On 9/1/2011 10:57 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sep 1, 11:03 am, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 31 Aug 2011, at 17:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
This is where we disagree. If the wetness or carbonic nature of the
brain plays a rôle in our consciousness, this would just mean that the
comp level of substitution is low, not that it does not exist. For
having no comp subst level, you need to make the brain into an
infinite machine *of some sort* (not all infinite machine will work
for the task).
Bruno
I think it's not the wetness or carbonic nature itself, those are only
the physical correlates. What matters is the interiority; the
experiences - animal stories are elaborations and collaborations of
cellular stories which are elaborations-collaborations of very
particular molecular stories. Silicon doesn't have access to those
organic stories and characters (because what stories it does or does
not have access to is the very thing that makes it silicon), but it
can maybe be inspired to discover it's own version of pseudomolecular
and pseudocellular experience.
I would assume however, that those experiences would even more alien
than an alien life form, and would instead be an order or sense alien
to life itself. Maybe it will be better? Maybe we are the organic Gods
of a yet unborn inorganic paradise. I've always liked the idea of
coming full circle from the origins of life in crystallized minerals
who use organic matter to differentiate themselves and increase
sensorimotive degrees of freedom, to a twilight of organic life using
crystalline mathematics to manifest a kind of freedom from
differentiation.
Craig
You seem to have misapprehended Bruno's theory. When he talks about 'comp' he is
referring to abstract computation, not silicon chip based computers. For you the question
is whether the 'animal stories' and 'cellular stories' can be instantiated as pure
information and their 'collaborations' as abstract relations, i.e. computations.
Brent
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