On 31 May 2012, at 08:02, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 29 May 2012, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:
The question I have in mind is "Does a brain produce consciousness,
or does the brain filter consciousness?
I had some thoughts on this same topic a few months ago. I was
thinking about what the difference is between a God-mind that knows
everything, and an empty mind that knew nothing. Both contain zero
information (in an information theoretic sense), so perhaps if
someone has no brain they become omniscient (in a certain sense).
"In a certain sense". OK. (The devil is there). But an empty mind has
still to be the mind of a machine, probably the virgin (unprogrammed)
universal machine, or the Löbian one (I still dunno).
If we consider RSSA, our consciousness followed some path to get to
the current moment.
Key point. I just used this in a reply on the FOAR list (where I
explain UDA/AUDA).
If we look at brain development, we find our consciousness formed
from what was previously not conscious matter.
Not really. It is counter-intuitive, but matter is the last thing that
emanates from the ONE (in Plato/Plotinus, and in comp, and even in the
information theoretic view of QM as explained by Ron Garrett and that
you compare rightly to the comp consequence). Matter can even be seen
as what God loose control on. It is almost pure absolute
indetermination. The primitive matter is really a product of
consciousness differentiation (cf UDA). But I see what you mean. I
think.
Therefore, there is some path from a (null conscious state)->(you),
and perhaps, there are paths from the null state to every possible
conscious state.
Yes, and vice versa by amnesia, plausibly.
If so, then every time we go to sleep, or go under anesthesia, or
die, we can wake up as anyone.
In a sense, we do that all the time. This points to the idea that
there is only one (universal) dreaming person, and that personal
identity is a relative illusion.
We "know" that consciousness is in "platonia", and that local brains
are just relative universal numbers making possible for a person (in
a large sense which can include an amoeba) to manifest itself
relatively to its most probable computation/environment. But this
does not completely answer the question. I think that many thinks
that the more a brain is big, the more it can be conscious, which is
not so clear when you take the reversal into account. It might be
the exact contrary.
I think there are many tricks the brain employs against itself to
aid the selfish propagation of its genes. One example is the
concept of the ego (having an identity).
Agreed. As I said just above.
Many drugs can temporarily disable whatever mechanism in our brain
creates this feeling, leading to ego death, feelings of
connectedness, oneness with other or the universe, etc. Perhaps one
of our ancestors always felt this way, but died out when the egoist
gene developed and made its carriers exploitative of the egoless.
Probably. I think so.
And this might be confirmed by studies showing that missing some
part of the brain, like an half hippocampus, can lead to to a
permanent feeling of presence.
Recently this has been confirmed by the showing that LSD and
psilocybe decrease the activity of the brain during the
hallucinogenic phases. And dissociative drugs disconnect parts of
the brain, with similar increase of the first person experience.
Clinical studies of Near death experiences might also put evidence
in that direction. haldous Huxley made a similar proposal for
mescaline.
This is basically explained with the Bp & Dt hypostases. By
suppressing material in the brain you make the "B" poorer (you
eliminate belief), but then you augment the possibility so you make
the consistency Dt stronger. Eventually you come back to the
universal consciousness of the virgin simple universal numbers,
perhaps.
Here are some recent papers on this:
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=do-psychedelics-expand-mind-reducing-brain-activity&WT.mc_id=SA_WR_20120523
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/01/17/1119598109.short
Thanks for the links and your thoughts. They are, as always, very
interesting.
Thanks Jason,
Bruno
PS I asked Colin on the FOR list if he is aware of the European
Brain Project, which is relevant for this thread. Especially that
they are aware of "simulating nature at some level":
http://www.humanbrainproject.eu/introduction.html
Has he replied on the FOR list? It seems he has been absent from
this list for the past few days.
He has disappeared again, apparently.
Best,
Bruno
Jason
If you have _everything_ in your model (external world included),
then you can simulate it. But you don’t. So you can’t simulate it.
Would you stop behaving intelligently if the gravity and light from
Andromeda stopped reaching us? If not, is _everything_ truly
required?
C-T Thesis is 100% right _but 100% irrelevant to the process at
hand: encountering the unknown.
It is not irrelevant in the theoretical sense. It implies: "_If_
we knew what algorithms to use, we could implement human-level
intelligence in a computer." Do you agree with this?
The C-T Thesis is irrelevant, so you need to get a better argument
from somewhere and start to answer some of the points in my story:
Q. Why doesn’t a computed model of fire burst into flames?
If this question is a serious, it indicates to me that you might
not understand what a computers is. If its not serious, why ask it?
There is a burst of flames (in the computed model). Just as in a
computed model of a brain, there will be intelligence within the
model. We can peer into the model to obtain the results of the
intelligent behavior, as intelligent behavior can be represented as
information.
Similarly we can peer into the model of the fire to obtain an
understanding of what happened during the combustion and see all
the by-products. What we cannot do, is peer into a simulated model
of fire to obtain the byproducts of the combustion. Nor can we
peer into the model of the simulated brain and extract
neurotransmitters or blood vessels.
To me, this "fire argument" is as empty as saying "We can't take
physical objects from our dreams with us into our waking life.
Therefore we cannot dream."
This should the natural expectation by anyone that thinks a
computed model of cognition physics is cognition. You should be
expected answer this. Until this is answered I have no need to
justify my position on building AGI. That is what my story is
about. I am not assuming an irrelevant principle or that I know how
cognition works. I will build cognition physics and then learn how
it works using it. Like we normally do.
What will you build them out of? Biological neurons, or something
else? What theory will you use to guide your pursuit, or will you,
like Edison, try hundreds or thousands of different materials until
you find one that works?
I don’t know how computer science got to the state it is in, but
it’s got to stop. In this one special area it has done us a
disservice.
This is my answer to everyone. I know all I’ll get is the usual
party lines. Lavoisier had his phlogiston. I’ve got
computationalism. Lucky me.
Cya!
Colin
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