On 2/28/2012 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/2/28 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net
<mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>
On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any
difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain
was substituted for a digital brain.
Hi Quentin,
OK, but could you elaborate on this statement?
It means an hypothetical "you" after mind uploading would feel as
conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel
*feel* and feel being you and conscious and all...
Hi Quentin,
We need to nail down exactly what continuity of self is. if there
is no "you", as Brent wrote yesterday, what is that which is invariant
with respect to substitution?
Is the differentiation that one _might_ feel, given the wrong
substitution level, different from what _might_ occur if a
"digital uploading" procedure is conducted that fails to generate
complete continuity?
It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of
continuity... it's not binary outcome.
At some point it would have to be, for a digital system has a fine
grained level of sensitivity to differences, no? I am trying to nail
down the details of this idea.
Those "does not feel any difference" terms are a bit ambiguous and
vague, IMHO.
Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted
with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue
your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be
inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is
non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of
computation that goes through your consciousness current state.
Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a
strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level
measurement of brain structure?
Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow wrong...
AFAIK, it would only prevent the continuation of the idea that "we
are only that which is within our skin". We might finally escape from
the modular clock world of gears and levers that the Parminidean and
Newtonian world view entails.
Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will
prevent any form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad
thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1p
indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire "universes"
in the many-worlds sense - but would doom any change of
immortality via digital uploading.
Sure, but if the level is that down... then even if it is still
compatible with comp, for all practical purposes, it's the same as if
it was wrong...
I am not so sure. I think that the way that QM systems are linear
will still allow substitution, but not in the usual way of thinking. The
problem that I see is the lack of understanding of QM's implications.
Onward!
Stephen
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