On 9 October 2011 14:37, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> Can you find any number(s) flying around >> that has any claim to an internal view right now? > > Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer only > to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number can have. A > person is not a brain, not a body, not a number, not anything 3-describable. > But we can bet on brains, numbers, etc. as tool for being able to manifest > ourself relatively to each other.
Very succinctly put. However, speaking as a (grateful!) survivor of many conversations on this topic, on this list, over the years, I would venture to suggest that confusion about, or even ignorance of, the very distinctions you draw in the above remark are responsible for many of the more commonly encountered (perhaps simplistic) misunderstandings of your ideas. I know that you have (indefatigably) attempted to explain, in various places, the distinctively different roles of the various concepts you mention above - i.e. programs, numbers, persons, brains, bodies and what have you. However, it still seems to be the case that various correspondents are quite confused (and indeed differently confused) about what motivates this particular approach in the first place, why and how the entities and roles in question then appear in the theory, and finally precisely how they are related and matched up in terms of the theory. Of course, I realise that these topics can all be studied in much more detail via your published papers, but in terms of this list, how might one best set out these motivations and distinctions for pedagogical purposes? David > > On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: > >>>>> >>>> >>>> I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic >>>> with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn >>>> blue or taste like broccoli. >>> >>> Assuming non-comp. >> >> There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to say >> arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say that >> arithmetic has an internal view. > > If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are* using non > comp. > If by arithmetic you mean arithmetical truth then I can see some sense in > which it is a category error. > > > >> It makes as much sense to say that a >> concept has an internal view. >> nternal view just applies to the only thing >> that can have/is a view, namely consciousness. > > It applies to person. It might be a category error to say that consciousness > has consciousness. Consciousness is not a person, even cosmic consciousness. > > > >> This is not a belief, this is >> just the obvious reality right now. > > Obvious for you. But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think so. > Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her point of view. > It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for. > > >> Can you find any number(s) flying around >> that has any claim to an internal view right now? > > Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer only > to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number can have. A > person is not a brain, not a body, not a number, not anything 3-describable. > But we can bet on brains, numbers, etc. as tool for being able to manifest > ourself relatively to each other. > > > >> The only thing that you >> can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an person that >> consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object in >> consciousness). > > Here you present a theory like if it was a fact. If that was obvious, we > would not even discuss it. Consciousness, despite being an obvious fact for > conscious person, is a concept. As you say, concept does not think. > > > >> You abstract so much that you miss the obvious. > > In interdisciplinary researches it is better to avoid the term "obvious". > I do agree that consciousness is obvious from the first person point of view > of a conscious person, but do you agree that a silicon machine can emulate a > conscious person, indeed yourself (little ego)? Do you agree that this is > not obvious for everybody (Craig believes it is false). > I don't know the answer to that question, but I can show that if that is the > case (that you can survive without any conscious change with such a silicon > prosthesis), then we have to come back to the Platonician theologies, and > naturalism and weak materialism, despite being a fertile simplifying > assumption (already done by nature) is wrong. > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
