Jon, (nihil0)
On 28 Sep 2011, at 01:18, nihil0 wrote:
On Sep 27, 2:46 am, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
I think Daniel Dennett's book "Elbow Room" is an excellent defense
of compatibilist free
will and why it is the only kind worth having.
Great suggestion. The wikipedia page was fairly informative, but I'll
probably buy the book anyway. From what I gather, he believes the kind
of free will worth wanting is the appearance (or illusion) that we can
control our behavior to a large extent. I agree with him that we don't
want to be uncaused causes (or uninfluenced influences) of events,
which is how quantum particles appear to behave (i.e.,
stochastically).
"Everything that is physically possible" is not very well defined.
And in any case it
doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible
must happen infinitely
many times. For example it might be that almost all universes are
uninteresting and
barren and only a finite number are interesting like ours.
Technically I think you are right. However, I was only talking about
an infinite universe likes ours that operates in accordance with the
laws of quantum physics. Let me explain by using what I've read of
Victor Stenger and Brian Greene. There are three ingredients in the
argument that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe
happen infinitely many times. 1) There is an infinite number of Hubble
volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the
theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter
and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as
a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible
configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle.
I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me
to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all
quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely
many times.
Bruno you say, "To have everything happening, you need the universe
being infinitely big, but also homogenous, and robust enough for
making possible gigantic connections and gigantic computations, etc."
I thought that physicists have observed our universe to be homogenous
on very large scales, but perhaps I'm mistaken. See the Cosmological
Principal http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmological_principle.
I don't assume physics.
But, although it is not relevant for my point, it is not clear for me
that the cosmological principle makes a UD possibly running in the
universe. Such a physical UD has to be *very* demanding in physical
space and time. But a concrete universe with a UD is an hypothesis
which is used for pedagogical purpose only. The step 8 (MGA)
eliminates that assumption.
MGA = the Movie graph argument. I explained it in this list:
http://www.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html#a20566948
I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "robust enough for making
possible gigantic connections and gigantic computations, etc."
Imagine a program with 10^(10^(10^ ..... < repeated a billion
times> ...) instructions. And this, for a logician, is still a very
tiny little number. yet to store it in a machine in such a way that
the program will do what it is supposed to do, you need more than a
homogenous universe, you need a way to avoid systematically black
holes, star explosion, etc.
but
perhaps the following explanation will be helpful. During the
inflation right before the Big Bang, all of the now disconnected
Hubble volumes were squeezed together and could affect each other.
Brian Greene says they conducted a variety of cosmic handshakes,
establishing, for example, a uniform temperature.
The UD argument does not presuppose any physical laws. Just a minimal
amount of physical reality (but not that such a physical reality is
primitive).
Best,
Bruno
Cheers,
Jon
On Sep 27, 2:46 am, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 9/26/2011 10:35 PM, nihil0 wrote:
It's a little late for this post since I've already posted 2 or 3
things, but I figured I might as well introduce myself.
I'm majoring at philosophy at the University of Michigan, however
I'm
studying abroad for a trimester at Oxford. I turn 21 on Oct. 4.
The main questions I've been researching are the following:
1. What kind of free will is worth wanting, and do we have it,
despite
the deterministic evolution of the Schrodinger Equation?
I think Daniel Dennett's book "Elbow Room" is an excellent defense
of compatibilist free
will and why it is the only kind worth having.
2. Recent cosmological evidence indicates that our universe is
infinitely big, and everything that is physically possible happens
an
infinite number of times.
"Everything that is physically possible" is not very well defined.
And in any case it
doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible
must happen infinitely
many times. For example it might be that almost all universes are
uninteresting and
barren and only a finite number are interesting like ours.
Does this imply that I can't make a
difference to the total (or per capita) amount of well-being in the
world? I used to be a utilitarian until I read Nick Bostrom's paper
"The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggretive Ethics."
Dunno.
3. Can only mathematical truths be known for certain? Can you know
something without knowing it for certain?
Sure. In fact I'm not so sure mathematical truths can always be
known for certain. For
example the four-color theorem has a proof so long that it is hard
to be sure it is
complete and has no errors. I think it has only been checked by
computer. And we know
computer programs can have bugs.
4. Do the laws of physics determine (i.e., enforce) events, or do
they
merely describe patterns and regularities that we have observed?
It must be the latter, since we change the laws of physics as we
get new information. But
I wouldn't say "merely". It's quite a feat to have predictively
successful theories.
I would be grateful if anyone could shed some light on any of these
questions. I'm very impressed with what I've read so far from
people.
Glad to be here,
Jon
Welcome aboard.
Brent
Each philosopher knows a lot but, as a whole, philosophers don't know
anything. If they did, they would be scientists.
--- Ludwig Krippahl :-)
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