On 04 Oct 2011, at 02:29, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

I agree with Craig, although the way he presents it might seems a bit
uncomputationalist, (if I can say(*)).

Thoughts act on matter all the time. It is a selection of histories + a sharing. Like when a sculptor isolates an art form from a rock, and then send it in a museum. If mind did not act on matter, we would not have been able to fly to the moon, and I am not sure even birds could fly. It asks for
relative works and time, and numerous deep computations.

When you prepare coffee, mind acts on matter. When you drink coffee, matter
acts on mind. No problem here (with comp).

And we can learn to control computer at a distance, but there is no reason
to suppose that computers can't do that.

Mind acts on matter in a manner of speaking, but matter will not do
anything that cannot be explained in terms of the underlying physics.

Locally, you are right. But the physics itself arise from the arithmetical computation structures on which consciousness supervene on (to be short). So I am not sure if the expression of consciousness duration for very short "emulation time" makes sense. In fact, between any two sequential computational states *at some level of description*, there exist an infinity of computational states belonging to computations generated by the UD going through them *at some more refined level, and this participates in the first person experience generation (as in its material constitution).



An alien scientist could give a complete description of why humans
behave as they do and make a computational model that accurately
simulates human behaviour while remaining ignorant about human
consciousness. But the alien could not do this if he were ignorant
about protein chemistry, for example.


OK.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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