Hi Folks,
I would like to append a question that we all seem to circle around: Why
do we even need to have a physical existance at all? Why isn't Platonic
existence sufficient?
Onward!
Stephen
----- Original Message -----
From: "Nick Prince" <m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk>
To: "Everything List" <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sunday, January 03, 2010 4:30 PM
Subject: Re: UDA query
Stathis wrote
Yes, but a critic could still say that no conscious observer could be
conjured up by a computation unless the computation is physically
implemented. At least at first glance that seems to be the case: the
brain is required for consciousness, since if the brain is destroyed
consciousness is destroyed. And if the mind is generated by a computer
program, it would be normal to think that if the computer is
destroyed, so is the mind, although the program in Platonia remains
unaffected even if the entire universe blows up. These are the common
sense objections. So the question is, is physical implementation
necessary for consciousness, and what does it actually mean to
physically implement a program?
>From what I surmised and what Bruno wrote earlier in the discussion, I
thought that consciousness might supervene over all computations that
were essentially equivalent (whatever that might mean— i.e. some sort
of equivalence class?). Anyway, this would imply that if the brain
was destroyed, then consciousness would simply be continued on by the
rest of the (competing) and remaining equivalent computations.
These would presumably be consistent extensions of the consciousness
in other worlds (MW interpretation) or in a platonic UD.
SP
(and of course, this hardware may itself be part
of the virtual world generated in Platonia).
I thought that this would be a consequence of comp since the
probability of consciousness staying in any “concrete” universe would
seem to be essentially zero. see below from earlier in the discussion:
NP> In other words every observer
moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but
any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in
the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe.
BM
Absolutely. Would a real *singular* concrete material universe exist,
the probability to stay in that universe is zero.
Brent
>I think you give an excellent explication of the problem, Stathis.
However, one thing about it that still worries me is the role of time.
You >say the mapping need not be consistent even moment to moment, and
yet the mapping is a timeless Platonic object. To be a timeless
object the the moments need some timeless representation. In Bruno's
theory time arises from the computational sequence. But in the
mapping, time is just a relation of similarity (closest continuation)
of states. So three states which when ordered by closest continuation
are XYZ may have been computed in the order XZY. So I find myself
seeing the hardwareless computer as a reductio against
consciousness=computation thesis and support for Peter's view that ur-
stuff and contingency are fundamental.
The time bit confuses me too but if the UD is recursive (as I thought
it would have to be) and a successor function was implicit in the
algorithm then the timeless algorithm would give a perception of time
to the internal observers that Stathis spoke of earlier generated by
the computation.
However I am still not convinced about this myself and get this
feeling that there is a dynamic element missing from the static or
timeless representations which I am assuming to be existent in the
platonic realm
Nick
On Jan 3, 6:57 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:2010/1/4 Nick Prince<m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk>:Thank
you Stathis This has helped move me on a bit. The hardwareless computer
has been giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of
what you said back just to check it is on the right lines. As a possible
example of one of these lurking computations we could consider the one
which begins with no-thing and think of the null set as made of it phi
={ } and then associating it with the number 0. Then imagine the set {
phi} associating it with 1, then { phi,{phi }} associating this with 2,
then { phi, { phi} , { ,{phi }} }, associating it with 3 etc. Hence we get
an infinite sequence of abstract (platonic) entities which can conjure up
(compute) the natural numbers and the implied successor function simply
from the abstract (platonic) notion of a set and an association rule (also
a platonic relation). More and more structure can be built up until - as
you say - the entire structure of the computation contained in the mapping
can be envisioned. Now although no external observers might be able to
access these computations, the computations might just create conscious
observers bootstrapped into existence by the special class of computations
which these (internal) observers (if they believed in comp) would
naturally consider as non trivial. As you say the entire structure of the
mapping which describes the computation is a platonic object too hence the
world comes from nothing and computation. Have I got this roughly right? I
would be grateful for any critical comments from you, Bruno (or
anyone).Yes, but a critic could still say that no conscious observer could
be conjured up by a computation unless the computation is physically
implemented. At least at first glance that seems to be the case: the brain
is required for consciousness, since if the brain is destroyed
consciousness is destroyed. And if the mind is generated by a computer
program, it would be normal to think that if the computer is destroyed, so
is the mind, although the program in Platonia remains unaffected even if
the entire universe blows up. These are the common sense objections. So
the question is, is physical implementation necessary for consciousness,
and what does it actually mean to physically implement a program? Suppose
we agree that it is necessary to physically implement a program in order
to get the consciousness. Physical implementation then involves,
essentially, causing a machine to go through a sequence of causally
connected configurations such that the configurations and the state
transition rules match up with the abstract program. There is a mapping
from the abstract program to the machine so that the engineer, programmer
and end user know what's going on. But "write 1 and then move the head to
the left" could be represented in an infinite number of ways. If a man
walks down the street chewing gum, that could represent "write 1 then move
the head to the left", while if he stood still humming "Jingle Bells" that
would have represented "write 0 then move the head to the right". Moreover
the mapping does not have to be consistent from moment to moment: chewing
gum could mean "0" on Fridays and "1" on other days. There is no reason
why a computer could not be designed to function in such an inconsistent
way, other than the practical necessity of keeping track of what's going
on, which is necessary if the computer is to be of any use to anyone. But
if we don't care about its usefulness to an outside observer we could say
that any abstract computation maps to any physical process: a random
physical process, a repetitive physical process, or a single physical
state. The man walking down the street chewing gum over the course of a
second could be seen as representing the one thousand steps of a Turing
machine adding two numbers together, although of course it wouldn't be of
any use to anyone interested in the result of the calculation. You can see
no doubt that if you accept the argument so far the physical process is
irrelevant, and all of the computation, such as it is, consists in the
abstract machine and the mapping, which are timeless platonic objects.
Arguable the mapping is also irrelevant, since there are an infinite
number of possible mappings for an infinite number of possible physical
processes. The only thing that seems to make a difference is the abstract
machine or program itself. The program "runs" necessarily, even in the
absence of a physical universe, and it only need run on physical hardware
in order to interact with the environment at the level of the hardware
(and of course, this hardware may itself be part of the virtual world
generated in Platonia).I think you give an excellent explication of the
problem, Stathis. However, one thing about it that still worries me is the
role of time. You say the mapping need not be consistent even moment to
moment, and yet the mapping is a timeless Platonic object. To be a
timeless object the the moments need some timeless representation. In
Bruno's theory time arises from the computational sequence. But in the
mapping, time is just a relation of similarity (closest continuation) of
states. So three states which when ordered by closest continuation are XYZ
may have been computed in the order XZY. So I find myself seeing the
hardwareless computer as a reductio against consciousness=computation
thesis and support for Peter's view that ur-stuff and contingency are
fundamental.
Brent
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