On 5 July 2012 18:05, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: *But we can already justify the relative indeterminacy of the relative > first person perspective, from what is an entirely deterministic background. > *
Hoyle wan't necessarily assuming comp (and nor do I when talking in this way). But the point which I have consistently tried to put to you is more basic. This is that "the relative indeterminacy of the relative first person perspective" already, by that very formulation, assumes without justification (albeit rather inexplicitly) some specific relative localisation within what is, more properly considered, an indifferent ensemble (e.g. UD* or alternatively some cosmological SWE). Hoyle's way of thinking makes the indeterminate localisation of experience explicit and * absolute* at the outset: he just imagines, in effect, what would it be "like" if the ensemble of all possible occasions of sentience were "unrolled" stochastically in a sort of eternal recurrence. This gives, effectively, a relative-frequency interpretation of the probability of any particular occasion being presently "given". *But then such stochastic process will interfere with the outcomes of duplication, and transportation, at least to make sense. But then it might be in conflict with computationalism.* I don't see why you think so. The experiences associated with each duplication or transportation outcome are assumed to be present in the deterministic substrate in due measure, and hence to occur in the associated stream of consciousness in due course. That there is always some given occasion of experience is consequent on an absolute first-personal indeteminism; relativisation to an episode of a particular personal history is then dependent on whatever deterministic substrate is associated with the given occasion. "Relative amnesia" (or selective memory) effectively compartmentalises first-personal histories from each other and is consequently transparent to "reconstitution delay". The above considerations seem so basic to our disagreement that rather than comment further on your other points, I will await your response to this. It is of course perfectly possible (not to say likely) that I am missing something basic here, so I am trying to be as explicit as possible. Let me know what, if anything, is still unclear. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
