On Mar 31, 1:43 am, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
> The observation that other people never seem to live beyond a certain > age is not evidence against the NCDSC. Only logical > impossibility can count. Even physical impossibility is insufficient, > because there is always the possibility of mind uploading into > machines that may be of arbitrary age. I follow that this observation is not evidence against the NCDSC but am wondering if it is evidence against QTI! If we eventually end up as Tegmark's amoeba then this can be deemed continuous in some sense but hardly immortal. My definition of immortal (which I held for the purpose of my posting) was that it would be more like a continuation of self aware consciousness - ie the ability to recognise I was experiencing an observer moment. > Even Jacques Mallah accepted the possibility that people of > arbitrarily old age must exist somewhere in the Multiverse. What he > couldn't accept was the certainty of getting from here to there, that > the NCDSC implies. The refinement of that debate lead to the distinction of > ASSA vs RSSA, and the NCDSC. But If we were to find ourselves in a universe in which we alone were arbitrarily very old and all other people had ages that were distributed about a mean of 70 yrs (give or take thirty yrs) then that would lead me to believe I was living in a very improbable universe - I might suspect self delusion! I often wonder about so called delusional conditions and their validity? In any case I would have suspected that the NCDSC would bring me into the most probable universes on the whole ( RSSA?). Hence if I was living to a very ripe old age then I would expect others to be sharing this perception too along with others who were even much older than me. I agree that we might just be on the verge of discovering the uploading of minds into computers, but if I had been a viking in 200 AD this would not really be realistic - yet they too must still be alive somewhere if the defined QTI I am considering is valid. Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.