comp immaterialism: "I am dreaming that all numbers are dreaming and I don't know it".
On Jun 7, 7:32 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote: > > > I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism, which is a > > consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you already defend the > > idea that the computations are in (arithmetical) platonia. > > Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal dovetailer. (UDA > > is the argument that comp makes elementary arithmetic, or any sigma_1 > > complete theory, the theory of everything. Quanta and qualia are justified > > from inside, including their incommunicability. > > By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which is more > accurately described as subjective > idealism:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism > I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism. > > > Okay, this makes sense given your solipism/immaterialism. > > > I would like to insist that comp leads to immaterialism, but that this is > > very different from solipsism. Both are idealism, but solipsism is "I am > > dreaming", where comp immaterialism is "all numbers are dreaming", and a > > real sharable physical reality emerges from gluing properties of those > > dreams/computations. > > You are right, I should find a less general term. It is the missing of the > glue I think that differentiates the immaterialism of comp from the > immaterialism of Berkely. > > > > > > > > > > >> > If by representation you mean the representation of consciousness, then > >> this > >> > is the functionalist/computationalist philosophy in a nutshell. > > >> Computationalism says that representation *is* something you are. > > >> I say the opposite. Representation is something you do, which is so > >> natural to you and so useful to you that you’ve mistaken it as the > >> explanation for everything. > > > You should read this > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind) > > > Functionalism is the idea that it is what the parts do, not what they are > > that is important in a mind. > > > Computatalism is a more specific form of functionalism (it assumes the > > functions are Turing emulable) > > > I disagree with this. Putnam' functionalism is at the start a fuzzy form of > > computationalism (the wiki is rather bad on those subjects). It is fuzzy > > because it is not aware that IF we are machine, then we cannot know which > > machine we are. That is why it is a theology, you need an act of faith > > beyond just trusting the 'doctor'. In a sense functionalism is a specific > > form of computationalism because functionalist assumes by default some high > > level of comp. They are just fuzzy on the term "function", and seems unaware > > of the tremendous progress made on this by logicians and theoretical > > computer scientists. > > > Note also that comp makes *1-you* different from any representation, from > > you first person perspective. So, the owner of the soul is the (immaterial) > > person, not the body. A body is already a representation of you, relatively > > to some universal numbers. > > > In a sense we can sum up comp's consequence by: If 3-I is a machine, then > > 1-I is not. The soul is not a machine *from its point of view". He has to > > bet on its own G* to say 'yes' to the doctor. Of course, once we accept > > comp, we can retrospectively imagine that "nature" has already bet on it, > > given that the genome is digital relatively to chemistry, and given the > > evidences for evolution, and our very deep history. > > > Bruno > > >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit this group at > >http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
