Sure, it would be great to have improved synthetic bodies, but I have no reason to believe that depth and quality of consciousness is independent from substance. If I have an artificial heart, that artificiality may not affect me as much as having an artificial leg, however, an artificial brain means an artificial me, and that's a completely different story. It's like writing a computer program to replace computer users. You might find out that digital circuits are unconscious by definition.
On Jul 9, 12:14 am, Kim Jones <kimjo...@ozemail.com.au> wrote: > Indeed, why? Any talk of 'artificial circuits' might risk the patient saying > 'No' to the doctor. I want real, digital circuits. Meat circuits are fine, > though there might be something better. I mean, if something better than > 'skin' comes along, I'll swap my skin for that. Probably need the brain > upgrade anyway to read the new skin. You could even make me believe I had a > new skin via the firmware in the brain upgrade. No need to change skin at all. > > I could even sell you a brain upgrade that looked like it was composed of > meat when in fact it was a bunch of something else. You only have to believe > what your brain presents you. > > Kim Jones > > On 09/07/2011, at 12:44 PM, meekerdb wrote: > > > > > > > > >> Replacing parts of the brain depends what the artificial circuits are > >> made of. For them to be experienced as something like human > >> consciousness then I think they would have to be made of biological > >> tissue. > > > Why? Biological tissue is made out of protons, neutrons, and electrons > > just like computer chips. Why should anything other than their > > input/output function matter? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
