On Monday, June 11, 2012 12:20:06 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: > > On 6/10/2012 6:12 PM, Pierz wrote: > > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and > eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. > > It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality > (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible > experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about > comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a > paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic > freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether > the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same > consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who > was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who > will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? > > This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the > question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be > scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have?" Will they be > happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I > don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine > dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the > continuity between the pre-dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can > only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes > 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. > > There's continuity of physical structure (I think that's what > 'reassembled' means). I > don't know what 'continuity of self-reference' means? Anyway this is not > a thought > experiment. The atoms in your body get replaced as you live, it is only > the structure > that is, approximately, conserved. >
Continuity of self reference = something like comp substitution level, i.e. I can recall a continuous self history which seems sufficiently coherent that I can identify a self. There is a continuity of physical structure, but one that is based on the pattern of relations not the physical atoms. So I could be duplicated, ending up with two selves. Now let's say one of these selves is tortured. Should I, prior to the duplication, fear this torture? Following the UDA, one 'diary' will record torture and the other won't. So do I have a 50% chance of being tortured? Should I fear it as if the matter were to be decided by a toin coss? I think not - this is not a normal type of probability. Both branches happen, and 'I' will experience both. > But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in > a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. > > Happens to me all the time. > > Yes, and well the question is, at what point do you stop being you and become someone else? Of course that is pure semantics from the 3p perspective, but from the 1p POV, it is the difference between being the locus of an experience or not, as the torture example shows. Imagine the brain is duplicated a million times, but each duplication introduces varying degrees of change from the original brain structure. Some duplications are almost (or exactly) the original me, others are completely different people. Now how do I 'bet' on whether or not to be scared of the torture that will be imposed on some of those copies? Should I only fear torture that happens to exact copies, slight variants, or *all* the copies, regardless of how divergent from the original they are? > Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried > about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? > What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer > recognizable as me? > > Are you worried that you may experience a heart attack in 20yrs? Are you > eating a > cheeseburger? > Heart attack's the least of my worries, but I hope you appreciate I'm not personally considering cryogenic freezing. I'm talking about the paradoxes that the idea of singular identity presents. > > > Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that > the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates > subjectivities is the contents of consciousness > > That seems to me a tautology; just an implicit definition of > "subjectivities"? > I don't think so. It arises as a necessary conclusion from contemplation of the foregoing scenarios and their variants. In comp, what maintains the continuity of the subject in the duplication experiment? The substitution level. The subject coheres through the teleportation/duplication because the structure of computations is retained - in my thought experiment, the physical brain structure. My statement that the contents of consciousness provide the continuity and the separation of observers is similar to the comp statement that it is the continuity of calculation that provides the cohesion of the 1p perspective. > > (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of > other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as > belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the > owner of a specific physical brain). > > Except it was the structure and implicitly the algorithms of a specific > physical brain > that provided the continuity. > > > I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's > like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must > ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every > manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). > > Well, have you experienced them? I remember some experiences but > certainly not all. > Have I? I don't know! I remember being a ten year old, but only a few snapshots. Nevertheless I'm sure I lived every second of being ten. I would not expect to remember every life I have lived/will live (consciousness is out of time, so I can't really put a tense on it). > > What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. > Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is > no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we > grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. > And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal > society, since > > everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every > action they commit? > > That's pretty much the Hindu idea, but I don't think they are notably more > altruistic. > Do they 'grok it deep down'? People espouse beliefs with which they have been enculturated without really believing them at a deep experiential level. > > Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. > > Or, no matter what I steal it's OK because it was really mine anyway. > > Ha ha. That would be more like solipsism, and very short sighted. > > Brent > > > Of course, if comp is true, moral action becomes meaningless in one > sense since everything happens anyway, so you will be on the receiving end > of all actions, both good and bad. > > > > On Monday, June 11, 2012 12:20:06 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: > > On 6/10/2012 6:12 PM, Pierz wrote: > > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and > eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. > > It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality > (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible > experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about > comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a > paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic > freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether > the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same > consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who > was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who > will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? > > This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the > question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be > scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have?" Will they be > happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I > don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine > dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the > continuity between the pre-dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can > only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes > 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. > > There's continuity of physical structure (I think that's what > 'reassembled' means). I > don't know what 'continuity of self-reference' means? Anyway this is not > a thought > experiment. The atoms in your body get replaced as you live, it is only > the structure > that is, approximately, conserved. > > > But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in > a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. > > Happens to me all the time. > > > Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried > about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? > What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer > recognizable as me? > > Are you worried that you may experience a heart attack in 20yrs? Are you > eating a > cheeseburger? > > > Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that > the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates > subjectivities is the contents of consciousness > > That seems to me a tautology; just an implicit definition of > "subjectivities"? > > > (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of > other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as > belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the > owner of a specific physical brain). > > Except it was the structure and implicitly the algorithms of a specific > physical brain > that provided the continuity. > > > I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's > like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must > ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every > manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). > > Well, have you experienced them? I remember some experiences but > certainly not all. > > > What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. > Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is > no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we > grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. > And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal > society, since > > everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every > action they commit? > > That's pretty much the Hindu idea, but I don't think they are notably more > altruistic. > > > Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. > > Or, no matter what I steal it's OK because it was really mine anyway. > > Brent > > > Of course, if comp is true, moral action becomes meaningless in one > sense since everything happens anyway, so you will be on the receiving end > of all actions, both good and bad. > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/smi9zoX5DhkJ. 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