On 29 Feb 2012, at 17:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 29, 4:33 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 28, 5:42 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
There is no such thing as evidence when it comes to qualitative
phenomenology. You don't need evidence to infer that a clock
doesn't
know what time it is.
A clock has no self-referential ability.
How do you know?
By looking at the structure of the clock. It does not implement self-
reference. It is a finite automaton, much lower in complexity than a
universal machine.
Knowing what time it is doesn't require self reference.
That's what I said, and it makes my point.
By comp it
should be generated by the 1p experience of the logic of the gears of
the clock.
?
By comp logic, the clock could just be part of a
universal timekeeping machine - just a baby of course, so we can't
expect it to show any signs of being a universal machine yet, but by
comp, we cannot assume that clocks can't know what time it is just
because these primitive clocks don't know how to tell us that they
know it yet.
Then the universal timekeeping would be conscious, not the baby
clock.
Level confusion.
A Swiss watch has a fairly complicated movement. How many watches does
it take before they collectively have a chance at knowing what time it
is? If all self referential machines arise from finite automation
though (by UDA inevitability?), the designation of any Level at all is
arbitrary. How does comp conceive of self referential machines
evolving in the first place?
They exist arithmetically, in many relative way, that is to universal
numbers. Relative "Evolution" exists in higher level description of
those relation.
Evolution of species, presuppose arithmetic and even comp, plausibly.
Genetics is already digital relatively to QM.
You reason like that: no animals can fly, because pigs cannot fly.
You mistake my common sense reductio for shortsighted prejudice. I
would say that your reasoning is that if we take a pig on a plane,
we
can't rule out the possibility that it has become a bird.
No. You were saying that computer cannot think, because clock cannot
thing.
And I'm right.
A brain can think because it's made of living cells
which diverged from an organic syzygy in a single moment. A computer
or clock cannot think because they are assembled artificially from
unrelated components, none of which have the qualities of an organic
molecule or living cell.
You reason like this.
A little clock cannot think.
To attach something which does not think, to something which cannot
think, can still not think.
So all assembly of clocks cannot think.
But such an induction will not work, if you substitute "think" by "is
Turing universal", or "has self-referential abilities", etc.
A machine which can only add, cannot be universal.
A machine which can only multiply cannot be universal.
But a machine which can add and multiply is universal.
The machine is a whole, its function belongs to none of its parts.
When the components are unrelated, the machine does not work. The
machine works well when its components are well assembled, be it
artificially, naturally, virtually or arithmetically (that does not
matter, and can't matter).
All know theories in biology are known to be reducible to QM, which is
Turing emulable. So your theory/opinion is that all known theories are
false. You have to lower the comp level in the infinitely low, and
introduce special infinities, not 1p machine recoverable to make comp
false.
This is
another variation on the Chinese Room. The pig can walk around at
30,000 feet and we can ask it questions about the view from up
there,
but the pig has not, in fact learned to fly or become a bird.
Neither
has the plane, for that matter.
Your analogy is confusing. I would say that the pig in the plane does
fly, but this is out of the topic.
It could be said that the pig is flying, but not that he has *learned
to fly* (and especially not learned to fly like a bird - which would
be the direct analogy for a computer simulating human consciousness).
That why the flying analogy does not work. Consciousness concerns
something unprovable for everone concerned, except oneself.
May I ask you a question? Is a human with an artificial heart still a
human?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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