On 16 January 2012 18:08, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > I do not need an extra God or observer of arithmetical truth, to interpret > some number relation as computations, because the numbers, relatively to > each other, already do that task. From their view, to believe that we need > some extra-interpreter, would be like to believe that if your own brain is > not observed by someone, it would not be conscious.
I'm unclear from the above - and indeed from the rest of your comments - whether you are defining interpretation in a purely 3p way, or whether you are implicitly placing it in a 1-p framework - e.g. where you say above "From their view". If you do indeed assume that numbers can have such views, then I see why you would say that they "interpret themselves", because adopting the 1p view is already to invoke a kind of "emergence" of number-epistemology. But such an emergence is still only a manner of speaking from OUR point of view, in that I can rephrase what you say above thus: "From their view, to believe that THEY need some extra-interpreter..." without taking such a point of view in any literal sense. Are you saying that consciousness somehow elevates number-epistemology into "strong emergence", such that their point of view and self-interpretation become indistinguishable from my own? David > > On 16 Jan 2012, at 15:32, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 16 January 2012 10:04, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using >>> only >>> addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary >>> arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number. >> >> >> That may be, but we were discussing interpretation. As you say above: >> "YOU can define computation, even universal machine, by using only >> addition and multiplication" (my emphasis). > > > Not just ME. A tiny part of arithmetic can too. All universal numbers can do > that. No need of first person notion. All this can be shown in a 3p way. > Indeed, in arithmetic. Even without the induction axioms, so that we don't > need Löbian machine. > The existence of the UD for example, is a theorem of (Robinson) arithmetic. > Now, that kinds of truth are rather long and tedious to show. This was shown > mainly by Gödel in his 1931 paper (for rich Löbian theories). It is called > "arithmetization of meta-mathematics". I will try to explain the salt of it > without being too much technical below. > > > > >> But this is surely, as you >> are wont to say, too quick. Firstly, in what sense can numbers in >> simple arithmetical relation define THEMSELVES as computation, or >> indeed as anything else than what they simply are? > > > Here you ask a more difficult question. Nevertheless it admits a positive > answer. > > > > >> I think that the >> ascription of "self-interpretation" to a bare ontology is superficial; >> it conceals an implicit supplementary appeal to epistemology, and >> indeed to a self. > > > But can define a notion of 3-self in arithmetic. Then to get the 1-self, we > go at the meta-level and combine it with the notion of arithmetical truth. > That notion is NOT definable in arithmetic, but that is a good thing, > because it will explain why the notion of first person, and of > consciousness, will not be definable by machine. > > > > > >> Hence it appears that some perspectival union of >> epistemology and ontology is a prerequisite of interpretation. > > > OK. But the whole force of comp comes from the fact that you can define a > big part of that epistemology using only the elementary ontology. > > Let us agree on what we mean by defining something in arithmetic (or in the > arithmetical language). > > The arithmetical language is the first order (predicate) logic with > equality(=), so that it has the usual logical connectives (&, V, ->, ~ (and, > or, implies, not), and the quantifiers "E" and "A", (it exists and for all), > together with the special arithmetical symbols "0", "s" "+" and "*". > > To illustrate an arithmetical definition, let me give you some definitions > of simple concepts. > > We can define the arithmetical relation " x =< y" (x is less than or equal > to y). > > Indeed x =< y if and only if > Ez(x+z = y) > > We can define x < y (x is strictly less than y) by > Ez((x+z) + s(0) = y) > > We can define (x divide y) by > Ez(x*z = y) > > Now we can define (x is a prime number) by > > Az[ (x ≠ 1) and ((z divide x) -> ((z = 1) or (z = x))] > > Which should be seen as a "macro" abbreviation of > > Az(~(x = s(0)) & ((Ey(x*y = x) -> (z = 1) V (z = x)). > > Now I tell you that we can define, exactly in that manner, the notion of > universal number, computations, proofs, etc. > > In particular any proposition of the form phi_i(j) = k can be translated in > arithmetic. A famous predicate due to Kleene is used for that effect . A > universal number u can be defined by the relation > AxAy(phi_u(<x,y>) = phi_x(y)), with <x,y> being a computable bijection from > NXN to N. > > Like metamathematics can be arithmetized, theoretical computer science can > be arithmetized. > > The interpretation is not done by me, but by the true relation between the > numbers. 4 < 6 because it is true that Ez(s(s(s(s(0))))+z + s(0) = > s(s(s(s(s(s(0)))))) ). That is true. Such a z exists, notably z = s(0). > > Likewize, assuming comp, the reason why you are conscious "here and now" is > that your relative computational state exists, together with the infinitely > many computations going through it. > Your consciousness is harder to tackle, because it will refer more > explicitly on that truth, like in the Bp & p Theatetical trick. > > I do not need an extra God or observer of arithmetical truth, to interpret > some number relation as computations, because the numbers, relatively to > each other, already do that task. From their view, to believe that we need > some extra-interpreter, would be like to believe that if your own brain is > not observed by someone, it would not be conscious. > > Let me say two or three words on the SELF. Basically, it is very simple. > You don't need universal numbers, nor super rich environment. You need an > environment (machine, number) capable of duplicating, or concatenating piece > of code. I usually sing this: If D(x) gives the description of x(x), then > D(D) gives the description of DD. This belongs to the diagonalization > family, and can be used to proves the existence of programs (relative > numbers) capable of self-reproduction and self-reference with respect to > universal (or not) numbers. So, some numbers can interpret by themselves > some relative number relations (relative to some probable local universal > number) as a self-referential statement (like "I have two hands"), or even > "I am hungry", making them hope some action in the environment will lead > them in most satisfying relation with that possible environment. Such > numbers can understand UDA like you and me, and realize that the only way > that is possible, is by its local reality being stable relatively to the > infinity of computations going through its computational states at its > correct comp level and below. > > Tell me if this helps. I use comp throughout, 'course. > > Bruno > > > > > >> >> David >> >>> >>> On 14 Jan 2012, at 18:51, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>>> On 14 January 2012 16:50, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote: >>>> >>>>> The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than by >>>>> invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Sure, but do you mean to say that the interpreter must be physical? I >>>> don't see why. And yet, as you say, the need for interpretation is >>>> unavoidable. Now, my understanding of Bruno, after some fairly close >>>> questioning (which may still leave me confused, of course) is that the >>>> elements of his arithmetical ontology are strictly limited to numbers >>>> (or their equivalent) + addition and multiplication. This emerged >>>> during discussion of macroscopic compositional principles implicit in >>>> the interpretation of micro-physical schemas; principles which are >>>> rarely understood as being epistemological in nature. Hence, strictly >>>> speaking, even the ascription of the notion of computation to >>>> arrangements of these bare arithmetical elements assumes further >>>> compositional principles and therefore appeals to some supplementary >>>> epistemological "interpretation". >>>> >>>> In other words, any bare ontological schema, uninterpreted, is unable, >>>> from its own unsupplemented resources, to actualise whatever >>>> higher-level emergents may be implicit within it. But what else could >>>> deliver that interpretation/actualisation? What could embody the >>>> collapse of ontology and epistemology into a single actuality? Could >>>> it be that interpretation is finally revealed only in the "conscious >>>> merger" of these two polarities? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using >>> only >>> addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary >>> arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number. All the >>> "Bp " and "Dp" are pure arithmetical sentences. What cannot be defined is >>> Bp >>> & p, and we need to go out of the mind of the machine, and out of >>> arithmetic, to provide the meaning, and machines can do that too. So, in >>> arithmetic, you can find true statement about machine going outside of >>> arithmetic. It is here that we have to be careful of not doing Searle's >>> error of confusing levels, and that's why the epistemology internal in >>> arithmetic can be bigger than arithmetic. Arithmetic itself does not >>> "believe" in that epistemology, but it believes in numbers believing in >>> them. Whatever you believe in will not been automatically believed by >>> God, >>> but God will always believe that you do believe in them. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> David >>>> >>>>> Hi Bruno, >>>>> >>>>> You seem to not understand the role that the physical plays at all! >>>>> This >>>>> reminds me of an inversion of how most people cannot understand the way >>>>> that >>>>> math is "abstract" and have to work very hard to understand notions >>>>> like >>>>> "in >>>>> principle a coffee cup is the same as a doughnut". >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 1/14/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 13 Jan 2012, at 18:24, Stephen P. King wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Bruno, >>>>> >>>>> On 1/13/2012 4:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Stephen, >>>>> >>>>> On 13 Jan 2012, at 00:58, Stephen P. King wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Bruno, >>>>> >>>>> On 1/12/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 11 Jan 2012, at 19:35, acw wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 1/11/2012 19:22, Stephen P. King wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi, >>>>> >>>>> I have a question. Does not the Tennenbaum Theorem prevent the concept >>>>> of first person plural from having a coherent meaning, since it seems >>>>> to >>>>> makes PA unique and singular? In other words, how can multiple copies >>>>> of >>>>> PA generate a plurality of first person since they would be an >>>>> equivalence class. It seems to me that the concept of plurality of 1p >>>>> requires a 3p to be coherent, but how does a 3p exist unless it is a 1p >>>>> in the PA sense? >>>>> >>>>> Onward! >>>>> >>>>> Stephen >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> My understanding of 1p plural is merely many 1p's sharing an apparent >>>>> 3p >>>>> world. That 3p world may or may not be globally coherent (it is most >>>>> certainly locally coherent), and may or may not be computable, >>>>> typically >>>>> I >>>>> imagine it as being locally computed by an infinity of TMs, from the >>>>> 1p. >>>>> At >>>>> least one coherent 3p foundation exists as the UD, but that's something >>>>> very >>>>> different from the universe a structural realist would believe in (for >>>>> example, 'this universe', or the MWI multiverse). So a coherent 3p >>>>> foundation always exists, possibly an infinity of them. The parts (or >>>>> even >>>>> the whole) of the 3p foundation should be found within the UD. >>>>> >>>>> As for PA's consciousness, I don't know, maybe Bruno can say a lot more >>>>> about this. My understanding of consciousness in Bruno's theory is that >>>>> an >>>>> OM(Observer Moment) corresponds to a Sigma-1 sentence. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You can ascribe a sort of local consciousness to the person living, >>>>> relatively to you, that Sigma_1 truth, but the person itself is really >>>>> related to all the proofs (in Platonia) of that sentences (roughly >>>>> speaking). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> OK, but that requires that I have a justification for a belief in >>>>> Platonia. >>>>> The closest that I can get to Platonia is something like the class of >>>>> all >>>>> verified proofs (which supervenes on some form of physical process.) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You need just to believe that in the standard model of PA a sentence is >>>>> true >>>>> or false. I have not yet seen any book in math mentioning anything >>>>> physical >>>>> to define what that means. >>>>> *All* math papers you cited assume no less. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I cannot understand how such an obvious concept is not understood, >>>>> even >>>>> the notion of universality assumes it. The point is that mathematical >>>>> statements require some form of physicality to be known and >>>>> communicated, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> OK. But they does not need phyicality to be just true. That's the >>>>> point. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Surely, but the truthfulness of a mathematical statement is >>>>> meaningless >>>>> without the possibility of physical implementation. One cannot even >>>>> know >>>>> of >>>>> it absent the possibility of the physical. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> it just is the case that the sentence, model, recursive algorithm, >>>>> whatever >>>>> concept, etc. is independent of any particular form of physical >>>>> implementation but is not independent of all physical representations. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Of course it is. When you reason in PA you don't use any axiom >>>>> referring >>>>> to >>>>> physics. To say that you need a physical brain begs the question *and* >>>>> is >>>>> a >>>>> level-of-reasoning error. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> PA does need to have any axioms that refer to physics. The fact that >>>>> PA >>>>> is inferred from patterns of chalk on a chalk board or patterns of ink >>>>> on >>>>> a >>>>> whiteboard or patterns of pixels on a computer monitor or patterns of >>>>> scratches in the dust or ... is sufficient to establish the truth of >>>>> what >>>>> I >>>>> am saying. If you remove the possibility of physical implementation you >>>>> also >>>>> remove the possibility of meaningfulness. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> We cannot completely abstract away the role played by the physical >>>>> world. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That's what we do in math. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, but all the while the physical world is the substrate for our >>>>> patterns without which there is meaninglessness. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I simply cannot see how Sigma_1 sentences can interface with each other >>>>> such >>>>> that one can "know" anything about another absent some form of >>>>> physicality. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The "interfaces" and the relative implementations are defined using >>>>> addition >>>>> and multiplication only, like in Gödel's original paper. Then UDA shows >>>>> why >>>>> physicality is an emergent pattern in the mind of number, and why it >>>>> has >>>>> to >>>>> be like that if comp is true. AUDA shows how to make the derivation. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No, you have only proven that the idea that the physicalist idea that >>>>> "mind is an epiphenomena" is false, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No. I show that the physical reality is not an ontological reality, >>>>> once >>>>> we >>>>> assume we are (even material) machine. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> And I agree, the physical is not a primitive in the existential >>>>> sense, >>>>> but neither is the information. Idealism would have us believe that >>>>> differences can somehow obtain without a means to make the distinction. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> i.e. that material monism is false. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I insist everywhere that this is not what I showed. I show that all >>>>> form >>>>> of >>>>> weak materialism is incompatible with mechanism. All. The monist one, >>>>> the >>>>> dualist one, etc. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> How weak does materialism get when its primary quality is removed? >>>>> This >>>>> is a case of "vanishing in the limit", something similar to the heap >>>>> that >>>>> vanishes when we remove the last grain. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> A proof that I understand and agree with. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Clearly you did not. You even miss the enunciation of the result. >>>>> Mechanism >>>>> is incompatible with WEAK materialism, that is the idea that primitive >>>>> matter exist, or the idea that physics is the fundamental science. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Can you not understand these words? How is materialism any weaker >>>>> than >>>>> the case of no material at all? My argument is that the possibility of >>>>> physical implementation cannot be removed without removing the >>>>> possibility >>>>> of meaningfulness. It is not an argument for a primitive ontological >>>>> status >>>>> for matter. You even seem to follow this reasoning when I ask you where >>>>> does >>>>> the computation occur then there is not paper tape for the TM and you >>>>> say >>>>> "on the walls of Platonia". >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Your arguments and discussions in support of ideal monism and, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I prove that ideal monism is the only option, once you believe that >>>>> consciousness is invariant for digital functional substitution done at >>>>> some >>>>> level. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No, you did not. Your result cannot do such a thing because you >>>>> cannot >>>>> have your cake (a meaningful set of expressions) and eat it too. >>>>> Digital >>>>> functional substitution is the substitution of one physical >>>>> implementation >>>>> for another, it shows that the fact of universality does not depend on >>>>> any >>>>> particular physical implementation but DOES NOT eliminate the need for >>>>> at >>>>> least one form of physical implementation. Digital substitutability is >>>>> an >>>>> invariance over the class of physical implementations, but what happens >>>>> then >>>>> you remove all members of a class? It vanishes! >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> like Berkeley's, still fail because while the physical is not >>>>> primitive, >>>>> it >>>>> is not merely the epiphenomena of the mind either. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It has to be by the UDA. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> And the UDA (like the UD) must have some implementation, even though >>>>> the >>>>> particulars of that implementation are irrelevant. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You are perhaps confused by the fact that unlike the physical, ideas >>>>> can >>>>> represent themselves. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I believe that comp makes the "physical" into an aspect of number's >>>>> self-reference. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> There we agree but I would say that a number's self-reference is its >>>>> connection to some physical representation. My point is that there >>>>> cannot >>>>> be >>>>> a self-reference without an implementation even if the particulars of >>>>> the >>>>> implementation do not matter. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If I take away all forms of physical means of communicating ideas, no >>>>> chalkboards, paper, computer screens, etc., how can ideas be possibly >>>>> communicated? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Because arithmetical truth contains all machine 'dreams", including >>>>> dreams >>>>> of chalkboards, papers, screens, etc. UDA has shown that a "real >>>>> paper", >>>>> or >>>>> & "real screen" is an emergent stable pattern supervening on infinities >>>>> of >>>>> computation, through a competition between all universal numbers >>>>> occurring >>>>> below our substitution level. You might try to tell me where in the >>>>> proof >>>>> you lost the arguement. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> When these "infinities of computations" are taken to have specific >>>>> properties merely because of their existence. You are conflating >>>>> existence >>>>> with property definiteness. Most people have this problem. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This does not make sense. I assume not just O, s(0), etc. I assume also >>>>> addition and multiplication. That's enough to get the properties. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> There is an "I" in that statement! What is this "I"? What is its >>>>> function? What class is it an invariant upon? Exactly how is it that >>>>> you >>>>> know of these properties? Absent the possibility of some form of >>>>> implementation in the physical, there is no distinction between you and >>>>> anything. Meaning requires distinction. Some even say that meaning *is* >>>>> distinction. What other than the persistence of pattern that the >>>>> physical >>>>> offers acts to allow for the ability to know differences? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Mere existence does not specify properties. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That's not correct. We can explain the property "being prime" from the >>>>> mere >>>>> existence of 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... and the recursive laws of addition >>>>> and >>>>> multiplication. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No, existence does not specify anything, much less that "0, s(0), >>>>> s(s(0)), ..." is distinct from any other string, nor does it specify >>>>> the >>>>> laws of addition or multiplication. Existence is not a property that an >>>>> object has. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Exactly. that's the point. You seem to contradict it. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But existence is thus independent of properties and thus >>>>> distinctions. >>>>> So your claim that " "being prime" from the mere existence of 0, s(0), >>>>> s(s(0)), ... and the recursive laws of addition and multiplication" >>>>> requires >>>>> a substrate that allows form representative patterns to obtain. >>>>> Universality >>>>> allows us to substitute one form of substrate for another so long as >>>>> the >>>>> function is the same. But universality and existence alone are >>>>> insufficient >>>>> for your claim that "I prove that ideal monism is the only option". You >>>>> also >>>>> have to show how the properties are both definite and invariant. This >>>>> requires implementation in a form that is invariant (to some degree) >>>>> with >>>>> respect to time. There is not time in Platonia therefore there in no >>>>> invariance with respect to time for the patterns of difference to occur >>>>> for >>>>> implementation to be said to obtain. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You need to study the "problem of universals" in philosophy, it is well >>>>> known and has been debated for even thousands of years. For example see >>>>> 1 >>>>> or >>>>> 2. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This is a red herring. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In a way, surely, but the essence of the problem is not. The paper >>>>> that >>>>> is reference 1 explains this well. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I go so far as considering that the wavefunction and its unitary >>>>> evolution >>>>> exists and it is a sufficiently universal "physical" process to >>>>> implement >>>>> the UD, but the UD as just the equivalent to Integers, nay, that I >>>>> cannot >>>>> believe in. “One cannot speak about whatever one cannot talk.” ~ >>>>> Maturana >>>>> (1978, p. 49) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think Maturana was alluding to Wittgenstein, and that sentence is >>>>> almost >>>>> as ridiculous as Damascius saying "one sentence about the ineffable is >>>>> one >>>>> sentence too much". But it is a deep meta-truth playing some role in >>>>> number's theology. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> OK, I deeply appreciate your erudition, you are much more educated >>>>> than >>>>> I am, but nevertheless, I submit to you that you cannot just ignore the >>>>> universals vs. nominal problem and posit by fiat that just because one >>>>> can >>>>> proof the truth of some statement that that statement's existence >>>>> determines >>>>> its properties. Our ability to communicate ideas follows from their >>>>> universality, that they do not require *some particular* physical >>>>> implementation, but that is not the same as requiring *no* physical >>>>> implementation. You argue that *no* physical implementation is >>>>> necessary; >>>>> I >>>>> disagree. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It is the result of the proof. It is up to you to show the flaw, or to >>>>> abandon comp. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than by >>>>> invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter. What you >>>>> seem >>>>> to think is that mathematics can prove things to itself in a manner >>>>> consistent with how I might be able to write out a set of symbols on >>>>> your >>>>> chalkboard that represent a proof of some theorem. You reject David >>>>> Deutsch's discussion of how this is wrongheaded out of hand, that is >>>>> unfortunate since it would greatly strengthen your case if you could >>>>> show >>>>> exactly where Deutsch is going wrong, if he is... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But I think that you cannot define the universal wave without >>>>> postulating >>>>> arithmetical realism. In fact real number+trigonometrical function is a >>>>> stronger form of realism than arithmetical realism. Adding "physical" >>>>> in >>>>> front of it adds nothing but a magical notion of primary substance. >>>>> Epistemologically it is a form of treachery, by UDA, it singles out a >>>>> universal number and postulate it is real, when comp explains precisely >>>>> that >>>>> such a move cannot work. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I am allowing for realism, it is a belief that may be true, but it is >>>>> not a unique singleton in the universe of models. I am arguing against >>>>> the >>>>> idea that the physical is primitive, against substantivalism especially >>>>> as >>>>> it is occurring in physics, for example see: >>>>> www.dur.ac.uk/nick.zangwill/Haeccieties.doc or 4. >>>>> In physics there is a huge debate over the haecceity of space-time >>>>> and >>>>> your result is important in this, but your attempt to argue from the >>>>> other >>>>> side is as treacherous because it ignores the necessity of the >>>>> physical. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Comp makes necessary that there is no *primitive* physicalness. But as >>>>> David >>>>> points in his reply, you cannot say that I ignore the physical. The >>>>> whole >>>>> work is an explanation of why we believe in the physical, why and how >>>>> such >>>>> belief emerges and are persistent, etc. Physics is entirely given by >>>>> the >>>>> material hypostases, which are defined by number's self-reference, as >>>>> UDA >>>>> shows it to be the case necessarily so. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This is insufficient. Merely postulating a property does not make it >>>>> so. >>>>> You continued intransigence on the non-existence of the physical world >>>>> with >>>>> statements that is shown to not be primitive is an avoidance of the >>>>> problem >>>>> by ignoring it, not a solution to it. The fact that is removing all >>>>> possibility of physical implementation by a theory of Everything makes >>>>> it >>>>> worse than mute, it eliminates itself as a meaningful theory simply >>>>> because, >>>>> to be consistent, it cannot be communicated. >>>>> >>>>> Onward! >>>>> >>>>> Stephen >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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