On 7/1/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2012, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/30/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. How
this follows then?
Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all universal system
are equivalent.
Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can emulate any
Turing machine by a fortran program, and you can emulate any fortran program by a
Turing machine.
More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing machine, and you
can find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). This
means that not only those system compute the same functions from N to N, but also that
they can compute those function in the same manner of the other machine.
But the question is whether they 'compute' anything outside the context of a physical
realization?
Which is addressed in the remaining of the post to Evgenii. Exactly like you can
emulate fortran with Turing, a little part of arithmetic emulate already all program
fortran, Turing, etc. (see the post for more).
Except neither fortran nor Turing machines exist apart from physical realizations. They
are abstractions.
There is no need of step 8, here. It is just a mathematical fact that arithmetic
emulates all programs, in the mathematical sense of "emulate".
That's a metaphorical sense. "Arithmetic" doesn't act or perform anything, it's concept
and a static, timeless one at that.
Brent
Step 8 just show that adding a substantial matter cannot make a difference from the
machines' points of view, without adding a non Turing emulable ability to the mind.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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