On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 7:20 PM, <smi...@zonnet.nl> wrote: > QTI is trivially false, because it is a paradoxical result, similar to an > alleged proof that 1 + 1 = 3. You don't need to check to proof to see that > it must be wrong.
You could apply that exact same argument to any hypothesis that sounds ridiculous to you. > The reason why QTI is a paradoxical is because we have a finite memory. The > class of all observers that can represent you is some finite set of machine > states, so you can't have any memories that exceeds a certain limit. > Therefore, "you" can't live forever, stay the same person who then also > subjectively experiences an unbounded time evolution. The paradox only exists if you disregard that he have the ability to forget selectively. Since I have only lived a finite amount of time and my memory is finite, there is a finite set of machine states that is sufficient to represent "me" (whatever that means). I could conceivably live forever and selectively forget, while always maintaining the core states that preserve my identity. > Saibal > > > > Citeren Nick Prince <nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com>: > >> In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” >> And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. >> >> It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear >> to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many >> discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single >> biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being >> false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - >> which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out >> to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. >> >> So is QTI false? >> >> Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests >> the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious >> mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby >> that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an >> appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. >> (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) >> >> >> To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a >> critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form >> of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby >> requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another >> consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person >> dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, >> there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking >> Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness >> – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. >> >> Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very >> specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would >> be something special about the architecture which the substrate >> employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode >> of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an >> appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of >> the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could >> simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to >> implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say >> no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? >> >> >> The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of >> Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the >> physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as >> a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent >> extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul >> de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness >> is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement >> it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques >> for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even >> as long as we now perceive we have. A stronger statement would be that >> if universal virtual reality generators are physically possible, then >> they must be built somewhere in some universes! >> >> But supposing the above (reincarnational) speculation was false in >> some way. In that case, I have yet to see a convincing argument as to >> how the the no cul de sac conjecture can be reconciled with people >> living to great ages. Whatever sampling assumption is applied, the >> facts are that we don’t typically see people reaching ages greater >> than 100+ yrs). Therefore either QTI is false or people just don’t >> get old! Rather, the special physical conditions of death associated >> with dementia or oxygen starvation of the brain, facilitate continued >> extensions of consciousness by branching into worlds where we >> supervene over new born babies (or something – animals, aliens?) - >> accidental deaths of people of any “normal ages” we can think about >> could of course be accommodated by the NCDSC). >> >> The mechanics of such reincarnational transitions would be >> interesting to speculate about since I see this as the only way out >> for a QTI. >> >> Nick Prince >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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