2011/12/6 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com> > > > Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote: > > > > 2011/12/5 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com> > > > >> > >> > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > > >> > > >> > On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote: > >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >>> > >> >>>> The steps rely on the substitution being "perfect", which they will > >> >>>> never > >> >>>> be. > >> >>> > >> >>> That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption. > >> >>> > >> >> No. Correctly functioning means "good enough to be working", not > >> >> perfect. > >> > > >> > Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital. > >> > Either you miss something or you are playing with words. > >> No, you miss something. You choose to define the words so that they fit > >> your > >> conlusion. > >> Wikipedia says "A digital system[1] is a data technology that uses > >> discrete > >> (discontinuous) values.". That does not mean that digital system has no > >> other relevant parts that don't work with discrete values, and that may > >> matter in the substitution. > >> COMP does not say they can't matter. > >> > > > > It does by definition. > > > Definition of what? Correct substitution level?
If you are turing emulable *then* there exists a *perfect* substitution level *or* the premice "you are turing emulable" is false. > It just says that there is a > working substitution level. It does not say it has to work perfectly, or > that only the right choice of the substitution level matters (indeed, > obviously it matter whether it is instantiated correctly). > > > Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote: > > > > The only thing that matter is digitalness... the > > fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter. > > > It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that > interact with the environment This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact with the "simulated" brain, you *must* run at the same level. That does not preclude that the simulated brain can be run on any level, only interaction with you require a specific level... your level. > , it will be useless (because the computations > are too slow to use the input and give useful output). And the brain/body > of > us interacts with the environment per definition of what a brain/body is. > Or, if your computer runs the expected computations, but fails 99,999% > percent of the time, it is also of no use. > Or if your computer runs the expected computations, but doesn't correctly > transform analog and digital values. Say, for example you give it a sound > "Woooshhh..." that is represented as data XYZ and then is transformed by > the > computation C which gives the digital output ABC, which is sent to your > screen, it will be useless. > We always need input/output, otherwise our brain can't interact with its > environment, making it useless. > > COMP does not say only the digitalness matters. Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be run/simulated on a digital computer. > It says digital > substitution, but it does not say that only the digitalness of the > substitution matters. As said, digital means using discrete values, not > something were everything else but its discrete values does not matter > (what > ever that would even mean, since we can't even absolutely differentiate > between discrete values and their physical anolog instantiation). > Also, we assume that doctor correctly implements the computations, and in > that implementation it may matter if his implementations takes care of the > non-computational aspect of the implementation. > > If we take COMP to mean only the discrete values and their computations can > matter, then we already state the conlusion, since discrete values and > their > computations are not physical, but abstract notions, so materialism (and > non-platonic-immaterialism) are excluded at the beginning. > But in this case the doctor can not possibly make a mistake (since the > physical instantiation can't matter, and so can't be wrong), but this means > that it doesn't matter at all what is being substituted and how. > That is a reductio ad absurdum of this interpretation of COMP, since it > obviously does matter whether we substitute our brain with a peanut or a > working device. > > I don't get why it is not valid to show that the assumption is absurd to > refute the reasoning. You can't say "assuming [the latter form of] COMP" if > that assumption is absurd (well, you can but then your reasoning is as > absurd). > > > Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote: > > > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > > >> >> A digital > >> >> computer is not defined to be always working, and a correct > >> >> substitution is > >> >> one where the computer works good enough, not perfectly. > >> > > >> > You miss the notion of level, and are splitting the hair, it seems to > >> > me. > >> I am splitting the hair if I am pointing out the most essential flaw in > >> the > >> argument? > >> I don't miss the notion of level. Correct substitution level means > >> working > >> substitution level, nowhere does it say it works perfectly. > > > > If there is a substitution level, then it is perfect by definition of > > substitution level. If it is not perfect, either it is not the correct > > substitution level or there are none. > Nowhere in COMP is substitution level defined as a level that works > perfectly. It works good enough for us to subjectively stay the same > person. > That's not the point... if we are turing emulable *then* the exists a *perfect* level of substitution or we are not turing emulable. The fact that an imperfect chosen level would work does not change the fact that *if* we are turing emulable *then* the exists a *perfect* level of substitution. > > If you insist COMP means there is a perfect substitution level, we get the > same problem as above (perfect substitution is not possible physically - > just according to the COMP conclusion -, so we can't substitute correctly, > or any abitrary substitution has no effect, which is absurd) and even if a > perfect substitution level existed, it would have to be correctly > implemented, which may include a non-computational aspect. > > > Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote: > > > >> > > >> > You are playing with words. Sorry, but I get that feeling. Comp would > >> > have no sense if you were true here, and that contradict other > >> > statement you made. you still are unclear if you criticize comp, or > >> > the validity of the reasoning. You seem a bit wanting to be negative. > >> I am just being honest. My criticism can be conceived of a criticism of > >> comp > >> or your reasoning, because I argue that either comp is false or the > >> reasoning. > >> > > > > His argument is not about comp validity but about the fact that you can't > > have computationalism true *and* materialism true. Both notion are > > incompatible. He does not says comp is true. > I know that. That's why I say his reasoning is invalid (in case we > interpret > COMP as a meaningful assumption), *or* COMP is necessarily false (as shown > by the reductio ad absurdum above). > The only reason I include the latter option is that a reasoning that > reasons > from an incoherent assumption is also practically not valid, since you can > "correctly" derive everything from an incohrent assumption. > > benjayk > -- > View this message in context: > http://old.nabble.com/The-consciousness-singularity-tp32803353p32923587.html > Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
