Bruno Marchal wrote:
Colin,
I think we have always agreed on this conclusion. We may differ on the
premises.
It just happen that I am using a special hypothesis, which is very
common, but not so well understood, and which is the digital mechanist
hypothesis.
I think things are more subtle than this...... I assume nothing,
especially 'digital anything'. In reality there's no such thing as
'digital' (do not conflate this with 'quantisation'!). There's brains
that make statements or kind (A) and (B). That's all.
Unfortunately, because of our conceptual divide I cannot give meaningful
answers to any of the subsequent questions you ask - because to answer
them at all means I have to agree with the starting point. Your
questions are of the same kind as "when did you first start beating your
dog?" - the presupposition is that I beat my dog and the only undecided
issue is 'when?'. The issues you discuss presuppose something that
fundamentally violates science approaches in the same way that
'strings', 'loops', 'branes', 'froth' etc etc violate it and get
sidelined. You have added the UTM and its variants to the pile. Any of
these could be just as right as you think COMP is.
The (A)/(B) framework is parsimonious/empirically tractable (requires
nothing extra in the Occam's razor sense) and COMP isn't because it
requires invocation of a form of unseen abstract computer running
rules-of-Bruno, none of which lead to predictions that implement/explain
the observer. You seem to think that my (A)/(B) framework must address
issues in Bruno/COMP terms. I need none of it. Your framework is a
preemptive generalisation of (A)/(B).
In the end, once (A)/(B) candidates have been found and explored,
Bruno/COMP may be able to be used as an abstract generalisation of the
Hales/(A)/(B) framework. When that realisation happens, we can all go
down to the pub and declare "Bruno was right" and drink to your
insights....However, this will not happen until (A)/(B) is adopted in a
self-consistent manner and followed to its logical endpoint....
/literal/, verifiable neuroscience predictions of an observer (not by
pointing to "what is believed corresponds to observation" within in an
abstract hypostase framework on a presupposed computer)........Then and
only then will we understand the relationship between the natural world
and formal/artificial computation of the COMP kind.....so we can then
make informed decisions.
IMO this is the way that you can ultimately be right, Bruno. Your work
is an uber-framework within which sits mine as a special case. It's not
either/or. Between you and proof of COMP is type (B) science of claims
and testing. The instant that a (B) makes a verified prediction of brain
material, you can then provide an abstract 'generalised theoretical
neuroscience' that can, under suitable constraints, become the specific
(B) that is us. At that time (A)/(B) will be able to be calibrated in
terms of 'digital doctors', 'white rabibits', hypostases etc etc. In
this way, Bruno/COMP can be quite right but devoid of practical
utility, at least at this stage. (Right now...if I believe in COMP or I
don't believe...changes nothing ....I still do (A)/(B), making
predictive claims) Note that at the same time, the equally sidelined.
'strings', 'loops', 'branes', 'froth' etc etc will also get their
validity sorted ... because all of them will be required to
predict/explain the observer or go away.
I can see how it must be very frustrating for you to see the overall
generalisation but not how we are actually implemented as a particular
version of it. At least my assessment of your position looks like that.
This is how I think the COMP proposition could be viewed in the
future....we'll see, I suppose.
:-) Meanwhile I have a broken, neurotic, deluded (A) science to fix.
That's enough work!
cheers
colin
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