On 04 Feb 2011, at 19:09, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 February 2011 16:52, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Yes, obviously. But I'm querying why Bruno says that this world
"has
to" be different from what comp predicts, given that comp itself can
only be true absent such difference. It seems self-contradictory to
me.
?
I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are
derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the
first
person indeterminacy.
So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed
physics'
is different from the comp extracted physics.
Yes, but on the other hand, failing to find such a discrepancy can't
prove comp true, simply not false (like any other theory). That said,
given the degree of prediction, agreement with observation + Occam
would make a pretty robust case in its favour, to say the least.
So Colin would indeed have to demonstrate empirical disagreement with
comp to prove it false - that's what you meant by "has to". But in
principle it's still open to him to have some form of non-CTM
natural-world theory that turns out to be in equal agreement with
observation, isn't it? That's all I was asking.
Yes. There is no problem. Colin has just to say no to its doctor, as I
think he did, and Colin is more coherent than most naturalist who does
believe or assume comp and materialism. There are no disagreement, we
work in different theory. I think we agree on what we disagree, and
those are just our different postulates. I bet on MEC. Colin, like
almost everybody, bet on MAT.
Science never ruled out any theory. In the case of comp this is true
with a revenge because the theory rather explicitly entails its non
provability, and asks for a big leap of faith. It is a belief in a
form of physical reincarnation, and the digitality entails the
admittedly less obvious belief in an arithmetical form of
reincarnation. The ethic of comp is the necessity of the right by any
machine to say no to the doctor.
We cannot know that we are machine. We cannot know our level of
substitution. We cannot name who we are.
The universal machines put a lot of mess in Platonia, even more when
they begin to try to fix it. Understanding comp is understanding how
big is or even could be our ignorance.
After Gödel we can figure out the infinitely many problems that
universal numbers can encounter by reflecting each other.
I certainly react in part to some establishment trends that science
would be, per se, on the side of materialism (even just weak
materialism).
I have thought that scientist knew that the mind-body problem is not
yet solved, and that it would be obvious that once we start to think
on on the mind body problem with a simple and rather precise
hypothesis, like comp which links philosophy/theology to computer
science, we are directly aware that the Aristotle/Plato different
kinds of fundamental reality has not yet been decided, really.
The incompatibility between MAT and MEC reflects the difference
between Aristotle and Plato.
When MEC and MAT are taken together, like the naturalist and the
materialist, I think you will arrive to the elimination of the person,
and then nihilism.
So, as far as Colin is aware that MAT and MEC are incompatible, I have
no disagreement with him. I might still not been convinced by the
validity of some of his arguments, because I have counter-example in
MEC for its reasoning. The validity of a reasoning can be made
assumption independent.
Of course many people still believe that MAT and MEC are compatible.
It is only by taking the notion of consciousness and of digital
mechanism very seriously, through tought experiments made in principle
possible, that you might see that it is easier to explain the
illusion of matter to numbers, than the illusion of numbers to matter.
And it is also true that you can make MEC and MAT coherent by adding
enough magic to MEC and/or MAT. The reasoning goes through in the
sense that it becomes just irrational to say YES to the doctor in
virtue of betting on MEC + those magical links.
Bruno
David
On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 February 2011 12:34, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of
"has to"
in the above.
If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world,
because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of
a real world to emerge from
Yes, obviously. But I'm querying why Bruno says that this world
"has
to" be different from what comp predicts, given that comp itself can
only be true absent such difference. It seems self-contradictory to
me.
?
I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are
derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the
first
person indeterminacy.
So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed
physics'
is different from the comp extracted physics.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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