On 10 February 2012 14:08, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> No. Craig can be considered to be exploring the implications of > Chalmer's claim that consciousness is a fundamental property of the > physical, like mass, spin and charge, i.e. it is not emergent from matter. > His concept of "sense" is not much different from your 1p or the content of > a "simulation". I disagree with this assessment, I think. ISTM that equating consciousness with other physical properties inevitably puts one in the position of having to "build up" composite entities from the properties of their components - hence the notorious "grain" and "binding" problems. The "theology" of comp, on the other hand, seems to imply that at some "ultimate" level consciousness is a symmetric unity, but that this symmetry is broken, by the internal logic of comp, into an infinity of views. Of course, this latter idea can only make sense in terms of 1p; from the 3p perspective, all that exists is computation. David > On 2/10/2012 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 Feb 2012, at 13:47, Stephen P. King wrote: > > On 2/10/2012 7:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> >> >> On Feb 10, 4:06 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: >> > 2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> >> > >> > > On Feb 9, 9:49 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: >> > > > 2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> >> > >> > > > > > > How does a gear or lever have an opinion? >> > >> > > > > > The problems with gears and levers is dumbness. >> > >> > > > > Does putting a billion gears and levers together in an arrangement >> > > > > make them less dumb? Does it start having opinions at some point? >> > >> > > > Does putting a billions neurons together in an arrangement make them >> > > > less >> > > > dumb ? Does it start having opinions at some point ? >> > >> > > No, because neurons are living organisms in the first place, not >> > > gears. >> > >> > At which point does it start having an opinions ? >> >> At every point when it is alive. > > > That's not true, does a single neuron has an opinion ? two ? a thousand ? > >> >> We may not call them opinions > > > Don't switch subject. > >> >> because >> we use that word to refer to an entire human being's experience, but >> the point is that being a living cell makes it capable of having >> different capacities than it does as a dead cell. > > > Yes and so what ? a dead cell *does not* behave like a living cell, that's > enough. > >> >> When it is dead, >> there is no biological sense going on, only chemical detection- >> reaction, which is time reversible. Biological sense isn't time >> reversible. >> >> > Why simulated neurons >> > couldn't have opinions at that same point ? Vitalism ? >> >> No, because there is no such thing as absolute simulation, > > > There is no need for an "absolute" simulation... what do you mean by > "absolute" ? > > >> >> there is >> only imitation. Simulation is an imitation > > > no, simulation is not imitation. > >> >> designed to invite us to >> mistake it for genuine - which is adequate for things we don't care >> about much, but awareness cannot be a mistake. It is the absolute >> primary orientation, so it cannot ever be substituted. If you make >> synthetic neurons which are very close to natural neurons on every >> level, then you have a better chance of coming close enough that the >> resulting organism is very similar to the original. A simulation which >> is not made of something that forms a cell by itself (an actual cell, >> not a virtual sculpture of a cell) probably has no possibility of >> graduating from time reversible detection-reaction to other categories >> of sense, feeling, awareness, perception, and consciousness, just as a >> CGI picture > > > A CGI picture *is a picture* not a simulation. > >> >> of a neuron has no chance of producing milliliters of >> actual serotonin, acetylcholine, glutamate,etc. > > > Is it needed for consciousness ? why ? > >> >> >> Craig > > Hi, > > How would your reasoning work for a virus? Is it "alive"? I think that > the notion of "being alive" is not a property of the parts but of the whole. > > > Which is the very basic idea sustaining comp. But Craig seems to defend the > opposite idea. He believes that life, sense, and consciousness must be > present in the part to sum up in the whole. A mechanist will insist that it > is the property of the whole which is responsible for the higher order > aptitude, like being able to play chess, or having a private experience. > > > Hi Bruno, > > No. Craig can be considered to be exploring the implications of > Chalmer's claim that consciousness is a fundamental property of the > physical, like mass, spin and charge, i.e. it is not emergent from matter. > His concept of "sense" is not much different from your 1p or the content of > a "simulation". > > > > Yet, the case of "living" and "conscious" are not entirely equivalent, and > should be treated differently. The definition of life seems to me > conventional, but being conscious is everything but conventional. > > > We agree on that! "Living" does seem to be 3p definable while > "conscious" is only 1p definable. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
