On 14 March 2012 15:12, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > No, in this case that is a perfectly legitimate question because in the > above you didn't say anything about making numerous copies of yourself so in > the quotation it is clear who "me" is, and that is the case with most normal > conversations. Normally you are free to use as many personal pronouns as you > like and everybody still knows what you're talking about, but in > philosophical discussions about identity involving bizarre (but not > illogical) thought experiments with lots of copies of you running around and > then to ask what one and only one thing will "I" do next is nuts.
Does it really have to be pointed out yet again that these "bizarre" thought experiments are not merely posed for their own sake? If they were, discussing them would be a pointless waste of time. But they have of course a deeper point, which is to assess, step-by-step, the subjective consequences of the proliferation of "bodies", competing for a common root "identity", that is implied by computational theory, and indeed by the Everett-MW interpretation of QM. The UDA is designed explicitly to assess these consequences, in a controlled manner, for the experiencing subject in each case as posed. The identity and personal history of each subject are seen to be locally distinguishable in consequence of different implied "event sequences" as recorded in their personal diaries. These diaries record common points of origination, different points of arrival, and prior indeterminacy as to ultimate destination. Each of these aspects is relevant to later steps in the reasoning, and to the UDA as a whole. Under such conditions we should indeed expect to have to modify the ordinary application of personal pronouns, though not beyond the possibility of rendering a principled account of what is supposed to take place. If you can accept that these issues are what the thought-experiment is actually about, it might be easier for you to use your imagination fruitfully to follow the overall argument through to its conclusion. Alternatively you can persist in distorting them into irrelevant nonsense of your own making. It's your choice. David > On Wed, Mar 14, 2012 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> > What you're telling is that a question like "what is the probabilty >> > that events happens to me in one second ?" is not a legitimate question, > > > No, in this case that is a perfectly legitimate question because in the > above you didn't say anything about making numerous copies of yourself so in > the quotation it is clear who "me" is, and that is the case with most normal > conversations. Normally you are free to use as many personal pronouns as you > like and everybody still knows what you're talking about, but in > philosophical discussions about identity involving bizarre (but not > illogical) thought experiments with lots of copies of you running around and > then to ask what one and only one thing will "I" do next is nuts. > > The entire point of the exercise is to focus in on what is meant by "I" and > then you use "I" as if it's meaning is already known right at the start of > the thought experiment! It's like saying the definition of "big" is a word > used to describe something that is big, but if I didn't already know what > "big" means then that is just not helpful, and if I did know then I don't > need the definition. > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
