Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> But I can have an hard time to separate my ego from that pure
>>>>> consciousness. That's why we can meditate, etc.
>>>> I'm not sure we can totally seperate it. The ego itself is an
>>>> appearance
>>>> within consciousness and thus part of it. It might be that trying to
>>>> seperate is an activity of the ego. Consciousness has no need to
>>>> seperate
>>>> anything because it is everything.
>>>
>>> I think that here you are a bit quick.
>> Might be. I'm not so sure. What I can observe within myself that
>> thoughts
>> like "How can I seperate consciousness and ego." arise, with "I"
>> refering to
>> my ego, which of course makes no sense. The ego can not grab hold of
>> consciousness, treating it as an object will miss its essential
>> nature.
>
> Consciousness can still be an object of consideration, even if we
> conclude it is not an object of any kind. If not, you will do the
> "schedule one" error: to forbid research on something on which you
> assert something. That can prevent any further inquiry.
Oh, I don't want to forbid anything. We study consciousness in some
objective frame. I think there is really nothing else to study, so sure.
My point is a bit subtler. We have to let go of the *need* to "get"
consciousness by objectifying it. We have to learn that all objectifications
are just pointers, not the real thing, and cannot really touch it.
In this sense we can just let go of the attempt of objectifying it, even as
we may study it from a objective standpoint. Otherwise an object (the
person) will try to get the subject (consciousness), that necesseraily
precedes it, which is futile.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> The trick to discover what one really is seems to be letting go of
>> indentity
>> and not trying to seperate anything. Trying itself has to be let go
>> of, as
>> it is an activity of an seperate person.
>>
>
> Well, remember that we are studying the consequence of
> computationalism, and that we already have a cute theory of self-
> reference which makes it possible to say a lot, notably on the 1-I and
> 3-I distinction. What you say makes sense, in that setting, for the 1-
> I, but, there is more to that, especially if you refuse solipsism.
I don't refuse "God-solipism" (God is I am and is everything), just ego
solipsism ("I", Benjamin, am all that exists).
I don't buy the fundamental 1-I / 3-I distinction. It is a relative
distinction. In my mind 3-I is an appearance within, and relative
identification of the 1-I.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Not sure I follow you on Nihilism, though. Usually nihilism leads to
>>> human extermination, you better should not deny the suffering of
>>> others.
>> Well, yes, nihilism can be used as an excuse for evil. But most
>> nihilsts are
>> apparently harmless. Many are just intellectual nihilsts and
>> nevertheless
>> care about suffering of others. The most evil and influential
>> persons were
>> believers in some religion or strong ideology (think of Hitler or
>> Stalin),
>> not really nihilists.
>
> Nazism was first a popular idea (indeed part of some Christian
> folklore), then the real nazism has been an intellectual idea, and
> then the German makes it into an industrial application. The same is
> true for Marxism. I think that intellectual have the highest
> responsibility. The Rwanda genocide is the result of intellectual
> ideas, together with intellectual cowardliness. I am not sure what you
> mean exactly by nihilism.
I'm not sure, either. Basically the rejection of meaning. I am just
reporting my experience with self-proclaimed nihilsts or people seeming to
hold somewhat nihilistic beliefs. Most seem not all that dangerous too me.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I guess the reason is that nihilsm is in some sense modest. At least
>> you
>> don't claim to know the answers, because you don't think there are
>> any.
>
> You don't think there are any, or you think there are none?
> If you say it is the first, then nihilism is just agnosticism (good).
> But most nihilist will say it is the second. They will use the idea
> that there is no answer to cut the funding in fundamental researches.
Most nihilists are probably just saying that they see no real meaning in all
of this, or think it is all subjective (with irreconcilably different
viewpoints). To make a absolute statement of nihilism is too obviously
self-defeating for most of them.
So I think they tend to be pessimist agnostics, for the most part.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>> That is the crux of the problem. Plotinus has a very hard time with
>>>>> this, like all theologian. Why did God generates anything if it was
>>>>> cool at the start? Why does the ONE leads to the MANY.
>>>> So maybe Plotinus is wrong in postulating the ONE as the only start.
>>>> ONE may
>>>> be intrinsically MANY (even ALL) and vice versa.
>>>
>>> Come on! He thought about that. The problem for simple mind like me
>>> and Plotinus, is that, well, the ONE cannot be the MANY. Now Plotinus
>>> explanation fits well with comp or with the everything-type of the
>>> theories, where the many appears from the one, when it attempts
>>> (without success) to look at itself.
>> I think of one and many as two sides of the same coin, so yes, the
>> ONE can
>> be the MANY. More accurate would be that the truth is beyond ONE and
>> MANY,
>> which perhaps why it is sometimes felt and described as
>> nothingness / void
>> / emptyness.
>> Plotinus explanation sounds nice, but I am not sure it really makes
>> sense
>> that something that is only ONE could not look at itself as ONE. The
>> experience of this apparently exists.
>
> Well, Plotinus' answer, roughly speaking, is that the ONE cannot look
> at itself, and if he tries, he becomes many, and gives birth to the
> NOÙS (the intelligible realm), which is a many. Some of his students
> did suggest that there is something beyond the ONE, but I think this
> makes the picture a bit more complicate.
Intellectually, maybe. Practically it is really simple, as an all-embracing
beingness (beyond one, many, none) needs no qualifications or distinctions
to make sense. It just is.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Nothingness makes no sense
> outside a theoretical frame, which has to suppose that something
> exist, like you need sets to have an empty set, QM to have a quantum
> vacuum, or numbers to get zero.
Oh, I wouldn't say that. Nothingness is experiencable. It is meant just as
the absence of anything that could be reasonably put in any particular
category.
How can you describe something that is beyond any particular thing, beyond
many, beyond one? "Beingness" or "existence", maybe. But this could suggest
it is only one being and that it is not non-existence, while it is meant to
be beyond that.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But the (relatively) unknown is always risky. Life is risky,
>>>>>>> because
>>>>>>> we are confronted with the relative unknown all the times.
>>>>>> Right. Let's hope some day risks mean only adventure because we
>>>>>> self-
>>>>>> correct
>>>>>> / learn faster than we can feel mistakes as truly bad. Even if
>>>>>> this is
>>>>>> possible, the road to there will probably be long and rough.
>>>>>
>>>>> We might be already there. In the years 400,000 the fashion is to
>>>>> relive the life of those ancien people like us.
>>>>> But shh..., let us not tell aloud the end of the novel :)
>>>> If this is true that would be somehow creepy. Going in a cruel and
>>>> boring
>>>> past, just because you can...? I certainly hope we won't make it
>>>> fashionable.
>>>> I hope the souls fall from their (seemingly?) eternal heaven to
>>>> build a
>>>> temporal heaven that they can't fall from (because the dreams glue
>>>> stable
>>>> enough), not to fall again, again and again.
>>>> But I am optimistic, mainly because a world where we will always
>>>> relive the
>>>> past seems inconsistent to me (we really are already in year
>>>> 9^9^9^...^9^9?)
>>>> and I don't see why we would want or need to relive the past. Some
>>>> amount of
>>>> rememberance is probably necessary to digest our past, though.
>>>
>>> I can hear you, but then science is not wishful thinking.
>> It might at least be useful in deciding which theories to consider,
>> and to
>> have a theology that provides a framework for interpreting what our
>> results
>> may mean.
>
> The problem is that people want a wishful thinking theology, I think.
> They are not prepared to accept our abyssal ignorance of the subject,
> which is needed to just begin the use of the scientific method.
OK. Wishful thinking can only be useful if take into account our ignorance.
Especially our ignorance about what is ultimately good or bad.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Also, I don't really see why science predicts that we will always go
>> back.
>
> This is ambiguous, and I hesitate to comment, because I would say
> things which requires a good familiarity with UDA and all that. Some
> theory, like mechanism, does not predict that we will always go back,
> but that we *can* always go back. It depends in large part of the care
> we have with our memories.
I can't comment on the theoretical aspect.
I can just report my experience that forgetting of everything that happens
is necessary, unavoidable and in some sense the only thing that can ever be
done. It is the eternal essence of creativity. The ultimate escape door.
So this would suggest we can't come back. The very notion of coming back to
an old state seems to be contrary to my experience. We only come back to the
unknown, but then it is not clear if we really come back, or just arrive.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Our observations of nature implies that irreversible change happens.
>
> I am not sure about that. Physics leads to reversibility everywhere.
In some theoretical sense, maybe. But practically the law thermodynamics
entail irreversibility.
Has anyone ever managed to go back in time?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> But I would
>>> say, in the terrestrial realms, we are bound to, well perhaps not
>>> fall
>>> again and again, but to be in a state of risking falling again and
>>> again. And the day we believe we have find a way to prevent us of
>>> falling, we can only fall.
>> OK. Maybe we should learn to just let us fall... Accepting is as
>> part of
>> what happens. Maybe then we can live it is less bad.
>
> Well, in the comp "religion" there is a good news and a bad news.
> The good news is that in Hell, there are always some (rare) doors to
> Heaven.
> The bad news is that in Heaven, there are always (many) doors to Hell.
> It might be the main difference between Hell and Heaven: the number of
> doors.
Hm, in which way does COMP entails this?
To me it seems like God would be a fool to make such a universe. And I don't
believe he is a fool.
If anything, it seems to me all doors lead to heaven. Well, you might go
through many rooms 'til you arrive there.
The good rooms feel like heaven and the bad ones will show quite strongly
that you better leave them and go to some better place.
I think hell teaches us to forget / let go of the past most deeply, and is
very valuable in that. But once we learned that, we don't need to return and
won't return. We just have no clue when that will happen. God creates hell
because it is useful in creating heaven, not because he is inapt.
Yes, this is wishful thinking. I just tend to think there is no reason that
the omniverse should be worse than optimal, so I just assume the best.
Paradoxically I don't know what's best, but I have a strong intuition that
having to fear to go to hell all the time when you're in heaven is not best.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>> Sure, and doing both can help, and is unavoidable. Even think that
>>> is
>>> why Löbian machines, once embedded in complex stories, need to sleep
>>> and dreams. A brain is an efficacious primitive drug dealers. And
>>> keeping memory can be used to avoid past errors, but the ignorance is
>>> always there, and can only grow. This doesn't prevent bigger and
>>> bigger relatively sound big pictures, and (personal or sharable)
>>> shortcuts.
>> Yep. Ignorance needs to be welcomed, as scary as it may be. I'm not
>> sure
>> there are shortcuts. Maybe to some temporary state, but not more.
>
> OK. But since recently, I am open to 3-temporary state which are 1-
> eternal.
Yes, but this just mean they feel eternal, not that they never change.
Paradoxically you can feel to leave a feeling of eternity. It won't help you
to escape, as a shortcut to eternal heaven, anymore than feeling totally
stuck will mean you will be stuck forever.
There is the opposite of the feeling of eternity, a feeling that seems to
end as soon as it begins. It's really scary, as you have no time to analyze
the situation or relax. It's just sheer terror. It feels like neverending
compulsive repitition. Thankfully the way a feeling feels doesn't mean much
about what it will evolve into.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Also, we might distinguish the ignorance of those who does not want to
> think, from the ever growing ignorance of those who think. It is
> really the difference between those who does not know because they
> keep the eyes closed, and those who open their eyes (and see that they
> know about nothing).
> Eventually, the surprise with comp (for the self-introspecting
> (mystical) machine) is that the second type of ignorance is creative,
> and perhaps even kind and gentle, but full of surprises (and not all
> surprise need to be gentle).
OK. But as soon as we embrace ignorance it becomes difficult to judge
someone as "badly" ignorant. We all close our eyes to something. We have to
decide what to look at.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>> But what theory will you use to tell me what you mean by an observer?
>> Well, I guess there can be no theory that tells you about this,
>> ultimately.
>> You can only discover yourself.
>
> Hmm... I agree, and I disagree.. After all I do propose a theory.
> Which is 100% precise on what is an observer, but then the theory says
> exactly what you say ... for the 1-observer.
There is really only a 1-observer. A 3-observer is just an abstraction in
the mind of an 1-observer. You will just never find an 3-observer apart from
an 1-observer.
So the theory just says that you can define an observer if you identify it
with some concrete thing. It's a bit like defining an apple as an image of
an apple. We can identify it at some level, but we better be aware which is
the real one and which the image.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> What theory will you use to tell me what you meany by numbers?
>
> Robinson Arithmetic (RA). But my notion of observer disagree already!
> The observers are described, in RA, by Peano Arithmetic (PA). PA is
> the same as RA, except for the supplementary beliefs in the induction
> axioms.
> Of course such theories don't tell me what numbers are. I suppose,
> like for consciousness, that you already know, or at least know enough
> so that we can agree on simple basic relations, like s(x) = s(y) ->
> x = y.
See, you just add one thing more, of which you can not really say what it
is, to explain something else, of which you can not really say what it is.
The theories just make our ignorance greater. In this way, they are not
really explanations in the sense that the common reductionistic thinking
would like them to be.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I am bit puzzled that you asked this question, since I got the
>> impression
>> you too inuit that many (most) things cannot be explained / grasped by
>> theories.
>
> Yes. But that very fact is what I am glad to explain in a precise
> theory. That is the beauty of comp: it explains completely why some
> things cannot be explained.
But this is a bit of a non-explanation. It's just a expression of the fact
that there is no explanation. Beautiful indeed, but we shouldn't
overinterpret it. It is very easy to make a theory that says that it is
inadequate to explain things. Granted, COMP has a nice sophisticated way of
stating it.
It's akin to the liar sentence, in the form of a theory.
This is not a fault of COMP. Every statement, theory is like this, in my
mind. Reality is paradox, always incomplete in its expression, and this is
reflected in all theories.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> 1+1=2 is
>>>> still true, just not independently of us.
>>> In which way?
>>> Are you not confusing the truth of 1+1=2, with the human theories
>>> that
>>> 1+1=2?
>>> Or with the subjective apprehension by some subject that 1+1=2?
>> No. For me it is somewhat obvious that 1+1=2 is an expression
>> within, and
>> reliant upon the self (consciousness/God).
>
> I am not sure I can understand that. Do you mean that God is able to
> decide that 1+1 is not equal to 2. I don't believe that.
Fundamentally God does not decide. He is beyond that. Ultimatly he is
already fully what he longs to be, so there is no decision involved. 1+1=2
is just a statement of God's nature (as is every other statement).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> There is no independent truth of 1+1=2.
>
> I'm afraid you confuse the human belief in "1+1 = 2", and the fact
> that 1+1 = 2.
There is no big difference in my mind. 1+1=2 is just a belief (though not
limited to humans, I grant that). It is not an independent fact, just an
expression of selfness, as every other belief. It is just a more universal
belief as - for example - "I am the easter bunny".
We can't totally seperate the truth that 1+1=2 from the fact that 2+2=4 and
1+1=3 (which is "wrong"), etc....
Where can you find the fact the 1+1=2 outside of your mind? I can't.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> If you really believe that "1+1=2" depends on something,
> you have to show me the exact dependence.
It's trivial. 1+1=2 can't exist without existence. There can only be one nor
two because they exist.
Because I can't see anything else existing, I suppose consciousness is
existence itself, so 1+1=2 is dependent on consciousness
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> It expresses the same truth as
>> everything else. What is (1+1), is what is (2).
>
> "1+1" denotes the sum of the successor of zero with the successor of
> zero.
> "2" denotes the successor of 1 (itself being the successor of zero).
Right, which is the same number. 1+1=2 on some level expresses the same as
"2=2".
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> remember my goal is to explain that IF we believe the body is
>>> digitalizable at some level, then physics, and the whole theology, is
>>> given by the arithmetical truth. I can't start from the human
>>> observer, nor can we do that in math, physics, and logic.
>> Well, in my mind, this is just trying to escape the reality, that we
>> have to
>> start from observation. We simply have nothing else to start with.
>> This is
>> not my belief. Apparently observation (in the broadest sense) is all
>> that
>> there is.
>
> Why? In what theory?
Apart from theory. In (my experience of) reality. Show me something apart
from observation. Everything I ever come in contact with is inside of my
observation.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> We don't start from observation, we start from
> assumption, even when doing only observation.
No. Even beings that can't assume anything observe.
What do we have to assume to be here? Nothing. We just are.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Simple perception use
> theories which are hardwired in our brain since a very long time.
> There is no pure notion of observation which does not depend on some
> form of (unconscious) theorizing.
No notion, okay. But it is still there without any notion.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Of course the mistake of being antrophocentric should be avoided .
>
> Good! I do think that saying that "1+1=2" depends on humans is
> anthropocentric.
Of course. That's why I don't state it. If you don't go down the road of
everything being interdependent.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> We still can make a connection between mind states and arithmetical
>> statements, so I wouldn't reject COMP outright. Just its ontological
>> claims.
>
> COMP makes no sense without the 'ontological claim'.
Okay, than I guess I reject COMP. I see no reason to believe in unverifiable
ontological claims.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> The digitalist
> doctor's work will rely on many subtle true number relations. You need
> to believe that your "Gödel number" is independent of your thought
> processes.
Well, I can believe that arithmetical truth is not dependent on my
particular thought processes, even though I don't believe they are true
independently of everything else.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Then the movie graph argument forces to attach your
> consciousness on the "abstract" logico-arithmetical relations, and not
> on their physical implementation.
Yes, this part I do understand. Though it presupposes that there is such a
thing as "my consciousness", which I don't think exists. Consciousness
doesn't belong to anyone.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> The reason is that 1+1=2 makes
>>>> sense because it is true, and truth is fundamentally linked to a
>>>> subject
>>>> that intuits what truth is.
>>>
>>> No, it makes sense because we can intuits the truth. But even if we
>>> could not, it would still be true.
>> How do you know?
>
> I don't know. But I can explain that comp makes no sense without it.
What is the problem with COMP if numbers just arise out of consciousness?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I need numbers (or equivalent) already for making sense of the
> definition of what a digital machine is, or what a computation is.
But saying they can't exist without consciousness (because consciousness is
all that exists) doesn't make them non-existent.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Besides, only professional philosophers doubt this; probably because
> they want to avoid some consequences.
This is just not true. Many people doubted this on this list. Of course we
doubt something that is unknowable and runs contrary to our intuitions.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> This introduces a sort of magic
> which is hard to maintain if you agree for a digital brain by virtue
> of keeping the right computations done at the right level (or below).
It might be that we just agree to a digital brain because we bet it's the
right kind of magic.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I see nothing to ground that statement in.
>
> You are right. It is part of the needed act of faith, with comp. We
> can justify it once we bet on comp.
I don't see I would believe statements that I can't make sense of, like
1+1=2 is indepedent of consciousness.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> It seems like a
>> statement that is neither falsifiable nor verifiable through
>> experience. I
>> am very skeptical about such statements.
>
> The point is that comp can be refuted. I doubt that 1+1=2 can be
> refuted though.
Well, I take two drops of water and they merge into one. So 1+1=1. Of course
you won't accept this because you cling to your definition of natural
numbers. But then this is just tautological. Don't get me wrong, I am not
critizising this. In my mind everything is tautological when it comes down
to it.
But it is no suprise that what we axiomatically define as such can't be
refuted.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Are you really skeptical. Do you really think that 1+1=2 can be false,
> with their usual meaning?
Not really. I have never stated that 1+1=2 can be false. Just that is not
indepedent of consciousness. But since consciousness must exist, 1+1=2 must
be true, if we define it in the usual way. It is just self -consistency.
What we define as true will appear true to us.
If I define 1+1=3, this will be true because of the axiom that 1+1=3.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> No need of any observer for making
>>> it true.
>> What's making it true, then?
>
> God.
So in your mind God can not observe. I can't see why the grandest "thing" in
existence should be unable to observe.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> This doesn't mean that 1+1=2 is true for me and not true for
>>>> somebody else,
>>>> but that is necessarily true because I (=consciousness, not ego)
>>>> necessarily
>>>> am.
>>>
>>> Well, with comp, this is tautological. You could have said 1+1=2 <->
>>> the machine i on input j asserts k". But the consciousness, and
>>> eventual matter around have to be explained.
>> Why? Some things are unexplainable. If not consciousness, than
>> numbers. I am
>> frankly skeptical COMP explains consciousness.
>
> You have to be skeptical until you fully grasp the explanation. As I
> said it is a partial explanation which justifies completely the
> existence of the gap and why we cannot bridge it, but also why we can
> still make it as little as possible.
If it shows there is an unbridgable gap, we really discover it can not
explain consciousness.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> It seems it just makes sense
>> of consciousness relative to numbers.
>
> ?
Well, if we associate certain mind-states with computations, this shows us
how the manifestation of consciousness relates to number relations.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> But in AUDA, consciousness is already well
> approximated by the unconscious guess in our own consistency, or in a
> reality which might transcend us. It makes consciousness into a
> logical descendant of consistency.
But you can't even begin to reason about consciousness without postulating
it. Just by hiding the fact that you postulate it, you do not change this
fact (well, you don't need to postulate it, but it's still there at the
start). If there was no consciousness AUDA couldn't even appear.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> To equate truth and consciousness is lazy mystery elimination by
>>> confusion.
>> I just don't see what truth could be, if not itself subjectively being
>> itself. Truth is what truth perceives itself to be, as there is
>> nothing else
>> to ground truth in, if not itself.
>
> (Arithmetical) Truth does not need to perceive itself. It is not a
> machine, and it is not a person (a priori). But it makes possible the
> existence of number relations which will lead to persons and
> perceptions.
OK. It just seems to be an abstraction in this case and not the ultimate
truth.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Above all, you are confusing 3-truth (reality) and 1-truth
>>> (consciousness).
>> I think this distinction is relative. It just makes sense relative to
>> persons. Ultimately there 3-truth is a 1-truth, as someone has to
>> witness
>> the third person view. We can't objectify things without seeing them
>> subjectively.
>
> We can't objectify things without seeing them subjectively. You are
> right. But we can be serendipitously correct. Anyway, we have to bet
> on that for accepting the possibility of surviving with a digital brain.
Well okay. But where does this suggest any fundamental ontological truths?
We bet on something that happens to work. So what?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> That can lead you to solipsism.
>> Yes. I never observe anything but myself. Why should I postulate
>> anything
>> beyond this? Granted, this may seem absurd, or even crazy.
>
> Well, I find it at least polite to guess that your interlocutor has
> some existence..
Yes, because I guess he is fundamentally the same as me.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> But if we let go of the idea that we are a seperate ego, it can be
>> quite
>> obvious that there is ultimately only one mind, the mind of God.
>> Truth.
>> Consciousness. And this I don't find absurd.
>
> But it is not *quite* obvious..
It *can* be in certain kind of states of consciousness. If you feel the very
personal feeling of absolute knowledge of yourself as everything, there is
no doubt about it.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Especially in a scientific context..
Yes. This is beyond science.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> and I don't see why there is a
>> rigid boundary between adults and kids in that matter.
>
> What do you propose?
Nothing. I am just saying I see no rigid boundary.
The relation between kids and parents is where our biological past
plays the most heavy role. Fundamentally, we are always kids and
beginners, with respect to truth/quote>
Right. Agree. But then this would suggest that it makes no sense that
something that is true for children (consent in not fundamental) becomes
suddenly absolutely true for adults.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>> I am not even sure about that. But i find plausible that there is
>>>>> no
>>>>> final realization and a coming back. The coming back forces a
>>>>> minimal
>>>>> amount of amnesia.
>>>> Hm... I still wonder how we can even fathom the final realization if
>>>> this is
>>>> true. Also, if there is a final realization it appears there has to
>>>> be hard
>>>> boundary between final-realization and not-final realization. I
>>>> don't see
>>>> how experience could work this way.
>>>> But perhaps we are just differing in what constitutes a final
>>>> realization. I
>>>> can conceive a final realizations in the sense that it is final with
>>>> respect
>>>> to knowing that you are THIS and not an ego. But then it is not
>>>> temporally
>>>> final and not final in its intensity, but final in the sense of
>>>> being a
>>>> necessary eternal attractor that can't be avoided forever.
>>>
>>> Yes.
>>> But it is a very difficult subject. In fine, I think we can only make
>>> the experience, and that, whatever we try to capture with words will
>>> be misleading.
>> That boils it down quite nicely.
>
> OK. But this should not prevent scientific theories to be proposed and
> tested. Even on the ineffable.
Well, but the ineffable is ineffable either way. Our theories are just
reflections of that. If we explain something through numbers we have just
added another ineffable layer (numbers).
The ineffable is the fundament and all expression will reflect this as well.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Especially when some mundane hypothesis, like mechanism, can
> contradict a lot of old mundane beliefs, like naturalism, materialism,
> etc.
Yes. But this is just because mechanism reflects some intuitive insights we
have. Many don't see the connections at all.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Drug entities are sometimes like fairy tale entities and seem to
>>>>>> be
>>>>>> real in
>>>>>> some sense, also many real phenomena like telepathy can seem like
>>>>>> fariy
>>>>>> tales. It is just hard to make precise theories about this, but
>>>>>> it
>>>>>> could be
>>>>>> possible.
>>>>>
>>>>> But that might be cultural. Like the feminine presence under salvia
>>>>> get called "Virgin Mary" after the Mazatecs have been
>>>>> 'christianized'.
>>>> Interpretation may be cultural, but there seem to be intelligent
>>>> algorithms
>>>> that work through some chemicals. I have no clue how this is
>>>> possible,
>>>
>>> Let me speculate a bit. I think that a brain can be defined
>>> recursively in this way:
>>> a brain is two universal machine in front of each other OR two brains
>>> in front of each other. So we have 2, or 4, or 8, or 16, or 32, or
>>> 64 ... brains. Those "brains" does not need to be hardwired, most can
>>> be programs. I think plausible that they all have their own
>>> consciousness, and purpose. The simple integration of all those part
>>> is itself part of a process maintained by some crucial part of the
>>> brain, like the cerebral stem or part of the limbic system. Some
>>> systems are quick and can handle 'real-time" phenomenon (the
>>> neurons),
>>> but other system talk the oldest language of living system, through
>>> chemicals. The glial cells do communicate a lot, but only through
>>> chemical waves. Of course neurons transmit electricity, but are also
>>> mediated through chemicals (neurotransmitters). So, when using
>>> dissociative drugs, it is not astonishing that we are confronted with
>>> 'entities'. By comp we know also that such entities live in Platonia,
>>> so this chemical quasi-materialist explanation should not be opposed
>>> to the idea that *we* are sort of consensus among many "algorithm" or
>>> number relations. Life just makes possible for many entities to plays
>>> different roles in different context and people.
>> Interesting thoughts.
>> I still suspect that something is going on beyond the activity of
>> the brain.
>
> That is what I was trying to explain. The number relations
> (Arithmetical Platonia, or Truth) is beyond the activity of the brain.
> This *is* idealism, but it is objective idealism (number theory and
> number number's theories). It prevents idealism from solipsism.
OK. I already stated why I think that consistent idealism ends up being some
kind of solipsism.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> But beware the delusional power of the brain. Descartes mentioned, in
>>> his famous reasoning in "the meditations", that it was possible to
>>> dream that 1+1= 3. That is very rare in dreams, where we are
>>> basically consistent, yet that can happen. The brain can convinced
>>> you
>>> of *anything*, including that the reason of your belief are 100%
>>> rational. Some brain pathologies can lead people to pretend to argue
>>> rationally, for example that they have two legs (when it is
>>> blattantly
>>> false).
>> Yes. We can deluded about anything. This can only encourage us to
>> not trust
>> our beliefs, but viewing them with detachment.
>
> OK. I would insist on the *critical* detachment. To avoid indifference
> and stagnation.
Sooner in our debate I stressed the importance of progress. But now I am not
so sure if detachment isn't a key to progress.
It is strongly counter-intuitive to many, but maybe progress happens all by
itself. Perhaps all attachments to some necessity of doing something and
attachments to outcomes and reasons just hinders the free expression of
ourselves, that leads to progress?
This time I really will not respond to our state argument in detail. It's
seems futile to me.
Just some general points. They are just statement of my emotions.
I find it a bit ego-centric that you agree to the state and thus conclude
that it is not violent. But I feel it is violent (or at least threatening),
and very much so. Isn't this reason enough to at least accept that it may be
agressive towards other people than you and thus doubt its goodness?
You seem to see the system of democracy as a final answer to decide what do
to. I just feel that all system are ultimately inadequate. Think of Gödel.
I don't want to insult you, but honestly it appears to me you are just a
dogmatic believer in the validity and usefulness of the state. Without much
tought, you equate statelessness / "anarchy" to lawlessness, chaos,
"everyone is on his own", lack of organization - reiterating what the
authorities have told you.
Maybe you would say I am a dogmatic believer in the usefulness of anarchy,
but I believe I am not. It just appears to me that all system are inadequate
and will fall apart at some point. So I am facing this reality and want to
encourage others to do the same, so we can make progress instead of seeing
everything going down the drain (because no system works forever) and crying
about it, trying to safe the unsafable. I am open to the idea that states
are useful right now, and will be for some time, even if they appear bad to
me - in the same way that suffering and strife can be useful.
I just apply to states the same principle that I apply to everything else.
Mainly, all system will be transcended, because reality is beyond systems. I
see anarchism mainly just as the negation of political systems (and
political authority), though it is often made into a belief system.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>>>> Anarchy is nice, but it can't work. The world is too complex.
>>>> But this is an argument if favour of it. States seek to simplify the
>>>> world.
>>>> They claim to understand the economy and society and lead it into
>>>> the right
>>>> direction from above. They assume they can successfully provide
>>>> homogeneous
>>>> law, homogeneuos school system, welfare for all, etc... But in
>>>> reality they
>>>> fail. The law is insanely complicated and often inadquate and
>>>> outdated. The
>>>> school system is based on dogmatic opinions on what is important to
>>>> learn.
>>>> Welfare leads to pseudo-welfare (taking from the people, without
>>>> them really
>>>> noticing it, and giving them less back) and welfare we can't afford.
>>>> Anarchism (at least my understanding of it, I can't claim do
>>>> represent all
>>>> anarchists) acknowledges the complexity of the world and does not
>>>> claim to
>>>> have the perfect solution. We just have to try things out.
>>>
>>> People leading state, and banks, should be more accountable for their
>>> doing, but anarchy will just throw us back in a violent past.
>> Why should a philosophy of anti-agression throw us back in a violent
>> past?
>
> You remind me of my 68 friends (or ex-friends). They talked so much on
> peace, yet they acted with extreme violence against those who just
> harbor some doubt on the practicality of such philosophy. A friend of
> mine was at the extreme-left, and has been transformed slowly but
> surely, from a pacifist hippy, into an authentical terrorist.
Well, then they obviously didn't take seriously (or even believe) what they
said. You will always find examples of hypocrisy. Yet this is no argument
against the validity of what they are saying.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> If you associate anarchism with violence, call what I advocate
>> voluntaryism
>> (I just don't like this term particularly much, because it is a bit
>> too much
>> associated with right wing / natural law libertarianism).
>
> I will call you an idealist!
This might be true, yet I don't think it is bad to have dreams. What seems
impractical now may become very practical in the future. If we clutch to
"realism" as thinking just in terms of the status-quo, we won't make
progress.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Eventually, when you are
> running for good social ideas, those who criticize them eventually
> look like enemies.
This makes just sense if you are rooted in dualistic thinking.
Unfortunately, humans tend to be. I am not an exception, yet I acknowledge
that it is legitimate to critize this ideas. If a good idea is criticised,
it will just reveal that it is good.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I just embrace anarchism because it is basically a statement of my
>> ignorance
>> about what works best.
>
> That is why I have still some hope for you :)
> You really look more like an honest wise agnostic than an anarchist or
> nihilist, to me.
I'm not saying I am a nihilist. And anarchist is just a label, due to lack
of a better one. It doesn't mean that I support everything every anarchists
says or does.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Let's not argue with those silly, obviously not applicable anologies.
>>
>> Contrary to what I said, I still wrote a lot in response to our state
>> debate. Well, I guess I see some chance that we can find a common
>> denominator, especially considering you are open to privatizing
>> states.
>
> I am open to any pacific changes which take into account what the most
> of us hope. I want the end of prohibition, but I would not appreciate
> that any dictator decides this without consulting my fellows. I accept
> the price of waiting a long time.
I agree. But we shouldn't abandon the idea of speeding the change just
because it seems difficult now.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I think we really agree on the fundamentals: less violence and more
> freedom.
Definitely.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I don't think that a democracy is a goal per se. I think it is the
> stage 0 of social life, let us try to build the step 1, and then
> 2, ...
Well, in this I agree. Of course democracy is a good start, in contrast to
dictatorship. But we should still be ready to abandon it, as we will never
reach step 1 else.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Let us find a way to regulate excess of power,
I find this a funny thing to say from a state supporter. The state is the
epitome of excess of power.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> PS I might take time to reply to future post because I am, actually,
> rather busy. Don't take this as a lack of interest in the
> conversation. I will be very busy for one week or two.
Take all the time you need. This conversation is for fun, so don't stress
yourself. :)
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