2012/5/23 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> > On 5/23/2012 4:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 May 2012, at 01:22, Stephen P. King wrote: > > On 5/22/2012 6:01 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2012/5/22 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> > >> >> No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any >> particular as primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do such is >> to violate the very notion of neutrality itself. You might like to spend >> some time reading Spinoza <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/>and >> Bertrand Russell's discussions of this. I did not invent this line of >> reasoning. >> > > *Neutral monism*, in philosophy <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy>, > is the metaphysical <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics> view that > the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the > same elements, which are themselves "neutral," that is, neither physical > nor mental. > > I don't see how taking N,+,* as primitive is not neutral monism. It is > neither physical nor mental. > > > If mathematical "objects" are not within the category of Mental then > that is news to philosophers... > > > If mathematical "objects" are within the category of Mental then that is > news to mathematicians... > > And it is disastrous for those who want study the mental by defining it > by the mathematical, as in computer science, cognitive science, artificial > intelligence, etc; > > > Are we being intentionally unable to understand the obvious? Do we > physically interact with mathematical objects? No. >
Do you physically interact with the physical ? No ! no mind, no interaction, hence the physical is mental, QED... or what you say is just plain wrong... Quentin > Thus they are not in the physical realm. We interact with mathematical > objects with our minds, thus they are in the mental realm. Not complicated. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such >> special status, >> >> >> Because of "digital" in digital mechanism. It is not so much an >> emphasis on numbers, than on finite. >> >> >> So how do you justify finiteness? I have been accused of having the >> "everything disease" whose symptom is "the inability to conceive anything >> but infinite, ill defined ensembles", but in my defense I must state that >> what I am conceiving is an over-abundance of very precisely defined >> ensembles. My disease is the inability to properly articulate a written >> description. >> >> >> >> >> especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of >> the "reality" of the physical world? >> >> >> Not at all. Only "primitively physical" reality is put in doubt. >> >> >> Not me. I already came to the conclusion that reality cannot be >> primitively physical. >> >> > You are unclear on what you posit. You always came back to the "physical > reality" point, so I don't know what more to say... either you agree > physical reality is not ontologically primitive or you don't, there's no in > between position. > > > We have to start at the physical reality that we individually > experience, it is, aside from our awareness, the most "real" thing we have > to stand upon philosophically. > > > The most "real" things might be consciousness, here and now. And this > doesn't make consciousness primitive, but invite us to be methodologically > skeptical on the physical, as we know since the "dream argument". > > > The only person that is making it, albeit indirectly by implication, > is you, Bruno. You think that you are safe because you believe that you > have isolated mathematics from the physical and from the contingency of > having to be known by particular individuals, but you have not over come > the basic flaw of Platonism: if you disconnect the Forms from consciousness > you forever prevent the act of apprehension. You seem to think that > property definiteness is an ontological a priori. You are not the first, E. > Kant had the same delusion. > > > > > > From there we venture out in our speculations as to our ontology. > cosmogony and epistemology. is there an alternative? > > > So you start from physics? This contradicts your neutral monism. > > > So you do need a diagram to understand a simple idea. > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> Without the physical world to act as a "selection" mechanism for what >> is "Real", >> >> >> This contradicts your neutral monism. >> >> >> > No, it does not. Please see my discussion of neutral monism above. >> > > Yes it does, reading you, you posit a physical material reality as > primitive, which is not neutral... > > > No, I posit the physical and the mental as "real" in the sense that I > am experiencing them. > > > > You can't experience the physical. The physical is inferred from theory, > even if automated by years of evolution. > > > We cannot experience anything directly, except for our individual > consciousness, all else is inferred. > > > > Telescoping out to the farthest point of abstraction we have ideas like > Bruno's. I guess that I need to draw some diagrams... > > > Not ideas. Universal truth following a deduction in a theoretical frame. > It is just a theorem in applied logic: if we are digital machine, then > physics (whatever inferable from observable) is derivable from arithmetic. > Adding anything to it, *cannot* be of any use (cf UDA step 7 and 8). > > You are free to use any philosophy you want to *find* a flaw in the > reasoning, but a philosophical conviction does not refute it by itself. > > If you think there is a loophole, just show it to us. > > > >> >> >> >> why the bias for integers? >> >> >> Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the type >> "finitely describable". >> >> >> This is true only after the possibility of determining differences >> is stipulated. One cannot assume a neutral monism that stipulates a >> non-neutral stance, to do so it a contradiction. >> >> Computationalism is the theory that your consciousness can be emulated > on a turing machine, a program is a finite object and can be described by > an integer. I don't see a contradiction. > > > I am with Penrose in claiming that consciousness is not emulable by a > finite machine. > > > This contradicts your statement that your theory is consistent with comp > (as it is not, as I argue to you). You are making my point. It took time. > > > You have no idea what "my theory" is. > > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail. >> >> >> You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say "yes" >> to the doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer executing a >> code. A code is mainly a natural number, up to computable isomorphism. Comp >> refers to computer science, which study the computable function, which can >> always be recasted in term of computable function from N to N. >> And there are no other theory of computability, on reals or whatever, or >> if you prefer, there are too many, without any Church thesis or genuine >> universality notion. (Cf Pour-Hel, Blum Shub and Smale, etc.) >> >> >> I do listen and read as well. Now it is your turn. The entire theory >> of computation rests upon the ability to distinguish quantity from >> non-quantity, even to the point of the possibility of the act of making a >> distinction. When you propose a primitive ground that assumes a prior >> distinction and negates the prior act that generated the result, you are >> demanding the belief in fiat acts. This is familiar to me from my childhood >> days of sitting in the pew of my father's church. It is an act of blind >> faith, not evidence based science. Please stop pretending otherwise. >> >> "evidence based science" ?? > > > Yes, like not rejecting the physical necessity involved in a > computation. > > > There is no physical necessity involved in a computation, no more than > in an addition or multiplication. You will not find a book on computation > referring to any physical notion in the definition. This exists only in > philosophical defense on physicalism. The notion of physical computation is > complex, and there is no unanimity on whether such notion makes sense or > not. With comp, it is an open problem, but it does a priori make sense. > > > Oh my, can you not see that the book on computation itself is physical > and is thus a case of the necessity of a physical instantiation? You can > not seriously tell me that the most obvious fact here is not visible to you. > > > > > > I reject Platonism on these grounds; it is anti-empirical. > > > As Brent pointed out, it depends on the theory. Comp is platonist, but > makes precise prediction (indeed, that the whole of physics is given by > precise theories based on self-reference). This illustrates that platonism > can be empirical. > > > What ever. > > > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." > ~ Francis Bacon > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
