Bruno: I stand corrected on steps 6 and 7. I believe I understand your UDA diagrams. Before I can comment, I need to decide waht progrmas are and are not Turing emulatable, and if the brain runs a program, parallel programs, or something else. Ronald
On Dec 7, 4:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 06 Dec 2010, at 19:00, ronaldheld wrote: > > > Bruno(and others) > > I am going to do this in two posts. The first is my interpretation > > of your UDA. Since the Brain is a Turing emulatable program running on > > a biological platform(to start), steps 1-5 are not controversal. Step > > 6 scan(and annilates) the body and only places the program on another > > physical hardware platform, for a finite amount of time. Step 7 is the > > usual scan and annihilate, > > Well, step 6 and 7 use step 5 where you don't need to annihilate the > original anymore. > A (classical) teleportation without annihilation is a duplication > where the original is considered annihilate and reconstituted at his > original place wihout delay. > You need that to understand that if you do an experience of physics, > you have to to consider into account all computations in the UD > execution to predict your future experience (including "looking at a > measuring apparatus needle'. OK? > > > and then looks for the program in the UD > > still on some physical platform? > > Yes. At step seven, you have already that DM entails indeterminacy, > non locality and even (exercice) non clonability of anything > 'physically' observable. (mechanism accepts the 3-duplicability of the > person which is not something physically observable (yet inferable)). > > > Step 8 removes the physical universe > > and had the UD "running" in Arithmetical Platonia? > > Yes. The UD is somehow given by the true sigma_1 arithmetical > propositions (with shape like ExP(x) P decidable) together with their > many proofs. This can be derived from a well known result asserting > that the computable functions are representable in Robinson (tiny) > arithmetic, or you can use the beautiful work of Putnam, Juila > Robinson, Davis, and Matiyazevitch). This makes it Turing universal, > and makes the UD emulated in Platonia (or in any model of Peano > Arithmetic, that is a tiny part of arithmetical truth). > > > If I basically understand this correctly, then I will interpret UDA > > from my(physicla scineces POV). > > Normally the reasoning does not depend on any points of view (that is > why is a deductive reasoning or a proof). The step 8 is more > difficult, and I might resend the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) already > sent. Step 8 explains the necessity of immateriality. It explains that > the physical supervenience thesis cannot work, unless you accept the > idea that an inactive piece of material has an active physical > activity in a computation, and still say "yes" to the doctor, like > Jack Mallah apparently. To avoid this I add sometimes that the > survival, when saying yes to the doctor, is done "qua computatio", and > I am working to make this more precise. It is always possible to put > some magic in the notion of matter to build a fake comp hypothesis > saving primary matter, but then you can save any theology, and it > seems to me quite an ad hoc move. But I am interested in hearing your > Physical Science point of view. > > Bruno > > > > > > > Ronald > > > On Dec 2, 10:55 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 02 Dec 2010, at 15:51, ronaldheld wrote: > > >>> Bruno: > >>> I looked at UDA via the SANE paper. I am not certain the the mind is > >>> Turing emulatable, but will move onward. > > >> OK. It is better to say brain instead of mind. The doctor proposes an > >> artificial digital brain, and keep silent on what is the mind, just > >> that it will be preserved locally through the running of the adequate > >> computer. > > >>> Using Star Trek transporter > >>> concepts, I can accept steps 1 through 5. > > >> Nice. Note that the Star trek transporter usually annihilates the > >> original (like in quantum teleportation), but if I am a "program" (a > >> natural program) then it can be duplicated (cut, copy and paste apply > >> to it). > > >>> Step 6 takes only the mind > > >> (the program, or the digital instantaneous state of a program) > > >>> and sends it to a finite computational device or the entire person > >>> into a device similar to a Holodeck, > > >> It is just a computer. A physical embodiment of a (Turing) Universal > >> Machine. Assuming the "mind state" (here and now) can be captured as > >> an instantaneous description of a digital program, nobody can feel > >> the > >> difference between "reality" and its physical digital emulation, at > >> least for a period (which is all what is needed for the probability > >> or > >> credibility measure). > > >>> where the person is a > >>> Holocharacter? > > >> A person is what appears when the correct program (which exists by > >> the > >> mechanist assumption) is executed ('runned') in a physical computer. > > >>> I am not certain a UD is physically possible in a > >>> finite resource Universe. > > >> You don't need this to get the indeterminacy, non-locality and even > >> the non clonability, unless you add that the resource are finite and > >> enough little (in which case you still have the indeterminacy and > >> non- > >> locality in case of self-duplication in that little universe of > >> course). > >> After UDA 1-7, you know that if you make a physical experiment, the > >> result that you will perceive depend on the absence of similar state > >> of "your body" in the (physical) universe. > > >> Then, with step 8, you can realize that even that move toward a > >> little > >> physical universe will not help to throw away the 1-indterminacy, > >> non- > >> locality and non clonability. The reason is that Arithmetical > >> Platonia > >> becomes the universal "Holodeck", if you want. > >> UDA 1-7 shows that the mind (the first person) cannot distinguish a > >> physical reality from a physical emulation of it (for a short time), > >> but after step 8, we can see that the person cannot even feel the > >> difference between a physical emulation and an arithmetical > >> emulation, > >> which exists out of space and time independently of any observers (by > >> Church thesis, arithmetic and computer science). That is subtler than > >> UDA 1-7, but it makes the argument a proof, i.e. a proof that physics > >> just cannot be the fundamental theory, once we assume digital > >> mechanism. The physical laws have a reason, and even a > >> "space" (arithmetical truth) where, from the point of view of the > >> observers, they have been selected. > > >> Thanks for your reply, and ask any supplementary questions if > >> interested. I am trying to work on the official "english" papers. > >> After that I will write a book. I have succeeded in explaining step 8 > >> to many different publics now, so that I think I have the whole thing > >> straight. > > >> AUDA, on the contrary, is well understood only by logicians, but > >> physicists have still problem with basic logic. There is a real big > >> gap between logicians and physicists. I was hoping that quantum > >> computations would make a bridge, but that will still take a long > >> time. Anyway, UDA is enough to understand the main point. > >> AUDA is cute, because it shows that the intelligent machine are > >> already here. It shows also that intelligence is mainly a right, > >> not a > >> gift (but many people dislike this, and that is hardly astonishing > >> when you look at the history of humanity: it is the sempiternal fear > >> of the others). > > >> Bruno > > >>> On Nov 28, 5:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >>>> On 27 Nov 2010, at 19:05, ronaldheld wrote: > > >>>>> Jason(and any others) > >>>>> Both. Level IV Universe is hard to explain even if real. Bruno's > >>>>> reality is equally hard to convincing present. > >>>>> Ronald > > >>>> Do you agree/understand that if we are machine then we are in > >>>> principle duplicable? This entails subjective indeterminacy. > >>>> All the rest follows from that, and few people have problems to > >>>> understand UDA 1-7. > > >>>> UDA-8, which justifies immateriality, is slightly more subtle, > >>>> but if > >>>> you have followed the last conversation on it on the list (with > >>>> Jacques Mallah, Stathis, ..) you could understand than to block the > >>>> movie graph argument you have to attribute a computational role to > >>>> the > >>>> physical activity of something having non physical activity, and I > >>>> don't see how we could still accept a digital brain in this case. > >>>> With > >>>> just UDA 1-7 you could already understand that most of quantum > >>>> weirdness (indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability) is a > >>>> qualitative almost direct consequence of digital mechanism (even in > >>>> presence of a primitively material universe). > > >>>> AUDA, the Löbian interview, is another matter because you need > >>>> familiarity with mathematical logic and recursion theory. > > >>>> Tell me please what you don't understand in the first steps of > >>>> UDA. I > >>>> am always interested to have an idea of what is it that people > >>>> don't > >>>> grasp. I am writing some "official" papers now, and that could > >>>> help. > >>>> Up to now the results are more ignored than criticized, or is > >>>> considered as crap by religious atheist/materialist, without > >>>> rational > >>>> arguments. Tell me if you have a problem with the subjective (first > >>>> person) indeterminacy. Thanks. > > >>>> Bruno > > >>>>> On Nov 26, 12:02 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > >>>>>> On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 1:50 PM, ronaldheld > >>>>>> <ronaldh...@gmail.com> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> Jason: > >>>>>>> I see what you are saying up at our level of understanding, I > >>>>>>> do > >>>>>>> not > >>>>>>> know how to present that in a technically convincing matter. > >>>>>>> Ronald > > >>>>>> Which message in particular do you think is difficult to > >>>>>> present convincingly? Tegmark's ideas that everything is real, > >>>>>> or > >>>>>> the > >>>>>> suggestion that computer simulation might be a legitimate tool > >>>>>> for > >>>>>> exploration? > > >>>>>> Jason > > >>>>> -- > >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. > >>>>> To post to this group, send email to > > ... > > read more »- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.