On 12 Feb 2012, at 18:54, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm assuming the observations of quantum mechanics, but not the
interpretations.
So you assume QM?
I think that what we measure at that level is literally the
most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena.
It is
the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small
detail
really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are
anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres
as
a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then
authenticity
is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary
universes
unto themselves.
With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means
something.
Why not?
Because matter are first person (plural) experiences emerging from
truth (not formalizable) and infinities of computations.
I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I
cannot
ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me "yellow" as example,
you
did not convince me. The qualia "yellow" is 1p simple, but needs a
complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be
manifested in a consistent history.
I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not
need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed
it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions.
This is a "don't ask" assumption.
No, it is a positive assertion of irreducibility. Ask all you want,
I'm explaining why you will never get an answer.
I already got an answer. I don't know if it is the true one, but I
know it follows from comp.
No amount of whats
and hows add up to a who or a why. They are anomalously symmetric. Not
dualistic, because they are only opposite views of the same sense
(making it an involuted monism, since 1p exists within 3p as 'energy',
and 3p exists within 1p as body/matter.)
?
The 3p quant
correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish
any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it
get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings
in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even
conceive
of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and
die with nothing but the 1p descriptions,
We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no
1p-3p relation.
The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat
catch a mouse, also.
Sure, yes. Every 3p is the back door of some other 1p. They are the
same thing in one sense, and opposite things in the opposite sense.
This makes brain mysterious.
therefore we cannot assume
the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the
power
to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on
their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the
universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete
understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on
their
own.
This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still
waiting for a list of what you assume and derive.
I assume that you don't need to assume in order to derive, and I
derive that there are many overlapping channels of sense which
themselves make sense relative to each other. By reaching for a list
of a priori assumptions, we subscribe to a logos-centric cosmology. We
are saying, in effect, first we must care about logical ideas before
we can explain anything. This is not how we organically make sense of
the world.
Sure, but those things are not as the same level. You are saying that
we cannot life science, because we have to alive for doing that. This
is incorrect.
Logic is always an a posteriori analysis
No doubt on this. But arithmetical truth does not depend on logic.
Logic is used in *theories*, or by *machines or beings* attempting to
get a tiny bit of the arithmetical truth.
and never precedes
or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense
experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the
history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in
emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily.
What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel
the wind? Nothing.
What if, to feel the wind, the brain has to make many unconscious
assumptions?
Just to show that your argument is not an argument, but a begging
question move.
I try to reason about reality, avoiding theory when I can.
Reality is what we search. You can only reason on a theory.
That's why I don't deal in philosophical zombies.
The point is that your theory entails either zombie, or that bodies
have an infinitely complexity relevant for the consciousness of the
person having that body.
That's a loaded question fallacy. If we use puppet instead of zombie,
there is no confusion and it all makes sense without invoking infinite
complexity. The puppet isn't one thing. It's a bunch of parts. Besides
being a bunch of parts on the outside, we are also one simple 'I'
thing on the inside. The I side is opposite to the parts side, so it
is very different; an experiential flow instead of discrete
mechanisms. I can see myself in as simple or complex terms as I like.
The outside cannot be seen that way. It is not subject to a 'seems
like' shifting of attention - it is instead a fully explicated 'simply
is' which can be quantified in terms like finite or infinite.
I don't see any sense in that paragraph. Sorry.
The I
side cannot be understood in that logical schema at all. It is both
finite and infinite, and neither. It is primordial orientation. It is
the sense maker itself.
Looks like the machine's 1p. It is far too much imprecise to be sure.
You cannot compare a bouncing ball with a self-referential programs.
I'm not comparing them, I'm exposing what they are made of. It doesn't
matter how sophisticated the logic or graphics are, there is still no
sensation or experience there.
How do you know that.
This implies p-zombies.
There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But
the reason why it looks like there is matter are given.
I understand, but I insist that the reasons are not sufficient to
explain the experienced character of matter.
Yes it is. That's the main point. We obtain a logic of qualia
That's the problem. Qualia is only 1% logic.
?
Qualia themselves are not logic at all.
But many non logical things can still be studied logically. If not you
just impose a don't ask attitude. You are still confusing levels.
If you conflate qualia
with it's capacity to represent, you amputate the significance of
qualia entirely.
You are right. So let us not conflate qualia and the theory of qualia.
which
has a bigger non communicable, yet know true by the machine, than the
quanta parts. The hypostases splits along the provable and non
provable parts, from the point of view of the machine.
Would you trade your eyesight for a technology which identified
optical patterns verbally?
No. But the hypostases defined with "& p" are provably non verbal.
You would never have to squint or wonder
what something is, the computer would just present you with a list of
every object you would be seeing if you could see. Using this non-
visual interface you could 'prove' that you could see.
Not to myself.
Again, it could be
sufficient, had we no authentic subjectivity to compare it with, but
since we do, virtual matter remains a theoretical concept rather
than
a reality.
You talk like if you knew what is reality. We are searching and
proposing theories.
I don't know what reality isn't,
That contradicts your non-comp statements.
but I do know that what we experience
directly is unquestionably one aspect of reality.
Sure.
Matter exist, but is an emergent phenomenon on consciousness (not
human consciousness, but universal number consciousness). It is a
consequence of the theory we are working on.
Why would it emerge at all though? It makes more sense to me that
matter and awareness have a form-content relation rather than a
function-product relation.
It is a form-content relation. With comp. Indeed a many-form----
content relation.
Primitive matter does not exist, and that's nice, because nobody has
ever been able to define it, or even to use the notion.
Notice how you equate existence with the ability to define or use
notions.
I did not.
This is the logo-centric assumption, which is great for
theory that cuts across subjective and objective lines (because logos
and techne form the perpendicular axis to subject and object) but it
is as arbitrary as a primitive matter assumption. It precludes the
possibility of anything that exists transcending intellectual thought.
On the contrary. The result is that most of arithmetical truth
transcend our intellect.
You seems to ignore to much facts which contradict your reductionist
view of numbers and machines.
I have never
seen any books in physics which attempt to define or use primitive
matter.
Right, because it needs no definition from a physics point of view.
The techne perspective is opposite logos, so it can be completely
instrumental and non-theoretical. Try defining definition.
Study theory of definability. We can define "definition" (as opposed
to knowledge, which needs higher order meta-levels).
What do you
assume when you attempt to define or use primitive assumptions or
theories?
I (meta) assume that the peer reviewer have learned to read and
compute in high school, and that they have at least the cognitive
ability of a LUM. But that assumption is not part of the theory, which
assumes elemntary arithmetic, like almost all theories.
and the
appearance of matter emerges
Emerges is the key word. Emerges from where?
From the average minds of the average universal numbers.
Why doesn't it just stay there in their minds?
It does, in some sense, but the dreams are shared and so seem to point
on an external primary physical reality which appears to be a non
sensical notion in the comp theory. We cannot use, and then we don't
need either.
To where?
To here and now.
Where is that? Why is it not where the numbers are? W
The numbers are not somewhere. Position is not defined for the numbers.
Why is it
necessary?
Because once you have addition and multiplication, numbers dreams,
and
their dreams arithmetically cohere into partially sharable first
person plural reality, normally (if comp is true).
Why would they?
Because if they don't comp is already false. But then, to make your
point, you have to show that they don't do that. If not, that's
begging the question again.
Once you have numbers dreams, why would you need
anything else? Number dreams should be the alpha and omega of the
cosmos with no appearances, emergences, or coherences at all.
What if that's the content of the (sharable) dreams?
That's the case for reason explained in UDA (+AUDA).
Can you write an equation that emerges as actual matter in
our world?
This has no sense. I can only describe a reality (arithmetic) and
explain why some numbers will have some physical feeling and beliefs
in material thing. I have no evidence for actual matter. I have
personal evidence for consciousness and qualia, and historical
evidences for measurable numbers and plausible locally stable
relations.
That's my point is that it makes no sense to jump from numbers to
appearances of matter.
But that points work for all 3p theory. So you are just telling us
that you have an inner conviction that we should not ask. That's
obscurantism, and contradicts your own approach.
Why would arithmetic want to pretend to
materialize?
Because it is the only option without introducing infinite ad hoc
complexity for which we have no evidence, and which explains nothing,
or to not assuming all what we want to explain.
That's a false dichotomy. It could also be the case that comp isn't
true.
Sure, but then show me the non-computable element.
Arithmetic isn't primitive,
Then tell me what is primitive, and how you derive arithmetic from it.
Comp might be wrong, but this does not mean that non-comp has made
any
progress on the mind-body problem. your theory seems to assume both
mind and matter, so it is not satisfying for those who search an
explanation of mind and matter (from something else). Machines like
PA
are already aware why this *seems* impossible. So don't refer to your
feeling that it seems impossible that machine can think, or that
matter might not exist primitively. I don't buy such intuition at
all.
Comp makes a pseudo progress into a receding horizon of promissory
certainty, while non-comp is anchored in the stillness of perpetual
acceptance of uncertainty.
You are the one who seems certain.
I can't see any reason for computations to ever leave this realm of
intangible dreamy universal entanglement.
It never leaves it indeed, but the dreamy things exists in the usual
sense of arithmetical existence, where we agree that ExP(x) is true
if it exists a number verifying the condition P.
See, it gets really foggy and metaphysical there.
I really don't see why. I was utterly clear on "existence".
The dreams are the
only reality
No. The numbers and +, and * is the only assumption.
but reality isn't really primitively real...
No. You are foggy. Physical reality, and experiential reality is not
primitively real, but the phenomenlogy is explained.
and there
really isn't any difference between a dream being real or not...
There is an important relative difference.
It's
a description of descriptions. There is no 'showtime' that
matters...which is, after all, the only thing that we really care
about as human beings. Comp doesn't explain this. It makes no
distinction between dream and reality.
It does. We can even test nature if we are in dream or not. And the
test confirms that we are in a multiuser dream.
Because you keep your theory in mind, but when you study a theory
made
by other people, you have to do the effort of abstracting yourself
from your assumption. I think.
I think that sounds reasonable, but that isn't what I do. I'm only
interested in further proving, disproving, or understanding the
implications of my own ideas. I already understand why comp can't be a
primitive truth, so it will never again be of interest to me.
That's understanding is good for you, but you don't succeed in
communicating it.
You also find obvious that we are not machine,
We are a machine too, but we aren't only a machine. We have parts, but
we also have wholes.
All machines have wholes.
but clearly it is not.
Nothing can be said to be obvious about the possibility of
consciousness to other entities.
In one sense that's true, but in another sense it's not. A young child
can tell you that a trash can lid is not conscious even though it says
THANK YOU on the lid.
I don't see the argument.
So you assume that you can extrapolate from a tiny sample of
observation.
I don't assume it, it assumes itself. I just have no reason to doubt
it.
Well, literally you are right, but still not answering. You seems to
assume that your extrapolation is true.
You keep avoiding reasoning. You really talk like someone
who has personal conviction, not as someone trying to provide a
public
solution to a problem.
If you have the same personal conviction, then it has become a shared
solution. If enough people share it, then it is a public solution, as
long as it is true also.
Personal conviction has nothing to do in science-discourse, and even
more when the science-discourse bears on the subject matter of
personal convictions, where it becomes not just wrong, but very
confusing.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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