On Thu, Feb 23, 2012 at 4:42 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Feb 22, 6:10 pm, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote: >> 'Yes doctor' is merely an establishment of the assumption of comp. >> Saying yes means you are a computationalist. If you say no the you are >> not one, and one cannot proceed with the argument that follows - >> though then the onus will be on you to explain *why* you don't believe >> a computer can substitute for a brain. > > That's what is circular. The question cheats by using the notion of a > bet to put the onus on us to take comp for granted in the first place > when there is no reason to presume that bets can exist in a universe > where comp is true. It's a loaded question, but in a sneaky way. It is > to say 'if you don't think the computer is happy, that's fine, but you > have to explain why'. > >> If you've said yes, then this >> of course entails that you believe that 'free choice' and 'personal >> value' (or the subjective experience of them) can be products of a >> computer program, so there's no contradiction. > > Right, so why ask the question? Why not just ask 'do you believe a > computer program can be happy'? When it is posed as a logical > consequence instead of a decision, it implicitly privileges the > passive voice. We are invited to believe that we have chosen to agree > to comp because there is a logical argument for it rather than an > arbitrary preference committed to in advance. It is persuasion by > rhetoric, not by science. > >> In fact the circularity >> is in your reasoning. You are merely reasserting your assumption that >> choice and personal value must be non-comp, > > No, the scenario asserts that by relying on the device of choice and > personal value as the engine of the thought experiment. My objection > is not based on any prejudice against comp I may have, it is based on > the prejudice of the way the question is posed. > >> but that is exactly what >> is at issue in the yes doctor question. That is precisely what we're >> betting on. > > If we are betting on anything then we are in a universe which has not > been proved to be supported by comp alone.
The "yes doctor" scenario considers the belief that if you are issued with a computerised brain you will feel just the same. It's equivalent to the "yes barber" scenario: that if you receive a haircut you will feel just the same, and not become a zombie or otherwise radically different being. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
