--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > A little thin brain would produce a zombie?
Even if size affects measure, a zombie is not a brain with low measure; it's a brain with zero measure. So the answer is obviously no - it would not be a zombie. Stop abusing the language. We know that small terms in the wavefunction have low measure. I would not call these terms 'zombies'. Many small terms together can equal or exceed the measure of big terms. > MGA is more general (and older). The only way to escape the conclusion would > be to attribute consciousness to a movie of a computation That's not true. For partial replacement scenarios, where part of a brain has counterfactuals and the rest doesn't, see my partial brain paper: http://cogprints.org/6321/ > What you call computationalism is a form of physicalist computationalism. Not true. It could be physicalist or platonist - mathematical systems can implement computations if the exist in a strong enough (Platonic) sense. I am agnostic on Platonism. > The measure is determined relatively by the universal machine by the set of > the maximal consistent extensions of its beliefs. Also not true. That's just your idea for how it should be done, which stems from your false beliefs in QTI. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
