On Sat, Jan 30, 2010 at 8:10 PM, soulcatcher☠ <soulcatche...@gmail.com>wrote:

> Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you:
> 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this
> program represents my brain in your symbols.
> 2. simulate a red rose
> 3. feed "rose data" into my simulated brain.
> I think (more believe than think) that this simulated brain won't see
> my redness - in fact, it won't see nothing at all cause it isn't
> conscious.
> But if you:
> 1. make a robot that simulates my brain in my symbols i.e. behaves
> (relative to the physical world) in the same ways as I do
> 2. show a rose to the robot
> I think that robot will experience the same redness as me.
> Would be glad if somebody suggests something to read about 'symbols
> grounding', semantics, etc., I have a lot of confusion here, I've
> always thought that logic is a formal language for a 'syntactic'
> manipulation with 'strings' that acquire meaning only in our minds.
>
>
When I play a video game I am conscious.  Presumably I would still be
conscious even using a fully immersive system like the vertebrain system
described on this page ( http://marshallbrain.com/discard8.htm ).  If that
is true, and you agree with me so far, do you think a brain in a vat (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain_in_a_vat ) would be conscious?  Would it
be conscious whether its optic nerve were connected to a webcam or connected
to the TV/OUT port of a video game?  What about a human brain that spent its
whole life as a brain in a vat from the time it was born (assuming it were
given a robot body for input, or assuming it was given a computer game
realistic reality)?  I am curious at what point you think the consciousness
would cease.

If you agree that the brain in the vat would be conscious in all cases (even
when given input from a video game) and you agree that a robot body with a
software brain would be conscious, why would it stop working when you put a
software brain in the same position as the brain in a vat?

Jason

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