Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Aug 2011, at 20:13, benjayk wrote:
>
>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> It depends on what we mean with primitive ontological entity.
>>>>>
>>>>> What we assume to exist (or to make sense) explicitly when we
>>>>> build a
>>>>> theory.
>>>> You could define this as primitive ontological entity, but honestly
>>>> this has
>>>> nothing to do with what I call a primitive ontological entity. As I
>>>> understand a primitive ontological entity, it doesn't need to be
>>>> assumed,
>>>> and even less explicitly. It is just there whether we assume it or
>>>> not, and
>>>> this is what makes it primitive and ontological.
>>>
>>> You confuse a theory and its (intended) model (or subject matter).
>>>
>>> This is a widespread confusion, and that is related to the fact that
>>> physicists use "model" where logicians use "theory".
>> Hm, I don't understand where my confusion lies. If anything, it
>> seems to me
>> confusing theory and subject matter lies in considering anything that
>> depends on assumptions within a theory a primitive ontological
>> entity. If it
>> dependent on assumptions, it doesn't seem to be ontological.
>
> In that case I understand why you want consciousness to be "primitive".
> But in a theory, by definition, you have to assume what exists. All
> existence on anything we want to talk in a theoretical frmaework as to
> be assumed, or derived from what we assumed, even consciousness. If
> not, such theories are no more 3-communicable. In fact I think that
> you are confusing the ontology, and the theoretical description of
> that ontology. I think this is due to a lack of familiarity with
> "theoretical reasoning".
Hm... OK. I am not sure that there are valid 3-communicable theories about
fundamental issues. I guess that is what it comes down to. I am not against
science, I am just skeptical that it can really touch fundamental issues. It
seems to me we always sneak 3-incommunable things into such a theory. So in
COMP, I think the 3-communicable part doesn't ultimately explain much
fundamental, as it totally relies on the subjective interpretation, that you
call the "inside view of arithmetics", that seems to me just to be the
primary conciousness.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> For me it is
>>>>>> just so integral to everything that I can't see how calling it
>>>>>> primitive
>>>>>> could be wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>> Both matter and consciousness have that feature, but this means
>>>>> that
>>>>> they are fundamental, not that they are primitive.
>>>> In the sense above you may be right, but then I don't agree with
>>>> this
>>>> definition.
>>>
>>> Let us use primitive in my sense, to fix the idea, and let us use
>>> "fundamental" for your sense.
>>> Those are the sense used in this list for awhile, and it would be
>>> confusing to change suddenly the terming.
>> OK. The terminology doesn't really matter. But then I have to say that
>> primitive has nothing to do with what is primary in reality. It is
>> just what
>> we treat as primary in a theory, which may have little do to with
>> what is
>> primary in reality.
>
> With comp, you can take the numbers, or the combinators, or any finite
> data structures. It does not matter at all. It does not makes sense to
> ask what are the real one, because they are ontologically equivalent.
> With the numbers, you can prove that the combinators (or the programs)
> exist. With the combinators, you can prove that the numbers exists
> (and do what they are supposed to do). But, to talk and search for the
> consequences, we have to fix the initial theory. They all leads to the
> same theory of consciousness and matter.
Good, but this doesn't really change what I wrote.
Just because we assume the numbers to be ontological and derive
consciousness from that, which we *assume* to be epistemological from the
start, doesn't mean that this reflects reality. It might as well be the case
that consciousness is ontologically there from the start, gives rise to
numbers, and numbers can reflect their source ("derive" its existence). I
think this question cannot be settled rationally. We can just ask ourselves
"What does really make sense to me?".
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> It's a bit like saying that existence isn't primitive. What
>>>>>> would that even mean? Deriving the existence of existence, or
>>>>>> consciousness
>>>>>> seems quite meaningless to me.
>>>>>
>>>>> Existence can be handled by simple rule (like deducing ExP(x) from
>>>>> P(m) for some m).
>>>>> Consciousness has no similar rules.
>>>> But the existence you speak of is not existence as such. It is just
>>>> the
>>>> existence of a thing in a particular theory.
>>>
>>> That is always the case when we do science. (3-discourse).
>> Right, that is why science cannot touch existence as such. It can
>> just make
>> relative sense of phenomena within existence.
>
> That is not entirely true, although a big part of it is true. But it
> would be long to explain, when such things explains themselves better
> once we grasp comp well enough.
> In fact science deals all the time with existence, and this without
> doing an ontological commitment. But when we apply science, some local
> and global ontological commitment can be done. So with a TOE, we need
> to take seriously some term of our theory, if not we remain
> "academical".
OK. I guess I don't agree with that because I don't agree with the concept
of a TOE.
Of course science deals with existence, everything does. But it can't
explain existence, or formalize existence.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But obviously I can't prove that it isn't. I am just stating a
>>>>>>>>>> (strong)
>>>>>>>>>> intuition. I guess there is no point argueing over that.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Especially that the comp theory, + the classical theory of
>>>>>>>>> knowledge,
>>>>>>>>> suggests clearly that machine's intuition will conflict with
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> correct self-referentially provable, and true, propositions.
>>>>>>>> This may be a strong point against COMP.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Why? On the contrary, it mirrors the emergence of a mind-body
>>>>>>> problem
>>>>>>> in the discourse of the universal numbers.
>>>>>>> Once I say "yes" to the doctor, I lost the option of taking those
>>>>>>> discourses as zombies one.
>>>>>> The problem is that we rely on our intuition to say yes
>>>>>
>>>>> We can't. We have to rely on some theories, which are always
>>>>> hypothetical. It is not different than taking a plane.
>>>> But then to rely on some theories, we can just use our intuition to
>>>> judge
>>>> whether they are reliable (or we talk us into some "rational"
>>>> reason, that
>>>> is ultimately just as dependent on some intuition). So we are
>>>> again at
>>>> square one.
>>>
>>> Not really. The intuition needed to understand a theory is equal to
>>> the intuition needs to understand the natural numbers. Not a lot.
>>> Then
>>> the theory, if precise enough, is refutable, and that is all we can
>>> hope for. (Yes, a scientist is *happy* when someone is kind enough to
>>> show him/her wrong).
>> OK. But I don't understand how this would lead us to accept COMP.
>> How can we
>> accept COMP due to understanding natural numbers?
>
> "digital" = natural number theoretical. The digitalist doctor will put
> your "soul" on a disk, and from a 3-view, this is only a number.
> COMPuters, from a 3-view, are well know to be "number crunching
> machine". Etc.
Fine, but even if we understand this intuitive faith is required that we
will survive our digital substitution.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> and then have a
>>>>>> theory that calls our intuition heavily into question, so that
>>>>>> from
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> theory itself it makes sense to reject it.
>>>>>
>>>>> On the contrary, the theory explains why the intuition is
>>>>> misleading
>>>>> fro that kind of operation. Evolution did not prepare our brains
>>>>> for
>>>>> the technological speeding up.
>>>> But what to use other than intuition? We can't base our faith on
>>>> some
>>>> rational thing, as this would require faith as well.
>>>
>>> Science is based on some faith in some reality and in some
>>> rationality.
>> Right, that's what I am saying. Faith is required to do science. And
>> faith
>> comes out of our intuition.
>
> Not only. Some reality (God, physical universe, arithmetic) play some
> roles.
Sure, but without intuition we can't access God, the physical universe
(perception is intuitive) and arithmetics (the understanding of natural
numbers is intuitive).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It might be that all good theories about reality as a whole show
>>>>>> that it
>>>>>> makes sense to reject them, as they are always incomplete, and if
>>>>>> they are
>>>>>> good they will reflect that.
>>>>>> In the limit this could lead us to reject theories as such, in
>>>>>> accordance
>>>>>> with what they say!
>>>>>
>>>>> Who knows. But that is a speculation, and it would be unwise to
>>>>> reject
>>>>> a theory by speculating that the theories in the future will say
>>>>> so.
>>>> It is really so speculative? The more sophisticated our theories
>>>> get, the
>>>> more they seem to point towards something beyond theories. COMP
>>>> certainly
>>>> does that very powerfully.
>>>> That this will lead us to abandon theories as such seems to be just
>>>> the
>>>> conclusion of that.
>>>
>>> That is an argument against science is general.
>> Right, it is an argument that science in general is quite a limited
>> tool.
>
> But it is all we can use to isolate a publicly sharable TOE.
Provided that this really makes sense! It seems to me all we do with COMP is
interpreting our subjective epistemological insights into numbers, as there
is no way of interpreting the meaning that is being arithmetized just with
numbers (even if you claim that numbers do it themselves, WE certainly can't
do it just with numbers). So the TOE is not a TOE at all, because it just a
way of representing all of our knowledge (that is practically outside of the
TOE) within the TO"E".
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> That doesn't have to lead us to abandon doing science, anymore than
>> seeing
>> that being a baby is limited is leading us to abandoning babies. But
>> we may
>> outgrow being babies, and science.
>
> Science is like a lantern, when used properly it shows us our
> ignorance, like when you put light on darkness and see how big the
> place you were in is.
Yes, that's how I see the role of science, too.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I am not sure if theories can even be true, ultimately. They are
>> just a tool
>> for explaining our observations, and they can only be relatively
>> true in the
>> sense that they serve that purpose. You say yourself that we can
>> only refute
>> theories, and never show them to be true. So why even suspect they
>> could be
>> true?
>
> Why not? It works that way.
> Fireman know that a call for fire might be a (bad) joke, yet they will
> go on he place, because it might be true.
> We use theory all the time. They can also be approximatively true, and
> very useful. All this becomes more delicate when searching a TOE. But
> that is not a reason to abandon the research.
No, I am not arguing for abandoning research. I just think that there is
limits to what is researchable. It seems to me a TOE is beyond what is
researchable. Not because I am not open to the idea, but I don't see how any
proposed TOE really explains much at all. Maybe formally it could be used to
explain something, but this itself is not of much use, if the formal
research is fundamentally dependent on our ability to interpret the
formality beyond the formality (arithmetics formulas must be interpreted on
higher levels to make any sense outside of arithmetics) - which makes the
formality somewhat superflous.
As I see it, we will just exhaust ourselves with trying to find truth in
theories. This doesn't mean we can't use them. Just that we don't treat them
as being true. Like we don't hope to find the truth in our keyboard. It is
just a tool, and as such not true or false.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> What can make me a bit nervous is when people believes that comp is
>>> false, based on invalid reasoning, or prejudice against some idea.
>>>
>>> I have no clue why you could have any problem with comp, given that
>>> 1)
>>> you have admitted not having study the theory, 2) you seem to have no
>>> problem with its main consequences (that physics is secondary to
>>> consciousness, non materialism, soul immortality, coming back to
>>> Plato
>>> and the mystics, etc.).
>> I have not studied it in detail, but I have read and roughly
>> understood the
>> main argument, and consequences. I simply am not sure that a digital
>> substition of our brain will leave our experience relatively
>> invariant.
>
>
> But that is only the comp assumption. Not only you cannot be sure, but
> the theory will explain why you should not be sure about this.
OK. But then it just natural that I don't accept it. Even the theory itself
seems to agree with me if I reject it.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>> I
>> don't see why I would necessarily bet on that.
>
> To see the next soccer club, or the marriage of your dear grand-grand-
> grand-grand-grand-daughter, or for making one more salvia experience,
> or for taking one more cup of coffee on a terrace some sunny day.
> People will have their own motivations.
Alright, but even if I try it this doesn't make me accept COMP.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> You might say that we have no evidence of infinities within the
>> brain. But
>> we just avoid infinity in physics because we can not make formal
>> sense of
>> it.
>
> I am not sure of that. Infinities makes things easier. Classical
> physics contains more infinities than quantum physics, which still
> contains a lot.
OK. But in some places infinities just let us lose all capability of making
predictions. Like if there is infinite energy everywhere.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> In fact, even in our theories it naturally appears, and we merely
>> assume
>> that our theories are just incomplete where it appears.
>
> Not necessarily. In logic we use infinities to make a theory complete.
> It is the finite things themsleves which appears to be the trouble
> makers.
OK, from the view of a logician, maybe, but most physicists would probably
say that their theories are incomplete where infinites appear (like in black
holes, or the big bang).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Also, in quantum mechanics, the whole universe is fundamentally
>> entagled,
>> calling the very idea of emulation into question. You can't emulate
>> the
>> whole universe.
>
> A priori you can, except with comp, because the physical universe
> appears to be a sum on all what you cannot emulate.
> Remember that the quantum is Turing emulable. The UD does emulate an
> infinity of quantum objects.
It comes down to the idea that the UD exists apart from physical reality.
Even though I don't believe that physics are more primary than numbers, I
don't think that we can say that numbers existence independently of them.
They may be interdependent. I don't believe we can seperate existence neatly
into physical existence and arithmetical existence.
And in this case, we can't emulate the universe, as the emulation itself -
being within the universe - could change the universe (as, if I understood
QM correctly, there is always some entaglement between everything, even
though it may be extremely weak), rendering the emulation invalid.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> The idea that quantum effects do not matter to the functioning of
>> the brain
>> rests on a reductionist idea of how the brain functions, which is just
>> another faith that I simply do not share.
>
> But this only betrays that you have a reductionist idea of the finite
> numbers and machines. Comp remains correct if the brain is a quantum
> machine.
What I said above applies.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Again, it is also very different from the divine and terrestrial
>>>>> points of view. A brain, or even a cells can be considered as a
>>>>> machine, or a word, or a theory. We are divine hypothesis.
>>>> But this is a metaphor. No one in science says the brain is a
>>>> theory. This
>>>> is just a category error.
>>>
>>> No. It is a theory, written in the language of chemistry, which is
>>> itself written in the language of quantum mechanics, which is itself
>>> written in the language of machine's theology (assuming comp). It is
>>> not a metaphor at all, but a bet on some 3-self-finitude (which leads
>>> to some 1-self-infinitude).
>> With your reasoning, just about everything is a theory,
>
> Everything finite, asserting finite things (propositions) from time to
> time.
That's a very broad definition, but anyways, I don't really want to discuss
definitions, so fine, call a brain a theory if you want.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Maybe making formalized theories is just a transitory
>>>>>> phenomenon, it
>>>>>> may
>>>>>> ultimately be a dead end.
>>>>>
>>>>> In that case, life is a dead end.
>>>> ?
>>>> Life is not a formalized theory.
>>>
>>> The 'life of consciousness' is not, but the life of a body is, unless
>>> you have an evidence of concrete special infinities.
>> I need no infinities for that. The word theory, especially "formal
>> theory",
>> just doesn't applies to life as such, except in a metaphorical way.
>
>
> A formal theory just means a finite things with some shape.
Hm, I am not sure life is a finite thing.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ...I don't think the vatican would like me proclaiming that WE
>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>> all God,
>>>>>>>>>> though. :D
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> They will burn you, but in some century they will sanctify you,
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> course censor the discovery.
>>>>>>>>> It can make sense when you see how far some are able to
>>>>>>>>> misunderstand
>>>>>>>>> the statement.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In comp you are true, and all machine can discover that, but if
>>>>>>>>> assert, or even if taken as an axiom, it transform itself into
>>>>>>>>> bewesibar ('0 = 1") which is the arithmetical version of BS.
>>>>>>>> Hm, I don't see why it shouldn't be taken as an axiom.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because you will become inconsistent.
>>>>>> So? We need formal consistency only in math, apart from math
>>>>>> inconsistencies
>>>>>> are abundant, and acceptable. Even in science. General relativity
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> quantum mechanics are quite inconsistent with each other!
>>>>>
>>>>> We need consistency if only to have a reality to look for.
>>>>> Inconsistency makes people saying about anything. It is very easy,
>>>>> but
>>>>> boring and unproductive, and eventually it leads to suffering. In
>>>>> fact
>>>>> suffering is the reaction of the soul in front of threat of
>>>>> inconsistency.
>>>> To me consistency and inconsistency can coexist. Inconsistency just
>>>> means
>>>> that our mind has no coherent understanding of something. 1=0 just
>>>> appears
>>>> inconsistent because it doesn't fit with your internal
>>>> representation of
>>>> natural numbers. Someone might just explain that he uses the symbols
>>>> 0 and 1
>>>> interchangeably, and 2 means what you understand as 1, etc....
>>>
>>> If someone says that 0 = 1, and later makes clear he is not talking
>>> on
>>> the natural numbers 0 and 1, then he was consistent, and we were just
>>> not talking on the same subject. It was not inconsistency, but just a
>>> vocabulary problem.
>> The point is that inconsistencies are relative to some theoretical
>> system
>> that we use. So we don't need to be worried if something is
>> inconsistent
>> from a particular point of view, since we aren't forced to believe
>> that this
>> theoretical system is the ultimate arbiter of what is true.
>
> In searching the truth it is helpful to not listen to inconsistent
> theory.
But inconsistent with respect to what? We don't need to restrict ourselves
to classical logic, do we? It seems to me we can just judge the consistency
of theory with the background of some theory we presume (or with our
intuition, but then constistency is subjective).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> If not, you can say that everybody is right, and work back in
> your garden instead. That is a good philosophical move for real life
> happiness, but a bad one in scientific research.
Well, we can still research in what way everybody is right, can we? Or, we
accept that what is accepted in science as consistent or inconsistent, is
subjective. Maybe the attempt to totally rid science of inconsistency is
futile. Practically, it certainly seems our science is incosistent.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> You look like trying to justify that you don't want to do scientific
> research. But I never say that people should do scientific research. I
> do it, and like to discuss results and questions with others. I like
> also to debunk invalid argument, like the quantum and the Godel based
> argument against comp. It is part of my job.
>
I am not saying you shouldn't do that. I am just reminding you that maybe
you are restricting your view on what science is, or should be.
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