On 06/03/11 17:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:17, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Chalmers defines a 'Computational Hypothesis'
You might attribute this to Putnam or Fodor, or many others,
including Galouye. That's CTM. I argue that the computationalist
hypothesis is already in the "King Milinda" text, which is a
greec-hinduist text from before JC.
You can see CTM as an ancestor of the more precise modern comp (TC +
yes doctor). The "yes doctor" is a belief in a level of description,
where CTM believes implicitlt that we know the level (neuron level,
for example). But as Colin explains we might take into account the
EM fields. I argue that we have to take into account the glial cells
(100 time more numerous than the neurons). No problem with comp, the
level might be as low as the 101000 rational cut of the heisenberg
matrix of the milky way at the dimension of the superstrings.
The Computational Hypothesis says that "physics as we know it is
not the fundamental
level of reality."
Give me the reference.
http://consc.net/papers/matrix.html
(first google hit for Chalmers Computational Hypothesis)
Thanks.
OK, I know that article. I will not explain why I find it rather
unfair in the references, it would involve other people, and no one is
really interested in priority issue. The paper is interesting, and
makes good points. Yet it still misses the point that I am trying to
explain to you (and other people on this list). We will come back on this.
I will insist on this, though: you cannot quote a reference without
explaining the context:
The statement just before the statement you quoted, i.e.: "the
Computational Hypothesis says that 'physics as we know it is not the
fundamental level of reality'." looks like the consequence of
comp. That's was astonishing for me and that's why I asked you the
reference.
But in fact, in Chalmers paper, it is preceded by "The Computational
Hypothesis says: Microphysical processes throughout space-time are
constituted by underlying computational processes."
So, what Chalmers call "The computational hypothesis" is what is
often called "digital physics". It is not the same thing.
Aha. Thanks. Much clearer.
A priori the computational hypothesis is incompatible with "digital
physics". Chalmers is a bit ambiguous though, due to the
'computational process' wording". In my work it is a result that IF I
am a machine, then physics is a (a priori non computable) sum on
infinities of computation, so there are no "underlying computational
processes", except in some extended sense of "underlying".
Do you simply mean that there is no single computational process giving
rise to this 'I' that is a machine?
There is a widespread confusion between digital physics, and the comp
hyp. in cognitive science. Digital physics see the world as a computation,
Meaning, if I understand you rightly, that the quanta are simply
emulations on some digital machine, giving rise to the reality we encounter.
comp assumes only that "I" is Turing emulable, in the 3-person sense.
I understand this to mean that "I" cannot be told from a simulation on a
Turing machine. And, from your concept of replacing increasing amounts
of the bodymind of the observer with machine, I understand this to mean
that it is "I" at the experiential level, in other words, "I" in terms
of the sensations (in the broadest sense, as defined by Page in
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE QUANTUM) experienced, that cannot be told from a
simulation on a Turing machine.
Digital physics implies comp, but comp does not imply digital physics,
Understood
and imply the negation of digital physics
Why so? why should not the emulation of "I" be taking place in an
apparently physical universe which is actually an emulation on a digital
machine. That would be peculiarly double layered emulation, but I can
see no reason why it is ruled out.
(comp might be coherent with some notion of "super-digital" physics).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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