >
> > So the existence of a big bang event certainly seems consistent with
> > our observations. But so does the idea of a Boltzmann style
> > statistical fluctuation from thermal equilibrium. Or the idea that
> > this is just the dream of the infinitude of relations between numbers.
> >
> > We construct narratives that are consistent with our observations, but
> > these narratives are about our observations, not about what really
> > exists. You seem to have jumped to some unfounded ontological
> > conclusions.
> >
> > You can talk about big bangs if that helps you think about your
> > observations, helps you identify patterns in what you experience.
> > But, that's as far as it can reasonably go, right?
> >
> > At the end of the day, we're always right back at where we
> > started...with our observations...with our subjective conscious
> > experience.
>
> I think we have made progress. We "know" (assuming digital mechanism)
> that we know nothing about the consequence of addition and
> multiplication, but that we can explore, and that it is divided into
> sharable and non sharable parts.
>
> We may correct a widespread error: the sharable part is the objective
> and doubtable part, the non sharable part is the subjective and
> undoubtable part.
>
> We have a theology. A "greek" one, by which I mean, that is the bad
> news for some, we have to do mathematics.
>
> And nobody ask you to believe it, unless you decide to say "yes" to
> some doctor and believe that 2 + 2 = 4.
>
> You can call it a toy theology, given that it is the theology of an
> ideally relatively self-referentially correct Löbian machine. It
> exists as a branch of math, and it applies to us if comp is true and
> as far as we are correct ourselves, which we can never known. But we
> can bet on levels, like "nature" apparently already did, and prey or
> hope or something like that.
>
> The quest of truth will continue. If comp is true reality is beyond
> fictions. For the best or the worth, this depends *partially* on us.
> Who "us"? "Us" the universal machines.
>
> The motto: be vigilant toward any *form* of authoritative argument,
> even those of nature. Eventually it is a matter of personal freedom,
> but it is far better to get the personal understanding in those
> matter. All universal machine "soon or later" understands this.
>
> Bruno Marchal
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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