On 5/19/2012 2:11 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 May 2012, at 19:17, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/19/2012 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Stephen,
I presented an argument. Whatever you read, if it casts a doubt on
the validity of the argument, you have to use what you read to find
the invalid step.
If not, you act like so many papers pretending that cannabis is a
dangerous, but which are only speculation on plausible danger, not
proof.
A proof, both in math and in applied math in some theoretical
framework does not depend on any further research, by construction.
If you doubt about immaterialism, by reading on Markow (say), then
you might find a way to use Markov against computationalism, or you
must make precise which step in the reasoning you are doubting and
why, and this without doing interpretation or using philosophy.
If not, you confuse science and philosophy, which is easy when the
scientific method tackle a problem easily randed in philosophy, or
at the intersection of philosophy and science.
Now, I don't see why the work you mention has anything to do with
the immaterialism derived from comp. You might elaborate a lot.
Bruno
Dear Bruno,
I finally found a good and accessible paper
<http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CEoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fntrs.nasa.gov%2Farchive%2Fnasa%2Fcasi.ntrs.nasa.gov%2F20050243612_2005246604.pdf&ei=8NO3T9LmFu-d6AHAq_3uCg&usg=AFQjCNHMBmwAi1K7yJY3oRBnJrYRC2H9RA&sig2=yb-YNcKWR6LNPSVy8bQquA>
that discusses my bone of contention. To quote from it:
"A theorem proved by Markov on the non-classifiability of the
4-manifolds implies
that, given some comprehensive specification for the topology
of a manifold (such as
its triangulation, a la Regge calculus, or instructions for
constructing it via cutting
and gluing simpler spaces) _there exists no general algorithm
to decide whether the
manifold is homeomorphic to some other manifold _ [l]. The
impossibility of classifying
the 4-manifolds is a well-known topological result, the proof of
which, however, may
not be well known in the physics community. It is
potentially a result of profound
physical implications, as the universe certainly appears to
be a manifold of at least
four dimensions."
The reference to the proof by Markov is:
Markov A. A. 1960 Proceedings of the International Congress of
Mathematicians, Edinburgh 1958
(edited by J. Todd Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) p 300
The point of this is that if the relation between a pair of
4-manifolds is not related by a general algorithm, how then is it
coherent to say that our observed physical universe is the result of
general algorithms?
But comp explained why it has to be like that. The observable universe
cannot be the result of general algorithm, given that it results from
a first person plural indeterminacy on infinite set of possible
computations.
Hi Bruno,
Can you not see that I am claiming that your notion of "an infinite
set of possible computations" is incoherent if "the immaterialism
derived from comp" is such that computations have content and
consequences in a way that is separate from the physical implementations
of those computations.
By "computation" I mean a set of states together with an universal
number relating them.
"States" of what? Is there a referent, an object, that is the
referent of the word "states" here? How are the "states" distinguished
from each other?
You claim that this "computation" has "immaterial existence" in the
sense that is is separable and independent of the physical word(s). You
claim that the physical world are not primitive ontologically. I agree
with this claim, but I do not agree that the "universal numbers" have a
primitive existence either. We cannot put numbers, or any other entity,
at a lower ontological level than the physical world.
The only thing proved by Markov here is that the homeomorphism
relation is not Turing decidable. It suggests that 4-manifold
+ homeomorphism is Turing universal (as proved for braids). Any
intensional identity, for any Turing complete system is as well not
Turing decidable. There is no general algorithm saying that two
programs compute the same functions, or even run the "same" computation.
Therefore we know that there does not exist a means to generate a
"Pre-established Harmony" nor can we imagine coherently that the
universe we observe is just some kind of pre-existing structure that our
mind is somehow running in. This implies to me that we have to think of
the universe we observer to be something like the result of an ongoing
and maybe even eternal process.
It is a well known result for logicians.
You don't give a clue what it has to do with immateriality. To be
franc, I doubt that there is any.
Immateriality, just as in Ideal monism, is a bankrupt ontology. It
is incoherent to claim that something that is the result of a process
exists prior to the actual implementation of the process.
--
Onward!
Stephen
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
