Richard,
On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno,
If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices,
could not it choose to select a single world from the many possible
worlds?
Richard Ruquist
Suppose that you are read (scanned) at Brussels, and reconstituted in
W and M. Your consciousness will select W, in W, and will select M, in
M. Both happenings will happen, if I can say.
You can decompose a "choice of going to M" into such a duplication +
killing yourself in W, or better: disallowing the reconstitution to be
done in W. Likewise, you can choose to go to M, by deciding to "not
take a plane for W, nor for any other places". That is why a choice is
possible in the MW, through a notion of normal world (or most probable
relative world) that you can influence by the usual "determinist"
means. If not you would give to consciousness the ability to suppress
branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), or
even less plausible, to suppress the existence of computations in the
arithmetical world, which is as impossible as suppressing the
existence of a number.
So the choices are relative to the state you are in, but even the
cosmic consciousness cannot chose between being me and someone else.
It can, or has to be both.
Bruno
On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:29 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:
Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):
(JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know",
Chaos is: "I don't know" and stochastic is sort of a
random. ..."
BM: Not necessarily. Why not free-up your mind to think wider and
include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the
result of ignorance of some deeper level?
OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a
perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence
of determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated
by the iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being
repeatedly duplicated into W and M, will have not only random
history (like WWMMMWMMMWWWWWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have
incompressible experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication
gives an example of abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long
term determinist chaotic behavior).
In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of
the most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look
below our computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our
sub-level computations) are random.
This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a
consequence of unitary evolution of the wf. It is curious that the
deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the
level of conscious experience.
This is easily explained by the digital mechanist assumption,
through self-duplication. No need of QM, except for a confirmation
of comp.
Note that he non cloning theorem is itself a consequence of digital
mechanism. In fact all the weirdness of quantum mechanics are
obvious in digital mechanism (DM, which does not postulate QM).
Indeed DM entails first person indeterminacy, first person plural
indeterminacy (many worlds), first person non locality, and it is an
"easy" exercise to show that it entials non cloning of matter, and
non emulability of matter (and thus the falsity of digital physics a
priori).
It is still an open problem if unitarity follows from comp, as it
should if both DM and QM are correct. But the room for unitarity is
already there, because the logic of arithmetical observability by
machine/numbers is indeed a quantum logic. Comp can be said to
already implies that the bottom physicalness is symmetrical and non
clonable. The arithmetical qubit cannot be cloned nor erased (nor
emulated by a digital machine, and this is perhaps not confirmed by
QM!).
Bruno Marchal
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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