Hi Bruno,

A short remark. I have decided start with philosophy, as it is more entertaining as mathematical logic. Right now I listen to lectures of Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen (in German)

http://podcasts.uni-freiburg.de/podcast_content/courses?id_group=12

His title "Controversy in philosophy" took my attention first but he has some more offers. Say now I listen to "What is philosophy". He speaks a bit too much but I have already got used to him.

The half of his series on controversies has been devoted to realism vs. nominalism. If I understand correctly, your theorem proves that comp implies realism and in my view your argument is a mathematical model for realism. It is interesting to note that Ockam was a nominalist and with his razor he wanted to strip realism away.

By the way, in the middle ages realism was quite popular as it was easier to solve some theological problems this way. At some time, one philosophy department had even two different chairs, one for realism, another for nominalism. Hence Plato's ideas have not disappeared during Christianity completely.

Prof Hoenen specializes in the middle ages and it gives some charm to his lectures.

Evgenii



On 03.09.2011 19:41 Bruno Marchal said the following:
> Hi Evgenii,
>
>
> On 02 Sep 2011, at 21:12, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> Thanks a lot for your answers. I have said Bruno's theory just to
>> keep it short, nothing more, sorry.
>
> No problem. But logicians knows the devil is in the details, and,
> frankly, "theorem" is just one letter longer than theory, so I don't
> ask for so much. If you are skeptical it is a theorem, just say
> "argument".
>
>
>
>>
>> Your theorem is on my list but presumably I will try to think it
>> over in some time, not right now. At the moment I just follow your
>> answers to others, in other words I am at the stage of gathering
>> information. I should say the list was so far very helpful to learn
>> many things.
>>
>> Just one thing now. Do I understand correctly that your theorem
>> says that the 1st person view is uncomputable?
>
>
> You are right. This follows already from UDA 1-6. No need of anything
>  except a rough idea of how most machines works (by obeying simple
> computable laws).
>
> The first person view is indeterminate, and non local. To predict the
>  precise result of a physical experience, you have to take into
> account that you don't know, and cannot know, which universal (or
> not) machine(s) execute(s) you (even just in the physical universe,
> if that exists). When a physicist uses a physical law, to predict a
> first person experience (like seeing an eclipse, or a needle pointing
> on a number), he uses implicitly an identity thesis between his
> body/neighborhood and its experience. A logician would say that the
> physicist use an inductive close, like saying that my equation
> predicts I will see an eclipse, and no other laws or history is
> playing that role. But when we assume comp, such identity thesis
> cannot work (this subtle point *is* the main UDA point: basically you
> can still escape, at step 6 and 7, such conclusion by assuming that
> the universe is little (finite and not too big).
>
> If you are a machine, you are duplicable. And if you are duplicated,
>  iteratively, you (most of the resulting "you"s) can correctly bet
> that the outcome of the duplication(s) cannot been predicted in
> advance. Children get the UDA 1-6 point without problem. OK, for "UDA
> step 6" they have to be a little bit older and capable to understand
> the plot in "the prestige" or in "simulacron 3". No need of math, or
> even of technical or theoretical computer science.
>
> Now, In AUDA, the first person appears also to be "a non machine",
> from the machine's point of view. This is due to the Theaetetus'
> connection between belief and truth, to define a knower. That is
> *much more* technical (to see that we stay *in* the arithmetical, to
> study an internal vision which escapes completely the arithmetical).
>
> But you don't need this to understand that if we are machine weak
> materialism becomes a sort of vitalism. We don't need it, and it can
>  only prevent the DM solution of the mind-body problem (the
> 'solution' being a pure body-appearance problem in arithmetic).
>
> Comp, alias DM, can lead toward a contradiction, but up to now, it
> leads to a quantum like reality. It leads to a many-words, or better
> many (shared) dreams, internal interpretations of elementary
> arithmetic (notably).
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno

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