On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> ** > On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>>> On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation >>>>>> to be there. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The computations are concrete relations. >>>>> >>>> >>>> If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them. >>>> >>>> >>> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them, >>> everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of the >>> computation implementing your mind. >>> >>> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a >>> concrete existence. How would a many-worlder point to the other branches of >>> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past? How would an AI or >>> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is >>> rendering its environment? >>> >>> >>>> >>>> They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be >>>>> described by some axiomatic. >>>>> >>>> >>>> And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations. So the >>>> "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of relations. >>> >>> >>> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a >>> chair? >>> >>> >>>> The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs. >>> >>> >>> Assume both matter and number relations exist. With comp, the existence >>> of number relations explains the existence of matter, >>> >>> >>> That's the question. It seems that comp requires more than the >>> existence of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or >>> equivalent. >>> >> >> The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144... >> It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) + Fib(n-2). >> This is a simple recursive definition. You might even say the number line >> has a simple recursive definition, where Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1. >> Different recursive definitions result in different sequences of numbers >> (different ways of progressing through the integers). In some of these >> definitions, bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well >> defined ways, >> >> >> There's the rub. Nothing changes in Platonia. Nothing "moves around" or >> "computes". Bit patterns are physical things, like 101101. Numbers are >> not. >> > > Nothing changes in physics either. Block time is the only consistent view > given relativity. > > > Different t ==> different g_ab. > Different N ==> different Fib(N) > That's change in physics. Anyway, GR must be incomplete since it's not > compatible with QM. > > All the relevant parts of relativity which imply block time have been confirmed. The above is like arguing against gravity because Newton's theory wasn't compatible with the observations of Mercury's orbit. > > > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined > relations between the bits. > > >> >> some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even evolve >> into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce >> themselves. Some of these bit patterns may even evolve consciousness, as >> they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future observations >> of bit patterns within the number. Let's call this function Universe. >> There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve their >> survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of >> Universe(n+x). There are number relations which define such sequences of >> numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the Fibonacci >> sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of recursive >> relations). >> >> >> I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still accept >> that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that John >> Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes. >> > > Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe, if > not the cause of the universe. > > > That assumes numbers exist. > It is no worse than assuming the physical universe exists. Both theories are consistent with observation. > > > In that sense, they are just as concrete if not more concrete than any > physical object. Your view is like that of a being who has spent its whole > life in a simulated virtual environment: It believes the virtual reality and > items in it are "more real" than the actual computer which implements the > virtual environment. The beings only justification for this belief is that > he can't access that computer using his senses, nor point is he able to > point to it. > > > That's logically possible and maybe nomologically possible - but there's > also not an iota of evidence for it. > There is not one iota for evidence that matter is primary. On the other hand, mathematical truth seems to exist independently of mathematicians, humans, and the universe itself. > So my view is *also* like that of a being who has spent his whole life in > this material universe. My justification for believing this (to the limited > extent I do) is that it is a model consistent with everything known and has > been successful all its predictions, from what I'll find in my refrigerator > if I look, to the spectra of emissions of galaxies at z=20. The idea that > I'm living in a computer simulation predicts everything and nothing. > How is that any different from the idea of living in a physical universe predicting everything and nothing? Also, I am not suggesting that you are in a computer simulation, only you can't be sure our universe isn't a program or set of infinite program proceeding platonically as number relations. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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