All: Can someone please post a design for an experiment that will test some of these great theories? As long as the arguments remain theoretical the obvious limiters are semantics and math--and over the course of the last 137 (!) messages we've seemed to reach both of those walls. It's beginning to look like the number-of-angels-on-a-pinhead stuff again.
R Miller -----Original Message----- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Constantine Pseudonymous Sent: Wednesday, July 06, 2011 2:48 PM To: Everything List Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out Bruno, is it possible that there is no "fundamental reality" or "primary reality"... and even if there was, and it was non- observational or non-experiential.... why would it matter to us? It seems to me that reality or knowledge always implies a blind dualism that reflects the way in which "we" ("I") experience phenomena (subject/object, knower/known distinction-absurdity) we are always looking in front or ahead. We are always looking at. -It- is always -away-. If reality is the Other and we are derived from the Other and this Other is transcendent or "fundamental".... then what of this "Other" and what is its relation to us, or what is our relation to it.... does it have any subjectivity and do we have any ultimicity in relation to it. It seems like any reality is assumed to not be us and we are assumed to be related to it... therefore it is separate and either conceived of as blind and inferior to us, our super conscious and superior to us. and why are we seemingly superior to this other... Unless you assume we are the One.... then I would tell you that the One is absurd. On Jun 28, 9:38 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 27 Jun 2011, at 21:51, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 26.06.2011 22:33 meekerdb said the following: > >> On 6/26/2011 12:58 PM, Rex Allen wrote: > >>> On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> > > > ... > > >> The idea that our theories are approaching some metaphysical truth > >> is essentially just the same as assuming there is some more > >> comprehensive and coherent theory. I note that Hawking and Mlodinow > >> recently suggested that we might accept a kind of patch-work set of > >> theories of the world, rather than insisting on a single coherent > >> theory. > > > Could you please give references to such a statement? In my view, > > this is exactly the way to implement efficiently some simulation of > > the world. It is unnecessary for example to simulate atoms until > > some observer will start researching them. > > Ah ah, ... but so you can guess that it would be more easy for > arithmetic too, in that case. That (a need for patch-work theories in > physics) could happen if the partially sharable numbers' 'dreams' > don't glue well enough. > But we don't know that. It is 'just' an open problem in the frame of > comp. Arithmetical evidences and empirical evidence is that the dreams > glue pretty well, I would say. > I think Hawking and Mlodinov are assuming that the fundamental > reality is physical. The fact that the physical needs patch-work set > of theories does not entail that the big picture needs that too, as > comp (uda) and "formal arithmetical comp" (auda) illustrate precisely. > The fact that physicists can arrive to such extremities illustrates > perhaps an inadequacy of the metaphysics of Aristotle. > > Bruno > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > > . > > For more options, visit this group > > athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > > . > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
