On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:19, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 6:30 AM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au
> wrote:
> But he[me] agrees and even proposes a compatibilist definition [of
free will]
> I'll let him speak to that, but its not the impression I get.
All I said was that the only definition of "free will" that is not
gibberish is the inability to always know what you will do next even
in a unchanging environment, the meaning is clear and its not self
contradictory.
OK. We agree on that.
I also said my definition was rarely used by anybody, is
intellectually shallow, and has zero value;
Not wen you succeed to formalize it. Then you can show, with computer
science that notion like free-will, or consciousness, can have a role
in the speeding of the evolution processes. This is done with all
details in my long french text "conscience & mécanisme".
but even so that makes it vastly superior to any other definition of
that two word phrase.
OK.
Bruno
John K Clark
> >No, but it does need 1-randomness
>
> Imagine the iterated WM-duplication. Why would the resulting peoples
> have more free will than the same person not doing the experience?
> It seems to me that if a decision relies on a perfect coin, it is
> less "free" than if it relies on my partial self-indetermination,
> which itself is a deterministic process, although I cannot see it.
>
Assuming the coin is operating inside the agent's body? Why would that
be considered non-free?
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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