Hi,
-----Original Message-----
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Rex Allen
Sent: Thursday, February 25, 2010 10:31 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 7:17 AM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 24 February 2010 07:03, Rex Allen <rexallen...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> With this in mind, I'm not sure what you mean by "two undeniably
>> manifest perpectives." Only ONE seems undeniable to me, and that's
>> 1-p.
>>
>> My proposal is that "seeming" is all there is to reality. It's all
>> surface, no depth. However, using reason to build models with
>> ontologies that are consistent with our observations provides the
>> illusion of depth.
>
> The danger here is that we get distracted from real questions by
> linguistic ones. What I'm saying is "manifest" is that there are two
> distinguishable analyses available to us, one in terms of our direct
> perceptual experiences, the other in terms of what those experiences
> encourage us to infer about our environment, and our own place in it.
> We can accept that these two accounts exist without committing
> ourselves, prematurely, to questions of primacy, or ultimate
> explanation or ontology. My recent questions and remarks have focused
> on the puzzles inherent in the "seeming" existence of the two accounts
"Seeming" is only an aspect of one of the two accounts. 1-p. There is no
seeming in 3-p, which is of course the problem.
But our knowledge of 3-p is strictly limited to what we infer from 1-p. So
the two accounts are not on equal footing. We can doubt the reality of what
we observe, but not *that* we observe.
snip
I take this as supporting the argument that 3-p is a construction,
in the sense of its properties, of an intersection of many 1-p's. All that
we can know of 3-p is that it could exist, but can say nothing about its
properties.
Onward!
Stephen P. King
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