On 20 Jan 2012, at 07:17, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Wed, Jan 18, 2012 at 1:33 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
Stephen, Ronald,
The paper is very interesting, on physics, but succumbs directly
from the argument that any digital physics is bound to be
unsuccessful on the mind-body problem by being still physicalist.
The body problem is a problem of computer science, that is
arithmetic, once we bet that observer are Turing emulable, as they
should if the physics is digital.
If the universe is a computation, then comp is true. But comp
implies that the universe cannot be a computation (by UDA).
Could you explain this a little bit? I didn't get that from my
reading of the UDA
I am busy today, and will explain this asap. Normally this should be
easy, and it probably means that you are not taking the hypothesis
(comp), or some UDA steps literally enough. Note also that I meant
"comp implies that the physical universe cannot be necessarily a
computation. Thanks for your patience. I prefer to answer at ease,
instead of being too short or unclear.
Bruno
So the universe is a computation implies that the universe is not a
computation. So the universe is not a computation, whatever it can
be. This defeat Finkelstein, Schmidhuber, Fredkin, and all attempts
to conceive the physical universe as a computation, or output of a
computation.
This does not mean that the paper does not have interesting ideas on
the unification of known forces in physics, and that "quantum
graphity" might be a good idea, but if correct, such idea have to be
recovered from the (more ambitious) attempt to get a unification of
both qualia and quanta (consciousness and matter). The authors have
still not integrate the mind-body problem. We are still much in
advance on this list :)
Bruno
On 18 Jan 2012, at 14:53, ronaldheld wrote:
I found this at arXiv:1201.3398v1 [gr-qc] 17 Jan 2012. Any comments?
I have just started to read it.,
Ronald
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