On 19 May 2012, at 19:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On May 18, 2:56 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 17 May 2012, at 23:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On May 17, 2:04 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Sense and matter is what I search an explanation for. You start at
the
finishing line.
That's why you are looking at it upside down. There isn't an
explanation for explanation. It is both the start and finish line.
The whole AI, and comp coginitive science search, at the least,
explanation for explanation, and a part of it is rather convincing
imo. Here you beg the question by extending a lot your "don't ask"
philosophy, I think.
I'm not saying don't ask at all - by all means, ask away...but what is
"ask" made of in the first place?
It makes sense to me that comp explanations should make almost perfect
sense. They make as much sense of the universe as you can make without
factoring in sense itself. Once you factor in actual presentation of
concrete experience, you should see that there can be nothing that it
can logically supervene upon. In order for it to supervene on
arithmetic truth, you would have to show actual presentation through
arithmetic alone without any matter or energy at all to ground it in a
timespace experience within the comsos.
Arithmetic has no way to get to timespace without inventing it for no
arithmetic purpose. Arithmetic can't justify sense, it assumes sense
behind numbers and from the start and begs the question of AI by
extending the "it can't be that simple" philosophy.
That just saying that comp is false, without argument.
BBp means that the same universal machine now utters Bp.
For any arithmetic (or equivalent) proposition, Bp > BBp, means
that
if that machine utters p, it will soon or later utters Bp.
So if I utter 'Toast is square', that means that eventually I will
utter 'I utter Toast is square' and then 'I utter I utter I
utter I
utter Toast is squalre'?
In principle, except that all universal machine get bored and stop
for
contingent reason. But to do the math, some simplification are in
order.
If I'm a UM though, I don't seem to be doing that. I don't seem to
be
recapitulating the recapitulation of everything I've ever done
continuously.
You took my words too much literally. "B" is really "believable", not
"believed".
So I am continuously making my beliefs that my beliefs that my beliefs
are believable?
No. Just that if p is believable, then "p is believable" is
believable. And so one. I work in platonia with ideal machines.
And that is
a theorem of arithmetic, making it true independently of you and
me.
I never argue that sense is dependent on human consciousness at
all.
Sense is universal and literally older than time itself.
I have no clue what is that "sense" and how it related to the use
of
the word "sense".
Sense should be self defining, but to be technical I'll say that
it is
detection, participation, and organizing relations between anything
and everything.
That's OK. But why believe a priori that machines can't do that.
Because machines aren't detecting, participating, and organizing their
own relations, they are driven only by agendas external to the
assembly as a whole, which ride on top of the natural low level
agendas of the groups of molecules, their relation to other objects,
the planet, sun, etc. It's the symbol grounding problem. Metal boxes
don't feel animal joy and suffering. They may feel electromotive
enthusiasm or tactile-acoustic collision, etc, but they have no
history as biological organisms that have proven their desire to
survive.
Yet they survive, and participate with in the multiplication. You just
feel superior, and you make unfair comparison. You could have mocked
the bacteries, which eventually made us.
You confuse arithmetic and the human's apprehension of
arithmetic.
Not at all. You are assuming that arithmetic is conceivable
outside of
some kind of sense faculty
That would not make ... sense. You need a conceptor to conceive.
But
you don't need one to make a proposition true or false.
You need a conceptor to even make a proposition in the first place.
Sure, but the truth of the proposition does not depend on the
existence of the sentence possibly used to express that proposition
later. The proposition "the Moon is a satellite of Earth" was
arguably
true before humans assert propositions.
I would argue that proposition is true if and only if there is some
awareness of Moonness, Earthness, and a relation between them as well.
Yes, it is your panpsychisme. It makes both matter and mind more
mysterious, and even if true, does not really contradict comp and its
consequence, it needs only making the substitution level very low, and
look at the points of view.
If there was nothing outside of the Moon and Earth, the Earths
universe would consist of only the feeling of being the Earth and
detecting the Moon. It could not see itself as a planet unless it
figured it out through the experience of the revolving rotating moon
(forget that there would be no light without the sun) and a leap of
faith rooted in metaphor that perhaps what is inside is like what is
outside.
That would forever be a mystery however unless there is a third
similar object, so that either of the other two can confidently infer
that they are all similar objects in similar relation. You would need
that third subject to make the proposition "the Moon is a satellite of
Earth" true.
True or false is a second order logic on top of that. The idea that
you don't need a subject to make a proposition true or false is no
different to me than the assumption of primitive matter. True to
who?
In what context? If you get rid of all of the matter and energy in
the
cosmos, what truth there be? Truth about what? Emptiness?
Numbers, for instance. I don't think that a proposition like "17 is
prime" needs any physical reality to be true or false. Truth is not
knowledge. It does not need a knower.
17 needs an objective reality that behaves like countable static
units. 17 puffs of smoke is no different than one puff. Prime requires
something to compare number sequences and read patterns into them.
It's true that an individual knower does not make something true or
false for others, but truth or falsehood in general cannot exist
outside of perception. Numbers are features of perception, but
perception is not a feature of numbers. Numbers are metaphysical to
any particular object because they are a language common to both
subjective and objective phenomena, but they are a low level language,
incapable of handling deep qualitative richness. This doesn't mean
that numbers are independent of objects and subjects in general
though. Numbers are clearly subjective contents, both for us, and I
think for everything else that can be enumerated in the
panprotopsychic universe.
You confuse p and Bp. I think.
and I don't see any reason to agree with
that. It doesn't have to be human apprehension at all, it could be
anything from a single atom to the totality of all mass-energy of
the
cosmos as a single unit...or even some other sensible-but-real
entity
beyond our ability to conceive through human sense. All of it
has to
make sense in some way to some thing. Something has to detect
something.
This explain what you start from an observer perspective. I don't
buy
this if the price is that machine can't think.
Why do you want machines to think?
I don't want that. I find it plausible, and refutable. That is why I
study the consequences of that hypothesis. With Gödel and QM, the
evidences are big in favor of comp, though.
What specifically do you find plausible about it?
It follows from known laws, and machines have a rich "theology".
And theories adding things non computable, seems to me to add a non
necessary marmalade to the pill.
Not really. If I am a machine, then "physics is in my head". I can
take a look, and compare with facts, so I can test mechanism. I
don't
see how your theory (assuming there is one) is testable. It just
look
as an negative assertion on a class of possible individuals.
But the facts are in your head too, as are the results of any test
you
could perform. You can see that this is the case from our dreams.
One
minute we can be sitting on the couch reading the tax code and the
next we can be floating down a stream of carrots. There's no test I
can perform on the carrots that will wake me up.
Why not. Lucidity in dreams is often a consequence of some reality
check.
But the same reality check can just as easily lead you into another
dream.
Which can interrupt the lucidity, or not.
As I already told you, to make this false, you need to build an
explicit non computable and non Turing recoverable function
having a
genuine role for the mind.
I don't need to build it, I am living in it already,
How do you know that?
How do you justify that?
In all kinds of ways. If I weren't, I could look at a graphic
display
of the contents of an mp3 file and experience it the same way as
listening to the song. Nobody would have ever felt that machines
were
inherently different from living organisms - that they were in any
way
cold or unfeeling. CGI would look warm, real and tangible rather
than
ephemeral and simulated. Higher math would be easier to learn than
emotions for infants. I don't think the burden of proof lies on my
end. What is one example of a Turing machine's behavior that
suggests
feeling?
The existence of S4Grz and the X logics, in AUDA.
But less technically, the fact that molecular biology shows life to
be
Turing mechanical, + the facts that mammals seem emotional.
For a computationalist, humanity illustrates the fact that machine
can
be very emotional.
But molecular biology can't see any feeling in life either.
Well, it is a young theory. And it is not supposed to think anything,
yet.
The
computational approach is blind to life and feeling.
I doubt this. This happens only when we confuse mechanism and
materialism.
That's why we
feel and live and a compution does not.
It has never been said that computation are conscious, just that they
can support someone conscious when done relatively to your most
probable computation.
A living organism can and does
compute, but only because has other senses first. A computation can't
live because it has no other senses to locate the physical cosmos
directly.
There is no physical cosmos, ontologically. (I assume comp).
I am agnostic. Not enough evidences.
you just aren't
admitting that it is the case.
I am neutral. I just try to make sense of your prejudice against
machine, a priori.
It's not pre-judice, it's post-judice. I have seen machines and I
see
no reason to assume that they feel anything. They don't deserve the
benefit of the doubt because I know their history originates
inorganically. There is no more reason to think a computer can feel
than I would think a cartoon can feel.
How can you see the difference between a machine and a non machine.
Lots of ways. A machine is assembled from parts intentionally. A non
machine assembles itself intuitively. A machine can't depart
meaningfully from it's program. A non-machine invents and discovers
novelty. A machine can be made to perform a monotonous task reliably
and automatically for an indefinite time, non-machines get tired,
angry, make mistakes, etc.
That is not seeing, that is by definition in your theory. You
extrapolate for mundane machines.
Machine cannot see the difference between a god and a more complex
machine than themselves. You refer to a personal conviction, and you
seem unable to doubt it. That looks like pseudo-religion to me, if
you
indulge my frankness.
You don't think that the idea of machine theology and numbers having
dreams sounds like a pseudo-religion to some people?
Only to those who does not read the definitions. That numbers have
dreams follows from "yes doctor" and Church thesis, (cf UDA, and
standard definition). And machine theology is, to be short, Tarski
Truth minus Gödel provabilty, and obeys precise, and some testable,
propositions.
How does it follow from numbers though that they necessarily
develop
anything at all?
That is a good question. It is not obvious at all. But Gödel and
others found this.
Can you explain it in English?
Addition and multiplication, once defined, are enough, together with
some logic, to program all computable functions, and execute those
programs. So if you agree that "17 is prime", independently of you
and
me and universe, you can see that the existence of all computations
is
as much independent.
17 is prime only because of the sense that whole integers make. You
could make a number system which calls 17 Waldo and includes a number
for 8.5 called Ralph, then Waldo would not be prime because it is
divisible by one and Ralph. It's only the sense of the numerical
schema which results in the tautological truths of that schema.
That's other numbers. If you find operation of them which make your
numbers Turing complete, it is OK. I use the usual numbers because
everyone know them.
It's
not a truth that is independent of sense or the universe at all, it's
just that it's truths extend beyond our personal capacity to make
human sense out of it in a convenient amount of time. 17 is prime is
like DNA is organic. The truth of it is contingent upon the
assumptions that define it. 17 walnuts don't know they are in a group
of 17 or that 17 is prime. A universe of nothing but walnuts would not
necessarily include any possible reference to prime.
Then walnuts is not Turing complete, and cannot be used for the TOE.
Then you can define, still in arithmetic, notion
of believability and study how, in arithmetic, numbers develop
beliefs, on knowledge, observations, and physical universe. The
arithmetical reality is very rich, especially as seen from inside, by
(relative) numbers, but you have to keep into account the different
person points of view.
How are you defining a belief that a number develops?
Read the paper, the archive or follow the discussion on the FOAR list,
where I explain more currently. I model ideally correct machine
believability by arithmetical provability. Basically by axioms and
inference rules.
You are suggesting that bytes are alive and do things
on their own, yet we have never seen that to be the case nor
does it
make intuitive sense.
It certainly does, once you assume comp.
Comp is not intuitive though.
Comp itself is rather intuitive. Its consequences are not. That's
already the case for arithmetic.
How is comp intuitive when every culture on Earth begins with non-comp
cosmology?
Comp makes correct that intuition, and explains it, somehow. Comp
implies that cosmology is non-comp, like theology.
So it is a common trait between every culture and universal machine,
they begin with non comp ontology, then they go to a phase of comp
theology, (the stupif phase, if you want), then they come back to non
comp theology.
Please don't confuse a computationalist theology with a computational
theology. Comp implies that all correct universal machines can refute
correctly *any* computational theology.
With comp, "we" are machines, at some level of description, but this
entails that about anything else is not machines.
It is a simple, yet radical and shocking (but no more than Everett)
consequence of taking the first person indeterminacy into account in
the arithmetical reality.
And it certainly does from a
third person perspective when you look at the arithmetical
relations.
Some emulate the galaxy, with all its inhabitants, and in
principle,
you can look at them, even talk with them.
Why should they emulate anything?
Because arithmetic 'contains' all possible computations.
What makes a computation define itself as an emulation though?
The relation between the numbers, and universal numbers. It is
technical and long, and not so easy to prove. But it is standard and
in all textbook in logic. (If I understand the question).
If that were true, we should see that Bugs Bunny
is having new adventures behind our back on 60 year old celluloid
reels by now. The internet would be haunted by autonomous entities
that we should be looking for like SETI.
You drive conclusion too much quickly. I use math to have very high
level perspective on arithmetic, something infinite, you seems to
look
just under a tree, and then conclude that there is no mushroom in
the
whole forest.
I don't need to look under even one tree to know that there is no
talking mushroom in the whole forest.
Yes, but you need to look everywhere in the forest to know that there
is no mushroom in it.
When I talk about machine, I talk about a notion which can be defined
in arithmetic. I am not talking about my fridge or any actual
machines. I refer to the concept.
I understand, but the concept is just a representation of common
principles found in buildable machines. The concept of machine can't
build an actual machine by itself.
Why should the concept of machine build an actual machine? What would
it mean?
The "actual machines" are stable machines/numbers/patterns in the
universal machine's first person indeterminacy domain.
Arithmetical truth itself is far beyond of numbers,
Why should that be and how could that be the case? At what point
can
numbers no longer tolerate being numbers and suddenly
become...what?
From where?
This is again not easy to explain in few line. It is related to
Tarski, and other, who prove this. After Gödel discover than we can
define arithmetical provability *in* arithmetic, it was soon (if
not
earlier) discovered that truth and knowledge by numbers and about
numbers, cannot be defined by numbers.
That is why arithmetic is a good ontology, because it is naturally
creative from inside.
To me " truth and knowledge by numbers and about numbers, cannot be
defined by numbers." should suggest that arithmetic truth fails to
define the whole of the cosmos in the same way that numbers fail to
define arithmetic truth.
No, for I cannot conceive something greater than arithmetical truth
seen from inside. It plays the role of God, in machine's theology,
not
of a finite 'terrestrial' creature. The cosmos is a tiny part of that
picture (in the comp theory), yet no machine can seen it entirely
too.
I can conceive that arithmetical truth can only seem great by virtue
of its association to non-comp qualities,
That's not the reason. The greatness from inside can be explained in
term of model theory, in logic. This is explained elsewhere. But the
incompleteness already explain a big part of it.
which are misattributed as
the consequence of numbers rather than the cause.
Well, that the bet the people will do by saying "yes". What will
happen to them? Will they look retard or will they become zombie?
Numbers are only
figures.
That means nothing.
Sense includes everything literal and figurative, including
numbers.
That a gap-god type of explanation. Equivalent with "don't ask".
yet numbers can
relatively develop some intuition about those kind of things.
You just seems stuck in a reductionist conception of numbers and
machines. We know such conception are wrong.
You confuse your conception of numbers with the reality of (non-
human)
sense in general.
Oh? Why not? Why adding something which seems more complex that
what
we try to understand. it looks like the God of the gap.
I'm not adding sense, you are. I claim sense from the start. You
smuggle it in as an unexplained addition on to arithmetic.
Because there are nice candidate playing that role. (like the UDA
first person notion, or its AUDA counterpart: Bp & p, Bp & Dp & p,
etc.).
That's not sense, it's a schematic of one of the behaviors found in
sense. Saying that a notion of first person experience covers sense is
like saying if you look at the blueprints of an airport in China that
you have climbed Mt. Everest.
OK, but the digital brain is not a metaphor.
Because we know that we have different channels of sense and we
know
that it is not necessary for a computer to have multiple sense
channels, and that in fact, all data must be compiled into a one
dimensional binary stream.
The cerebral stems also simplifies a lot. But adding complexity
does
not solve the problem, per se. In the worst case, it dilutes it.
Which problem?
The mind body problem, or the sense problem.
But having to account for the complexity does help solve the mind body
problem, since it makes no sense under comp.
Read the papers. On the contrary, comp reduces partially the mind-body
problem into a problem in arithmetic. So, with comp the MB problem get
in part a *quite* precise sense.
Our senses multiply the richness of our
experience, and even simple sensations like a circle quickly
invite
imaginative elaboration. If a person is dizzy, they will
complain. A
computer will never complain even if it is inside of a washing
machine
that never turns off.
It depend which one.
None of them will complain unless someone programs it to do so.
How can you be sure?
I don't need to be sure, I only need to observe the universality of
the lack of machines that have ever existed thus far in the history of
the world, and to understand that it makes perfect sense that they do
because the have no personal preference to ground a complaint in. I
don't have to be sure that all scissors cut to know that they don't
drive a bus in their spare time.
Lol
That the existence of universal numbers, and their many dreams,
is a
consequence of logic and arithmetic.
Which is a consequence of sense and motive.
Arithmetic cannot be a consequence of anything, except if it
assumed
it (or equivalent) already.
What makes you think that?
That can be proved, and is part of the history of logic (failure of
logicism).
Don't you recognize the incestuous nature of using logic to prove
arithmetic and vice versa? Arithmetic cannot prove feeling, but all
arithmetic can only be proved through feeling and first hand sense
making experience.
I agree that there might be something incestuous in arithmetic. But
why would that make them into zombie, the accusation is a bit grave.
Some people can do arithmetic better than
others, the ability to understand arithmetic develops at certain
ages
and not others. In people we see clearly that arithmetic
understanding
is a consequence of physiological development.
This suggests only that physiology is more complex than arithmetic,
not simpler.
No, it proves that one particular physiology develops gestural
emotional sense before cognitive symbolic sense. It doesn't say that
physiology as a whole is more complex than arithmetic as a whole. It
does imply though that numbers are a more complex sense experience
than feelings involving more levels of abstraction.
Because you don't listen to them.
That's obvious, a bacteria, at the molecular level is already
equivalent, for computability, to Robinson Arithmetic.
That's only what we see as a bacteria. If an alien astronomer looked
at New York through a telescope, New York would seem equivalent to
Robinson Arithmetic too.
No. It will be hard to distinguish for a moister, unless they zoom and
find brain and computer, or bacteria.
How can something be determined to be true without something else
making sense of it as being true?
It can be true without anybody capable of determine if it is true
or
not. That's the point of being realist.
I would say that the capacity to determine truth or not (sense) is
the
only independently valid condition. Truth is a second order logic of
sense.
That is the solipsist slope.
The cosmos is solipsistic. Solipsism is only problematic because
multiple solipsistic entities have to relate to each other in order to
maintain the integrity of the overall solipsism.
With comp the cosmos is an open question.
A billion digit numbers can be prime without
us being able to know it.
Sure, but if nothing is ever able to know it, then it isn't
something
real, it's only an idea of what could be real.
?
There is no factory making numbers in reality. Numbers are
hypothetical.
Everything is, except consciousness here and now.
But through consciousness here and now you can extend your sense
experience into memory or mental and physical action in the world.
You can bet on that, yes.
You
can't access a non-hypothetical instance of a number though.
It depends what you mean by access. I think the number 4 is more
accessible to me than the moon, especially when the wether is bad.
AUDA illustrates that many different notions of accessibility exist.
There is
nothing a number by itself can do to threaten you or move your body.
But their natural relations makes me dream in threats and move.
Like Zeno's paradox - the idea that something would be
impeded from moving because it would first have to move halfway is a
fallacy because 'halfway' is an intellectual interpretation with
intellectual consequences. It has no causally efficacious
consequence
on its own.
I can agree with this.
I agree, but the ability to experience any of them, including
numbers,
is more primitive.
Well, it certainly is, with comp, for it relies in the additive and
multiplicative of numbers. But you want them to be primary, and
thus
unexplainable. This makes your approach a bit too much like "don't
ask". But even machine will ask, so I search for more
understandable
theories.
It's only unexplainable because it is explanation itself. Why would
you need further explanation?
Because it does not put any light on what interests me.
I think it should though.
I am suspicious that theories affirming peremptorily that another
theory is wrong, is not helpful. Build your theory first, and compare
it to comp after.
The first person of the machine cannot believe she is *any* machine,
nor that there is any reductive or normative theory about her. She is
a universal dissident. Can be a terrible child, if you lack respect.
In your logopomorphic theory of comp.
Be polite!
:)
Hah. I wasn't trying to be pejorative, just saying that your view
makes sense in my view but my view doesn't make sense in yours.
On the contrary. As I told you, you just reify the first person
point
of view. I already know why machine want to do that. The illusion
is
true and genuinely felt by them, yet illusory. (in the comp
theory).
And as I have told you, you just reify the logomorphic point of
view.
I too know why mathematicians and logicians want to to that. The
illusion is true and logically proved by them, yet (relatively)
illusory.
?
If you have only a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
OK.
(There is no Church thesis for Hammer, no notion of universal hammer,
I think. And if there is, hammer and nails will be enough for the
ontology).
It develops from intuition.
That's sense!
OK. For machine, it is what depend on both the machine beliefs, and
(arithmetical) truth.
AKA, what (hypothetically) makes sense to a machine.
Sure.
Ok, so that's what I'm saying, beliefs and truths supervene on sense.
I would say it is more like beliefs and sense supervene on dreams and
truth.
At the ontological level only. Not for the epistemology, which is
on
the contrary vaccinated against reductionism.
The ontological level is all that I care about. I am trying to
describe the universe, not engineer within it.
I don't buy the myth of the (ontological) universe. It is
incompatible
with comp, but even without comp, I take it as a fertile simplication
in the natural sciences, but nothing more. I have always intuited
that
such metaphysical assumption tend to eliminate sense and persons.
You do better by securing sense in putting it in the ontology, and I
appreciate that, but this does not make much sense to me, especially
if it makes machines into puppets. It is a far too carbon centered
conception of life, mind and even humans.
If you can make and control a machine made out of living cells, then
you have a good change of doing the same thing you could do with
silicon or ping pong balls. If there is no important difference then
you should have no problem making a machine like that.
Not at all. The evidences, and the theory suggests it might be very
difficult to do, except by copying/stealing nature, or by waiting very
long time with or without lucky serendipitous jumps (computer science
is full of jumps, some of them reflected in the tractabibility domains).
This is what
counting is; an abstraction layer which we use to identify or
mention
*that* things are, but it doesn't address the actual experience of
what it is to be presented with those things. We count five apples
but
the number five tells us nothing about apples.
What the logomorphic perspective does is invite an elevation of
truth
values and universality at the direct expense of qualitatively
rich
experience and specificity. It amputates the protocol stack of
humans,
animals, organisms, chemicals, even physics and leaves only a
mathematical stump.
Not at all. comp explains entirely whay arithmetic, seen from
inside,
look even beyond the mathematical (and why machine naturally
develop
theologies, which goes beyond what they can rationally justified).
What you accuse comp of doing, is what you do on machines. you
amputate their qualitatively super rich epistemological realities
by
looking only to the third description of the computations or
arithmetical relations.
We don't have direct access to any super rich qualities of comp,
they
all are inferred through our natively super rich qualities of
cognition.
That is locally true, but globally wrong (in the comp theory).
How can numbers be numbers but also be super rich qualities.
because that is what universal numbers do, relatively to some other
universal number.
That is possible for the same reason that you can buy a CD, with a big
number graved on it, and your computer will interpret that numbers in
a sound wave, and your brain (natural personal computer) interpret the
sound waves as first personal emotions and beauty feeling.
Wouldn't
the qualities be the more completed description of what they are?
That is exactly how they seem to be for the first person subject. But
they are not description, they are experiences, which cannot really be
described (without ending up with 6000 pages à la recherche du temps
perdu).
The whole complete theology of any universal machine is beyond any
human conceivable domain.
The sense of the totality-singularity is beyond any conceivable
theology.
But we can get nice big picture of it, in
the study of fixed little a priori correct machine; it is already
quite a mess full of things that *we* can name, in more powerful
theories than arithmetic, and we can see why the machine cannot get
those names, and the catastrophes which can occur if they
inadvertantly give a name to those things. Then we can lift such
theologies for us, with the proviso that we can only bet on our
correctness, and that eventually, we need to refer to truly
unameable
things to ensure such theologies makes sense.
You are the reductionist, and this to claim that we (who exactly?)
have something that a vast class of creature cannot have
according to
your feeling.
They aren't creatures though, they are ideas of creatures. Ideas
don't
create things, creators create using ideas.
Well, the one who says "yes" to the digitalist surgeon, refutes this.
But that's coherent with your saying "no".
I can understand that before Gödel, we might have tought
mechanism is
a reductionism, but after Gödel, mechanism appears to be a vaccine
against reductionism. The self-referentially correct machine is
bound
up to be a universal dissident.
If she succeed in never exchanging an atom of security for an
atom of
liberty, she can go to heaven (Dt and Co.), if not she can go to
hell
(Bf and Co.). Despite it is hard to imagine something less
deterministic than arithmetic, from inside, it is looks like we
surf
on a frontier between security (below universality, or sigma_1
completeness, we can control our submachines), and liberty (you can
be
become whichever machine you want, you are (at different levels)
Turing universal, or sigma_1 complete. Universal machines, in a
sense,
have already a sort of free will possibility, because they are
initial
segment of the all histories, or subjective experience, dreams, or
the
comp first person experiences.
The desire to go to heaven and avoid hell is sense. It doesn't
emerge
logically from arithmetic.
How do you know that?
What kind of a number is heaven
Heaven is not a number, but it is a place supposed to be cool.
and why would one want to "go there"
The motive is harm reduction, relative to competing universal numbers,
at different levels.
if there were no sense or motive?
You are the one assuming machine or relative number have no sense and
motive.
What do numbers care about heaven and hell?
By definition, they fear and hate hell, and desire heaven. Hell is
pain, and pain is what they have to avoid so that they consciousness
flux maximize the long term consistent histories. In the comp
theology
"absolute Hell" is the constant false. Like in Plotinus, it does not
exist. But already for the ideally simple correct machine, lies,
error, dreams abound, and they are of the type Bf (or BBf, BDt,
etc.). They can approach "hell". With B and D variants of the
Gödelian arithmetical B and D.
It sounds interesting, and I wish I could follow you into an
arithmetic divinity at least for the alchemical correspondences alone,
but it all seems like an arbitrarily fantastic scenario that projects
obviously anthropological level sense onto one dimensional recursive
enumeration.
It is computer science. Mathematical logic applies on the ideally
correct machine. They have already quite a personality I think. (I
recognize myself a bit).
Now, here, even in the toy case, there are *many* open problems. And
before proceeding, we should need to agree on many definitions. To be
clear.
I don't doubt it.
The assumption is that using the splinters of the
stump, we must be able to build the entire tree, but what keeps
happening is that we get only a Turing Frankentree and splinters
in
our hands.
Possible. But I bet on the contrary. I don't feel superior, and
it is
also a hope, and a fear. Typically I dunno. But it is a simple and
elegant hypothesis, with an "effective everything" (the UD, made
solid
by Church thesis), and which leads to a physics that we can tested.
That's ok but it doesn't lead to the untestable first hand
experience
of reality.
If comp is correct, it does. Indeed, it defines your here and now
domain of first person indeterminacy. Singular, and plural, and sorts
of intermediates. It is complex.
But a singular what? Who is the first person? It's an empty chair that
has an X where the self is supposed to go, but that doesn't make it a
real person.
Enough real for it, perhaps?
The danger is that rather than seeing this a sign to
understand the tree as a unique top-down event in the cosmos as
well
as a bottom up assembled machine, we become even more fascinated
by
the challenge of transmuting AI gold from leaden code and pursue
it
even more avidly and obsessively.
It is not without danger. The only danger, both for comp and non-
comp,
would be in pretending to know the truth about that. Comp is a type
of
technological religion, and the question is really "can your
daughter
marry a guy who bet on comp?".
Betting on comp is ok, I just think that betting on sense makes more
sense.
It is certainly better than eliminating sense. We agree on this.
But I
do think there is an explanation of how they emerge from number's
introspection.
To me, any sort of introspection is already sense. Sense doesn't need
sense to explain sense, it just experiences directly.
= don't ask.
And if sense does not need sense to explain sense, why would machine
lacks sense? And how could you be sure?
The universal numbers already "behave" like if they
sense their relationships with variate universal numbers.
Arithmetic is full of life.
It would take me a full lifetime to learn to see much real life in
arithmetic. Skeletons of life, sure.
Your non comp theory makes it a skeleton, peopled with infinitely many
zombies.
Just make clearer all your terms, learn a bit of logic, and build a
"real" non-comp theory of reality. But the math needed to handle
non
comp entities is basically the same than the math for comp, and you
have to conceive quite complex (but existing) entities to escape
the
mathematical theologies of the self-referentially correct entity.
Another solution, is that you stop pretending that your theory of
reality decides between comp and non-comp, for you do have some
intuition comparable ... to the machine's intuition. The first
person
of the machine already don't believe she is a machine.
Does the first person machine also believe that her world is a
machine?
Only the dumb one.
But aren't you a first person a machine who says I should believe our
world is a machine?
?
No I insist that "we" are machine entails "that" is not a machine
(with that being diverse things, like reality, god, universal soul,
intelligible matter, sensible matter).
Look at reality as a sequence of planes with many holes on them, of
all dimensions. We can go through tunnels made by hole successions,
but we can also get stuck. Now the more a machine makes herself small,
the more such tunnels she can find.
The one who have not yet understood that if they
are machine, then "reality (God included)" cannot be a machine.
How could reality not be a machine when it is made up completely of 3-
p machines?
At the ontological level, nothing is made of something. There is just
the numbers and their usual additive multiplicative relation. They
implement naturally all computations, most of them being infinite. In
some computations Löbian machine appears, and eventually understand
that their continuations has to provide by a statistics on their lower
substitution level relative computations. That is testable.
It is
almost a triviality. Above the treshold of sigma_1 completeness, you
need explore the whole arithmetical and analytical hierarchy to just
learn on the sigma_1. That is perhaps why Emile Post, called its
Turing universal sets the creative sets, because sigma_1 complete
set,
creative set, or universal "machine" or number are explosively
creative, but they can reason, and thay can understand that IF they
are machine (which they cannot know) then, whatever whole exist, it
can't be a machine.
This is what is going on in Big
Physics (mechanemorphism) now as well, and in fundamentalist
revivals
(Big Religion, anthropomorphism) around the world and Big Business
(technemorphism).
Business and religion are wonderful things, like money, which is
the
blood of economy, unless it is captured by special interest and
will
in control. So the state has to be independent of them, or it leads
to
Big Gangsterism (current situation, btw).
All four points on the compass are hyperextended
into pathology until unity can be reconciled.
That happens all the time with the liars.
The role of the lies in life and in matter is still unclear for me.
That's what I was trying to get at with numbers being constrained by
truth. A sense based model means that fiction is primary, fiction is
the whole or ultimate truth, while fact is a quality of fiction
reliably presented as non-fiction.
I can give sense to that. That is why I use so often the term dream.
Awake of sleeping, we feel only the result of the brain information
processing, and as such awakeness, if that exist, can only be dream,
but well connected to some other (most probable) universal numbers.
Awakeness on p is dream on p + p is true, somehow.
But this does not dilute awakeness, although it might relativize it.
Awakeness on p is (sense-motive) dream on p + consensus of
constructively interfering dreams in a given inertial frame
(spatiotemporal) radius of the dreamers.
Because truth extend logics, and number are constrained by truth,
before what they can believe.
I get that truth extends logic, and that numbers are constrained
by
truth (which I say is lowest common denominator sense) but I don't
get
the last part. Why does truth have to discover itself?
I am not sure truth can discover itself. Truth from inside divides
into different perspectives, like the provable, the knowable, the
observable, the sensible. Necessarily when in the case of the "eyes
of
a universal machine", with the classical definition. Truth itself,
from inside is not nameable.
It's not nameable but it is experienced through sense.
Yes.
cool.
In our development as children, do we not discover logic out
of the chaos of infancy rather than the other way around? Do we
not
learn numbers rather than learn feelings?
Because we have brains which sum up millions years of teaching in
nine
month, making us believe that walking and seeing is simpler than
trigonometry. Later we can understand that is the contrary.
You are right in one sense, but that sense doesn't exist until
'later'. Trigonometry is indeed simpler mathematics than the
mathematics underlying human walking and seeing, but the sense
underlying trigonometry is even simpler. That sense is the same
common
denominator that makes us a single walking seeing person - it's
the
absolute common denominator, simplicity itself - unity, totality,
wholeness, being. It makes no distinction between now and forever,
between everything and nothing. It is the greatest and least
inertial
frame possible. For this not to be the case, there would have to
be
something preventing it. Some limitation inherent that does not
allow
everything to be one thing on some level. Sense does this
temporarily,
I think literally, it does it through time.
Ok, but then you reduce the ontology to the arithmetical sense.
That
makes sense, even with comp.
It reduces to sense but why say that it's arithmetic sense?
Because we study the comp theory, which is plausible from molecular
biology, or any physical theory (except those using ad hoc selection
principle).
And if it is false, may be we can refute it.
And if it is false, to make sense of its falsity, we will still need
the comp theory.
You can still study comp theory without giving consciousness and
matter supervenience on it.
Thanks to God.
They can all three be part of the same
thing...sense.
?
Then the comp act of faith
appears to be the simplest way to restore logic, except for
that
act
of faith and the belief in addition and multiplication.
What kind of faith does a Turing machine have?
If she is correct, it looks like it is plotinian sort of faith.
But a
machine can also develop a faith in mechanism, by surviving back-
up,
and be led, with occam, to a more pythagorean sort of faith.
Sounds like a very Greco-Anglican faith. Where are the Vedic
machines?
Very close. I have a craving for the study of the relation between
Greeks theologies and Eastern "theologies", it is a rich subject.
My
favorite text is the question of king Milinda. The arithmetical
interpretation of Plotinus comes from an earlier arithmetical
interpretation of Lao-Tseu.
I mean all correct machines seems quite Vedic to me.
With comp, the outer-god, the One, cannot recognize itself, but the
inner-god, the soul, the first person, can.
That makes sense in my terms too. That necessity to project an
interior that projects an exterior is the same thing as metaphor. I
think it's fundamental architecture of sense. The Big Diffraction
means that this can only be accomplished by masking the self into
partitions, so it's not really a projection as a gated filter on a
sense of everything which in turn filters itself into a sense of
self
and other things. Metaphor is how awareness bleeds through the
partitions, across levels vertically, ie in defiance of strict logic
(horizontal sense within one channel of sense).
Nice we might agree, but you get me lost here.
It *looks* like 1004 type of over- specified terms in a vague
context.
Sorry.
Yeah got a little too run together there, sorry.
OK.
Just saying how
metaphor is a big deal because it associates figures by making the
boundary between inner and outer realities porous in one sense and
solid in another. Diffusion of meaning through the semi-permeable
mindbrain if you will.
If that diffusion respects reasoning validity then it is OK. If not
the metaphor can lead astray.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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