Le 24-juil.-12, à 19:07, Stephen P. King a écrit :
On 7/24/2012 7:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-juil.-12, à 20:30, Stephen P. King a écrit :
On 7/23/2012 6:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If this is relevant for UDA, you should show to me. You start from
an assumption of some primitive physical reality.
Could you please explain to me why it is that you make this
claim in spite of repeated explanation that show the contrary?
Because despite you repeat that physics is not primary, you argue
that something is invalid in UDA by mentioning physical interactions,
and by referring to papers which assumes physicalism (implicitly or
explicitly). As I said you contradict yourself.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
It would be a contradiction if I where not qualifying the
definition of "physical interactions". Have you noticed that I mention
that I am putting the physical at the same level as the numbers, not
by making the physical primitive but instead by making the numbers
(the immaterial aspect as per your designation) occur (within my
approach) at the same level. Neither numbers nor physical objects are
primitive. Let me re-post something I wrote yesterday that you may
have missed:
The natural numbers, or something recursively equivalent, have to be
primitive (in my sense) by a theorem in logic. We cannot define the
natural numbers by assuming less.
On 7/22/2012 2:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Many (as implied by the word plural) is not just a number. A
plurality of 1p is a mapping function from some domain to some
co-domain (or range), no? If there is no distinction between the
domain and co-domain, what kind of map is it? Maybe it is an
automorphism, but it is not something that allows us to extract a
plurality over which variation can occur. You are talking as if the
variation was present but not allowing the means for that variation
to occur! The use of the word "plurality" is thus meaningless as you
are using it: "first person plural view of physical reality".
You must show first how it is that the plurality obtains without
the use of a space if you are going to make claims that there is no
space and yet plurality (of 1p) is possible. In the explanation that
you give there is discussion of Moscow, Helsinki and Washington.
These are locations that exists and have meaning in a wider context.
At least there is assumed to be a set of possible locations and that
the set is not a singleton (such as {0}) nor does it collapse into a
singleton.
Just use the plurality of the number relative situation among each
other. That works fine for the multidreams, and that is enough to
understand how the illusion of space and time occur (but not to get the
measure, which needs the mathematical treatment of self-reference).
and
On 7/22/2012 2:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
[SPK] If the computer is defined as a closed system then
solipsism automatically follows.
It is not define as a close system. that is even why it is natural
(but conceptually wrong) to put the infinite tape in the definition
of the universal machine. But the universal numbers are open in a
lot of sense. Now, even a closed computer, with a finite non
extensible memory, can emulate a plurality of observers, defeating
solipsim locally, if its memory is enough big.
Ah! Exactly! "...even a closed computer, with a finite non
extensible memory, can emulate a plurality of observers, defeating
solipsim locally, if its memory is enough big." YES! Defeating
solipsism locally. That is exactly what I am trying to discuss with
you, that is what the verbosity about "local measures" is trying to
convey. The "memory" is a resource, it is the computer's version of
space. It is where the plurality is necessary.
But those are purely arithmetical concepts.
Let us recap the idea so far: A Computer, defined abstractly, is
a closed system.
But it is not closed (except for diagonalization, but I guess that is
not in your sense).
It must be closed if it has a fixed point identity (ala Kleene
theorems) ,
That has nothing to do, or it is the closure for diagonalization, but
this makes the RE sets topologically open. You are quite confusing, and
I don't see your point of invalidity.
but this closure causes it to be solipsist. It cannot name anything
or have knowledge of anything that is not within the span of its
being. How do we solve this problem? We first have to accept the
problem. Like the alcoholic that wants rehabilitation, we must accept
that we are - as observers - solipsists, but there is a chance that
we are not doomed to this misery. If the memory of the computer is
"big enough" then there is a non-zero chance that the memory of a
separate and different computer has a state of its memory that is
identical. This allows for a partial bisimilarity to exist between
the two computers.
My idea is that if there is sufficient bisimilarity between a
disjoint pair of closed computational systems and if there is a
smooth transformation that allows homomorphisms of arbitrary states
within a memory, then the appearance of plurality of computational
observers is possible. The Stone duality then implies that if a
homomorphism between a pair of Boolean algebras exists then there is
a transformation between a pair of Stone spaces that exists. If
physics can be defined in terms of Stone spaces and abstract
computations in terms of Boolean algebras then the mind-body problem
is solved. There is no need to "reduce" the mind-body problem to a
body or a mind problem (in the singular sense). There is a reduction
to a Minds (plural) or Bodies (plural) problem, and this is the
interaction problem that I am trying to explain. If you would only
read that article on the Concurrency Problem in Wiki, this might have
been an easier journey.
The key is that I am considering the body problem (as you define
it in your discussion of UDA) to be the dual of the mind problem for
materialism.
Too vague. AUDA shows the existence of such a dulaity, but the mind is
not just the dual of matter, for the mind reality is a priori vastly
bigger than the physical realm. How do you treat the first person
indeterminacy in that duality?
Perhaps the only problem in our mutual understanding is vocabulary and
definitions of words. What we are considering is very subtle and hard
(almost impossible!) to define exactly. I need to be more patient in
my explanations.
The problem is typical in the dialog between science and philosophy,
and more servere when a point of philosophy is tretated with the
scientific method. We can discuss only when you grasp the technical
point, really (or find a possible flaw).
Do you understand the key isomorphism that is being postulated to
"connect" the physical with the mental aspects?
With comp it is not an isomorphism a priori. It might be, but that is
an open very hard problem (even to just formulate it).
It is the identification of a physical object with its best possible
computational simulation.
But we can't do that. If we do it for a mind person, its brain *is* an
emerging pattern on infinities of computations, interfering
statistically.
Keep in mind that comp makes both matter (apparent primitive matter)
and consciousness not Turing-emulable a priori.
It for this reason that I insist that we cannot disconnect the mental
world of mathematics (including any form of number or arithmetic -
including {N, +, *} - from the physical world of objects.
Logically you are right, for the first implies the second, but only at
the epistemological level.
There must be at least one physical system that can implement a given
computation for that computation to qualify for universality.
That is plain wrong. I guess you are changing the sense of
universality. I use it in the usual Post-Turing-Church-Kleene-Markov
sense.
Given that ypou say "physical suystem are not primitive", I don't know
what you mean by physical.
Of course universality demands that the computation can operate on
any functionally equivalent system, so there is an invariance with
respect to function, but the equivalence class "pivots" on the
necessity that it can actually be run on a physical system.
Which physical system? Where does it come from. What is it? What is
your theory?
Otherwise computations (as per the abstract theory of Universal
Turing Machines) would have nothing at all to do with physical
computers and be a purely mental exercise of fantasy.
You still evade to criticize UDA which shows that if we are machine
(even just physical machine) then physics is derivable from
aritthmetic. It is a theorem in applied logic, once you accept the
classical very wide definition of knowledge and belief.
Have you understand the step 7? It shows that comp + robust physical
universe already makes physics a branch of number theory. Then step 8
shows that the assumption of a robust physical universe (or any primary
physical universe) is a red herring: it simply cannot work, making
observable matter necessarily non primary (making primitive matter into
an epinoumenon).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
