On 6/26/2012 10:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jun 2012, at 21:01, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
<mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to step
4.
I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observation that sometimes we don't know what
we're going to do, or was that step 2?
Step 2 is that the diary of the one teleported does not mention the delays of
reconstitution in absence of third person clue.
Step 3, is that no machine can predict the content of its personal future diaries
content in self-multiplication experience.
Step 4 is a mix of step 2 and 3, and makes the observation that if P(W) P(M) = 1/2, say,
in the WM-duplication experience, then P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the same experience except
that an asymmetrical delay of reconstitution has been introduced.
> You ignore that we can test inequalities, even without probability. I do
produce
the description of the devices so that we can test the hypotheses.
Then tell me of an experiment that a scientist can perform in a lab where if X>Y then
your theory is wrong but if Y> X then your theory is probably right, where X and Y are
objectively measurable quantities of some sort; just tell me what X and Y are.
Look at what is observable close enough. Comp predicts that the logic of those
observable will appear as being non boolean. Read the whole sane04 to see why, and how
that is made precise, for the non-booleanity is quantum, but not yet proved equivalent
with the QM quantum logic.
> but this does not mean that we cannot attach one mind to two different
machines,
Yes provided the machines were identical, or at least functionally identical.
We agree on this since the start.
> or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in different
environment,
If they were in different environments then the machines would not be identical or even
functionally identical and their associated minds would be different because they would
have different memories.
By the comp assumption, they can be copied and put in two different environments, so
that they will differentiate, and that is why they cannot predict their experience, even
in a prior state of complete information of the issuing protocol.
But that is true if you simply fell asleep and were whisked to Moscow or Washington. The
interesting claim is not the unpredictability, but the uncertainty of identity. If
something is faithfully copied, it no longer makes sense to refer to "it" as singular.
Brent
Or you have to put the substitution level in the infinitely down so as to make us non
duplicable, but then we are no more working in the comp theory.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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